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**Reforms, Adaptation
and Breakthrough**

**The Sources of and Limits
to Institutional Changes in Poland**

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INTRODUCTION

In this book I present an interpretation of the changes which have been taking place in Poland since 1989. It is not, however, the history of the downfall of communism and the structure of this work has not been organized on a chronological basis. The interpretation of changes being proposed here fits into the mainstream of institutional sociology. When I speak about changes, I refer mostly to the changes in the economy, although political changes are also present in my analysis.

In this work I look at three fundamental sources of change. I define these as changes within the system, changes outside the system, and changes to the system. Changes within the system are the reforms, changes outside the system are the diverse forms of adaptation mechanisms, consisting of "transgressing" the framework of formal rules, while the change to the system is the radical transformation initiated by the downfall of communism in 1989-90.

We are dealing in Poland with the simultaneous existence of those three sources of change. Moreover, these sources influence one another. We can say that the reforms which never were successful and consistent under communism influenced, however, the shape of the system. Their influence was visible also in the fact that the unsuccessful attempts at reforms accelerated the erosion of the system. Changes "outside the system" contributed to that erosion, while they also exerted an influence on the changes within the system. In this work I indicate how certain new mechanisms, initially located in the informal sphere, penetrated into the official programs of reforms. Finally, both the changes within the system and the changes outside the system have contributed in a certain way to the change of the system, that is to its radical transformation.

Since the beginning of the transformation remaining sources of dynamics have not, however, disappeared. Within the radical transformation of the economy we still hear echoes of earlier reforms.

Similarly, the informal adaptation processes, which substituted true legitimation under communism, have not disappeared in the post-communist period either. However, the functions of those mechanisms are frequently completely different from the original ones. One of my theses states that the sources of changes discussed here under certain conditions become obstacles to changes. The mechanisms which led to the erosion and the downfall of communism often hamper further transformation. The dynamics of change and continuity is one of the most important subjects of my work. In principle, each of the sources of changes analyzed in this book in certain situations becomes also an obstacle to the subsequent changes.

This applies to the reforms, which, after all, apart from modifying the shape of the system also lead to the consolidation of its fundamental features. Moreover, in the post-communist period certain elements of the "reformatory" thinking, inherited from the former system, such as the planned, rigid character of changes or the greater importance of a passive tolerance than of an active social participation, can, after initially aiding the changes, hinder further transformations.

A similarly equivocal role was played by the informal adaptation processes. They modified the communist system and actually led to its erosion. However, they can simultaneously impede radical transformations toward a market economy. An example here would be the second economy, the rules of which, although they departed from the rigidity of the command economy, were, however, and are distant from those of a normal market economy.

Finally, the systemic breakthrough itself contains not only dynamizing elements but also seeds of barriers to changes. The dynamics of the ongoing transformation has made it very clear to us how enormous is the difference between the logic, mechanisms, and social forces of the downfall of the old order and the logic, mechanisms, and social forces of the construction of the new order. The difference between the downfall of the old system and the formation of the new one is fundamental. What served the first aim is often dysfunctional in the second. There are many indications of this difference. Among them one could certainly mention the dramatic change in the position of workers. The main heroes of the downfall of communism, which had been achieved through their activeness, have transformed themselves into a non-homogenous, differentiated group. The economic interests

of this group are often seriously threatened, and its political position is weaker not only when compared with the final period of communism, but also paradoxically weaker when compared to the communist period. An analysis of these paradoxes of change and continuity constitutes an important theme in this work.

Therefore, the basic assumption of the book is the author's conviction of the continuity of processes of change. They did not begin with the transformation of the political order, although it had a radical importance for their acceleration. Analogously, the barriers to changes are not a feature specific to communism, for we are dealing with them at present as well.

The acceptance of such an assumption forejudges the character of this work. I reject in it the view according to which the change taking place in Poland and in the region of Central Europe is a direct transition from totalitarianism to democracy. I believe that such a definition of the essence of present changes mistakes its ideological vision for the true picture. Communism was neither - at least its Polish version - a realization of the totalitarian model (though the government had the intention of realizing this model), nor at present can we speak about the realization of the democratic model. This ideological vision is present in some approaches of the "transition to democracy" type, concentrating on the study of that transition from the point of view of the model of destination. This perspective is, in principle, nonexistent in my work. I am trying to substitute it with a different one, according to which the processes taking place should be studied without any far-reaching assumptions about their direction. Therefore, analyzing the final period of communism I suggest an approach other than the totalitarian approach, and explaining the present changes I concentrate more on their barriers and their hidden logic than on accentuating the democratic aim of those changes, which, nevertheless, is socially desirable.

I have already mentioned that this work is not a historical analysis of the downfall of communism and of the changes that have followed. This justifies my focusing on selected problems. I have been interested in those which relate to the three distinguished sources of change. Therefore, it is not chronology, but this distinction, which constitutes the basis of the structure of my work.

In the first chapter I discuss the three principle sources of change and the relations between them.

In the second chapter I analyze the reforms and their limits. The first part of the chapter concerns the limits to economic reform at the close of communism. In this part I advance a thesis on the evolution of limits to reforms at the close of the communist period. Before the downfall of communism, apart from the limitations of a political nature, there have emerged limits which I call "civilizational," and which go beyond pure politics and concern rather the disputes between more general ideologies.

Apart from that, evidence supporting the thesis on the evolution of limits to reforms was the change and the approximation of the positions of the communist government and that of the hitherto still illegal Solidarity. As early as in the Spring of 1987, both of these political forces have strongly emphasized in their programs the importance of market reforms, and both, compared to their earlier positions, to some degree weakened their support for self-governmental options. The empirical analysis of the hitherto published programs, which I present in the chapter 2.1, entitles me to advance such a thesis. This thesis, it seems, is of crucial importance to the understanding of the evolutionary character of the systemic breakthrough in Poland: the will to move toward the market was visible among the Polish communist elites at least two years before the Round Table talks.

In the second part of this chapter I will analyze the limits of and barriers to the present changes. One of those barriers is the very fact that the present transformations are to a certain degree being undertaken as a "paradigm of the reform." This, in turn, can cause a certain rigidity of changes (their inflexibility). Moreover, it results in the paradox of the post-communist transformations mentioned earlier. It consists in the fact that the changes, the goal of which is to promote social, economic, and political activeness, are implemented "from above," by the elites (see, e.g., C. Offe's concept of "political capitalism") expecting a passive acceptance of masses rather than their activeness. It is thus an inconsistency between the goal to be achieved (activeness and flexibility) and the methods for its realization (its rigidity and control "from above," which is usually characteristic of reforms).

The third chapter is devoted to an analysis of extra-systemic informal adaptive processes. I discuss them as mechanisms substituting legitimation. The first part of the chapter is devoted to the analysis of the role of those mechanisms at the close of communism, while in the

second part I analyze the problems of legitimation after its downfall. The thesis of the whole chapter concerns two crises of legitimation. The first one, before the downfall, was a crisis of the lack of legitimacy, while the second, after the downfall, is a crisis of the formula for legitimation of the first post-communist period. It consists in the fact that the post-communist transformations cannot be justified by the ethos and the legitimating mechanisms of the first, "workers" Solidarity. In other words: the construction of capitalism requires a different kind of legitimation than does aiming at the downfall of communism. In this work as a whole, the analysis of the first post-communist period (1989-90) takes up an important part, because that period had its own interesting logic and dynamics.

Finally, in the fourth chapter I present theses about the dynamics of the transformation itself, the dynamics of "the change of the system." It is in a sense a summary of many themes of this work, and the general thesis concerns the radical evolution of social strategies and structures: from the active adaptation during communism, through the passive politization of the first post-communist phase to the active depolitization in the second phase in 1990-93.

* * *

This work sums up a period of several years of studies undertaken by the author. Its initial idea, developed at the end of the 1980's, underwent a far-reaching modification which was an inevitable reflection of the changes taking place. However, during all that time I have attempted to fulfil the main goal of my work, namely the analysis of mutual permeation of the processes of change and continuity, of rejection and adaptation, that is all the things owing to which there is so much continuity in changes, and owing to which in the continuity there are hidden seeds of changes.

Two fragments of this work appeared earlier in the form of articles. One of them (chapter 2.1) was published in Polish, the other (chapter 3.2) - in English. I present them in a modified and updated form.

CHAPTER 1

REFORMS, ADAPTATION, AND BREAKTHROUGH: CONTINUITY OF CHANGE AND TRANSFORMATION

1.1. SOURCES OF CHANGES IN COMMAND ECONOMIES¹

Can one speak of changes in command economies? Common opinion about such economies claims that these entities were rigid, centralized, and invariable. Their stability and conservative character were usually said to be conditioned by political factors. Sociologists and economists have demonstrated that it was the political fear of losing control over the economy that led to the relinquishing of economic reforms, the aim of which was to grant enterprises a certain independence and autonomy.

The economic system, however, did undergo changes, though reforms failed. It is therefore necessary to differentiate between reforms and changes. A reform is a specific type of change. In the literature of the subject it is distinguished from rapid, revolutionary changes and from unintentional and spontaneous ones (Lamentowicz 1987). Generally speaking, reforms are accepted as a variety of planned change. The distinction between reforms and changes is useful in that it allows us to refer to the role of each of these mechanisms as to sources of dynamics. Obviously, systems do not change exclusively through planned reforms or only through spontaneous changes. In this section I would like to go further than merely adopt one of the presented points of view. I intend to consider the mutual relationship between reforms and spontaneous changes. In my opinion this problem had special significance in Poland, because we were witness to two parallel processes: that of the failure to introduce economic reform and that of changes in the social and economic behavior of various social groups. The parallelism of these

¹ This section of chapter 1 is based on some parts of my article "Industrial enterprise during economic reform: factor of stability or change?" *The Polish Sociological Bulletin*, no. 2 (86): 1989, Wrocław: Ossolineum 1990.

two processes justifies the thesis that in Poland spontaneous changes were more common than planned reforms. More precisely speaking, it appears that deviations from the centralized model of management took place rather by way of spontaneous changes (so often analyzed by economists and sociologists) than through planned reform. Two types of such spontaneous changes may be distinguished:

(1) violent changes characteristic of social riots and revolts - there were several of these in post-war Poland;

(2) "everyday" changes accompanying various adaptation processes by way of which people try to modify the centralized system.

This second type of spontaneous changes is the subject of this section. My intention is to reflect on their functions and to answer (among others) the following question: Did the adaptation processes "from below" always change the system or - maybe paradoxically - may they be ascribed a stabilizing function? The differentiation between two basic processes - the reforms "from above" and the changes "from below" - enables me to ask several questions about their relationship and mutual influence. While analyzing these issues I will refer to a hypothesis about a certain evolution of ideas and reformatory solutions. It seems that certain spontaneous, "from below" attempts at changing the system (expressed in the increase of "extrasystemic" aspirations and trends towards private models of economy) had to a certain degree penetrated into the official reformatory propositions. This will be analyzed in the next chapter.

I would like now to elaborate on the thesis that in Poland during the last period of communism we were dealing more with changes than with reforms.

At first glance, the systems of real socialism seemed to be rigid, centralized entities, unyielding to changes. Such features as a planned economy and a nearly complete monopoly in the sphere of politics were usually considered basic manifestations of their rigidity. However, the "reality of real socialism" to some extent strayed from this portrayal. One can say that such depiction referred to the ideological rather than the everyday shape of the system (Orzeł 1986). In practice, we saw constant dynamics; the centralized methods of management were "caked" with networks of informal, adaptive bargaining processes, and solutions which "monopolized" other spheres of life often led to

impetuous demonopolization. These processes have been frequently analyzed by sociologists and economists.

Can these processes which modify the system be seen as due to reforms? Did change always imply a reform, i.e. a planned and conscious attempt at introducing changes? To some degree, certainly - but not entirely. I would like to defend the thesis that the system (together with the sphere of economy management) yielded rather to unintentional, spontaneous changes, while planned changes with their accompanying ideology, that is economic reforms, usually failed. This took place because the system had somehow acquired the ability of neutralizing reforms which had become a natural element of Polish post-war history. This led to a rather paradoxical situation where various spontaneous attempts at changes were more readily noticed than planned and effective reforms. The mechanisms of the "second economy," for example, the various adaptive strategies of enterprises and social groups were formed more readily and seemed to be more effective than the officially declared reforms.

This bespeaks of at least two phenomena. First of all society did not stand idly by awaiting reforms but it tried to deal with problems as best it could, either through the "second economy," earning money abroad, or through other "extrasystemic" and "extrareformatory" methods. Secondly, this means that even if the offer and promise of reform were finally, consistently carried out, such might be of interest to a much smaller group of people. The scale of this "extrasystemic" activity should not, of course, be overestimated. It was not equally accessible to all. The point, however, is that a certain pattern of social and economic behavior was created, and it was neither passive waiting nor active pressure for reforms "from above." People tried to solve problems on a scale which they saw possible. This process has been a subject of interest for sociologists (e.g. Marody 1987) and economists (e.g. Bednarski 1985; Gruszecki 1986) who draw attention to the role of changes in spheres not controlled by the state. For the moment, let us put aside the problem of whether these phenomena stimulated the reform or blocked its chances for success. According to the thesis of this book, they played both roles: stabilizing and changing. No doubt as result of these spontaneous patterns of behavior, in the long run the system underwent certain changes, though the direction of the change was often different from what it might have been as result of planned

changes based on democratic procedures. I merely want to stress the fact that society, that people, to the best of their ability, tried to fill in the gap created by the indecision of reformers. I am therefore strongly against the opinion that it was the apathy and passive attitude of our society that impeded the progress of reforms.

In discussing the relations between reforms and spontaneous changes, reference must be made to some attempts at the theoretical conceptualization of both types of processes. Some Polish economists and sociologists referred in their works to the differentiation center/periphery, which constitutes a suitable framework for analyzing the relations between reforms and spontaneous changes. As illustration I can quote the analyses of K. Kloc and P. Marciniak (1988) as well as the works of J. Staniszkis (1987), who while not using this term directly, expressed her opinion about the role of changes outside the "socialist system of economy" and of those within it. We should not overlook a large number of works deriving in some way from studies of life styles. The subjects of analyses were alternative styles of life, behavior, alternative institutions and their attitude towards official ones. Those authors who have investigated the sources of the stability of real socialism systems suggest the analysis of "stabilizers" which are substitutes for legitimacy. Various adaptive processes are enumerated - they were "active," which means that adaptation did not only occur in relation to the institutional system, but that through various informal measures and deviation from official rules, the institutional system itself also underwent changes. These processes, therefore, were substitutes for legitimacy and also in a sense, substitutes for reforms. They will be analyzed in the chapter 3.1.

To include these spontaneous attempts at changes (not revolutionary but "everyday") in the category of adaptation processes may at first seem a paradox. Adaptation is usually associated with stability, not with change. This paradox reflects the vagueness of the basic function of these processes: did they dynamize the system or stabilize it? Did they stimulate the process of reform or impeded it (Stark 1992)? In discussions on this subject one can easily fall into the trap of seeming paradoxes and barren scholasticism. Also in the case of reform one can say that their ultimate aim is to reinforce the system through change,

but such which takes place within it. Thus, a lot here depends on the precision of terminology. Such precision helps to overcome the seeming paradox that spontaneous, informal attempts at changes, both stabilized the system and, in the long run, changed it (though this may not be noticeable at once). This imperceptibility is due to the fact that the limits of what was "socialism" and what was not were not precisely determined.

While considering the relations between such spontaneous, adaptive attempts at changes "from below" and reforms, it is easy to conclude that opinions in this subject widely vary. They range from opinions that these spontaneous, "extrasystemic" behaviors were the only significant reform existing in Poland, to the stance that they blocked reform. The former is to a certain degree present in one of the works of T. Gruszecki (1986), where among other matters he wrote: "We observe the formation of market mechanisms in various, isolated as yet segments of the economy. This process cannot be reversed. Everybody is looking for such a mechanism in the state owned sector of the economy while they appear elsewhere. This process is the ally of households" (p. 46). On the other hand, K. Kloc and P. Marciniak (1988), submitted a thesis that equally significant changes occurred both at the peripheries and in the core of the system. Still another opinion was expressed in the analysis of J. Staniszkis (1987) who discussed the dilemma of choice between two types of economic reform. One is to "institutionalize" the second economy and controlled expansion of the private sector. The second was privatization within state-owned sectors of the economy. The author was of the opinion that to institutionalize these peripheries would mean the reinforcement of "system-supporting structures." It would follow that she considered that such measures would block the true privatization of state owned sectors. A similar opinion we can find in M. Marody's (1987c) paper, in which she stated that the individual strategies could not be transformed to the systemic changes. There are also further opinions. A. Iwanowska (1988) analyzed the role of the private sector in the state economy and she opposes Marody's idea. In my opinion two dimension of changes were significant here: the proximity to the "core" of the system and the type of changes which occur (e.g. privatization or "socialization" through self-management). I will deal with this in detail in further parts of this section.

Between these stances there is still room for many other, intermediate opinions. For instance, quite a sensible hypothesis is that although "extrasystemic" and spontaneous changes of the "peripheries" could not be seen as a real substitute for state reform of the economic system, they did stimulate it and coerced transformations in the state-owned sector of the economy.² Using analogies from the field of sociology of organization, one could say that such changes in the environment coerced adaptation processes in the state-owned sector, and this in turn might lead to transformations in the structure of this sector and to the general change of its functioning. This hypothesis is noteworthy because it draws attention to the mutual relationship of these two types of processes, as well as to the influence of "extrasystemic," spontaneous changes on the shape of official reforms. I think that such influence cannot be excluded *a priori*: that is why an attempt at complete separation and juxtaposition of processes at the "peripheries" and those taking place in the "centre" is risky.

Among various intermediate stances and opinions yet another is worth noting. These processes "from below" can be seen not as the reform proper or its substitute, but rather as phenomena complementary to it. In my opinion this seems to be the most reasonable interpretation. In the last period of communism there were many interpretations of various alternative manners of behavior, styles of life, work, etc. This in connection with the failure of systemic reform caused the impression that these alternative changes were substitutes for the reform or maybe even were the reform itself. The whole of society, however, could not "step outside" the system. Besides, there was no reason to relieve the state of its responsibility for solving the problem of real systemic changes. The "complementary" stance therefore, is in my view much more realistic than the "substitutive" one.³

² For this idea I am indebted to prof. Włodzimierz Brus. We can study this process on several levels. Anna Iwanowska (1988) showed how on the technological and organizational level the private sector modernizes the state-owned enterprise through the process of cooperation. We can also see that some "market" ideas were grafted onto the official reform program, though firstly they were located "outside" the state economy (see next chapter).

³ Introducing the complementary and substitutive approach I refer to the distinction of Morawski 1986. See also Iwanowska, Federowicz and Żukowski 1986.

However, one might submit a thesis that when there were also no real economic and political reforms the "substitutive" function of an "extrasystemic" mechanism would ultimately imply the change of the system itself, while their "complementary" function would rather stabilize the system in an unchanged form.

Generally speaking, I would be of the opinion that relationships between systemic reforms and "extrasystemic," spontaneous attempts at changes were multilateral. In my view, these processes became allies of systemic reforms rather than their substitutes. In certain circumstances however, some of them (e.g. "second economy") blocked the reform.

Why was it that in the last years of communism the scale of these "extrasystemic" behaviors had so noticeably increased? The first argument draws attention to the role of social activity in dealing with situations of crisis when no systemic reform existed. But again there is need for a second explanation which answers the question of why the state tolerated these alternative mechanisms. There are several answers. First of all, the significant fact is that "peripheral" transformations might - according to the government - for a certain period of time have reduced both the need for reforming the system itself and the social pressure towards it. Besides, according to the already quoted J. Staniszkis, these processes might have preserved, and stabilized, the core of the system. Let us add still another factor: the state hoped that in this way responsibility and costs of the reform would be partially reduced. There is still another possible explanation. Tolerance of these "extrasystemic" changes and adaptation mechanisms might testify of the process of further determining the limits of the system. Tolerance of any deviation from official rules implied that the state located it outside the system. Perhaps, then, the expansion of these "peripheries" meant that the state, while minimalizing the sphere of its monopoly, wanted at the same time to have better control over what is left (cf. Kloc and Marciniak 1988). This hypothesis is not very probable because the process of including something within a "system" and of placing something else in "extrasystemic" spheres was never brought to an end during communism, despite calls for doctrinal purity which appeared from time to time. The next section of this chapter deals with the relationships between different sources of changes in post-communist times.

1.2. THE POST-COMMUNIST PERIOD: LIMITS TO THE REFORM PARADIGM AND OTHER SOURCES OF CHANGE

My thesis is that there are three main sources of the institutional (mainly economic) changes: previous reforms, spontaneous processes of adaptation, and political breakthrough. Each of these sources of the change is also the source of the specific limits to it. Let us start with the role of the reforms.

The history of the communist system in Poland is the history of its reforms. Except for the period of Stalinism, which was more a period of the forming of the new order, each of the political leaderships started with the ideology of change and reform, and none of them put this ideology into practice. By reform I mean here a change that is prepared by the ruling elite, is planned and fits within the logic of the system. Why were reforms so attractive for communist elites and why were they never implemented? After the first years of imposed industrialization (Morawski 1980) communist economic systems reached the limits of their effectiveness (Gomułka 1989, p.1). The need for improving economic efficiency became one of the most important factors shaping political life under communism. This was why each political leadership tried to legitimize itself through the ideology of economic reform, but, due to the fact that the reform proposals always called for the decentralization of decision making, the reforms collapsed. The fear of losing political control over the economy was one of the most important reasons. In this way the issue of reform revealed its political character. Demand for reform was one of the important slogans of the political opposition made up of the revisionists within the elite and later also integrating dissent movements. Limits to the reforms were an important political issue. But starting from the mid-1980's the very notion of reform revealed its limits. After many years of using this slogan without implementing it, the slogan itself lost its credibility and was perceived more as a propaganda tool than an instrument of change. There are data that confirm this phenomenon. In sociological research carried out in 1988, it was found that society perceived that the power elite was the strongest supporter of the reform. At the same moment the prestige of the reform supporters was rather low. As a result the reform was not supported by any prestigious group (Adamski and Rychard 1989), reflecting the delegitimization of the

reform slogan. Reform was supported mainly by the power elite and by representatives of some intellectual groups, such as scientists and journalists. On the other hand, the groups that could support the reform because of their interests, such as representatives of the private sector were located low on both the scales of support and of prestige. The notion of the economic reform during the last period of communist rule seemed to be more an issue for politicians and for intellectuals than one for other interests groups. Overintellectualization of the reform is, in my opinion, a stable feature of the thinking about Polish reforms. My thesis is that, although the reform paradigm generally cannot explain ongoing changes, it does have some limited usefulness. The post-communist changes repeat some important elements of the reform pattern, and this is also the source of limits to these changes. This thesis will be elaborated later on, after I discuss the role of other sources of change.

The second source of economic changes are spontaneous adaptation processes. By spontaneous processes I mean all the adaptive processes through which people were trying to adapt to the centralized system. This was to some extent a reciprocal process with society trying to adapt itself to the system while also modifying it. Opportunities were provided by phenomena such as informal structures in the enterprises, bargaining processes between enterprises and their supervisors, visits abroad to earn money, and the parallel economy.

If reform was the change, or attempted change, within the framework of the system, these phenomena were often outside the system or, to be more precise, outside its official sphere. As a result, the system was modified to some extent, becoming less centralized and rigid.

Despite the disputes on the role of these phenomena, the most important thing is that some of the elements of these "extrasystemic" mechanisms that were formerly located on the periphery of the system also influenced its center. Consequently, the changes outside the system influenced the system itself. For example, the ideas of privatization and competitive markets were at first present only in the informal activities outside the official system but later on penetrated the official reform programs, not only those of Solidarity but also to some extent the communist reform program of 1987 (which I will analyze in the next chapter). Finally, after the political breakthrough of 1989 they became the pillars of the Solidarity government's economic program.

However, society was sure that these extrasystemic mechanisms could not be a substitute for the real reform of the core of the system. In the study "Poles 88," respondents were asked about the future they wanted for their children. The idea of this question was to analyze the popularity of the intrasystemic and extrasystemic life strategies. Intrasystemic strategies included a job in a state-sector, work devoted to the country and other people, and a political career. Among the extrasystemic strategies were emigration, a job in a private sector, work that could yield easy gains, and a job in the state-sector with the possibility of parallel economy activity. Table 1 shows the popularity of these different strategies.

Table 1.

Parental preferences of intra and extrasystemic life strategies for the child*

Intrasystemic		Extrasystemic	
Find an enjoyable and lucrative job in the state sector	78.7	Go abroad, earn some money and come back	36.5
Do something for the country and the people	76.5	Find a job in the private sector	14.5
Try to make a political career	-66.1	Find a job in the state sector with the possibility of the parallel economy work	-31.7

Source: Rychard 1989, pp. 422-3.

* Percentages of net support are "yes" answers minus "no" answers.

The results show that, for the majority of people, the state-owned sector of the economy was the most important frame of reference when planning the future of their children. Only a political career was completely unpopular during the last year of communism. One can argue that after the political and economic breakthrough, this picture would be different. It is possible, for example, that the support for work in the private sector will be greater. But the reason I have presented these data is to show that during the fall of communism, where there was no real systemic reform, the expectations toward the state-sector were quite great. The extrasystemic strategies, though popular, were not perceived as real substitutes for intrasystemic reform. They were instead considered to be complementary mechanisms. For example, in the whole sample the biggest group (42.4 percent) consisted of those

respondents who simultaneously advised their children to find a job in the state-sector and also in the private sector, as they probably wanted to maximize the opportunities for their children.

These results are especially interesting in view of the previous data showing the erosion of the credibility of the notion of reform. Society did not believe in the reforms, but simultaneously it expected a lot from the state-owned sector and placed its aspirations mainly on it. These two contradictory beliefs combined reflect the scope of social frustration.

Finally the time for radical reform has come. Did these spontaneous adaptation mechanisms survive or not? There is some evidence that many of these mechanisms of the active adaptation from the period when the system was not modified and people adjusted to it still existed during the era of the Balcerowicz plan (Kolarska and Rychard 1990). Such phenomena as the parallel economy, corruption, and informal networks seem to be more universal rather than connected only with the communist system. It is possible that their continued existence can create obstacles to the program of economic transformation. The third and the most important source of economic change is the political breakthrough of 1989-90. Although communists in their last years tried to introduce some market measures into the economic system, their measures were, as usual, inconsistent, due to the ideological and social constraints they faced. This was not the case with the new Solidarity government. The ideological bias of a planned economy was rejected, and the tremendous social support for the new government gave it the greatest chance in post-war Poland for real economic change. As a matter of fact, the economic change promoted by the new government was a part of a general transformation from the communist to the post-communist system. From this point of view, the change reveals two most important features. It combines the radical character of the economic transformation with evolutionary and non-violent political change. The "big bang" approach in the economy was necessary because of the depth of the Polish crisis. Poland, with a 1989 per capita GNP of about 22 percent of that of the United States came only before Romania among the European communist countries in terms of living standards. Moreover, this per capita GNP was estimated to be equal to just 98 percent of the 1980 GNP (*Eastern Europe...*, 1990, p. 4). On the other hand, the Polish communists rather smoothly decided to give up power and maybe this was the reason

why political changes were rather evolutionary. This evolutionary character of change in which some institutional mechanisms of political pluralism are still not developed sometimes is regarded to be not only chance for transformation, but also its constraint. I will deal with this later on.

To sum up we have to deal with three sources of changes:

- (1) reforms, which were the attempts at change in the system with maintaining its identity, were planned, and were made from above,
- (2) spontaneous processes of adaptation, which were the attempts at change outside the system, and
- (3) the political breakthrough, i.e., the change of the system.⁴

All of them interacted with each other in the primary phase of post-communism. Factors (1) and (2) are the legacy of communism, but they are in play now also. According to the thesis of my book, each of these three sources of change could also be regarded as a limit to change. Each economic reform and transformation touches upon the problem of the system's identity. Communism in Poland never had a clear, well defined identity. This provided some opportunities for the reforms: it was very hard to define their limits since the limits of the system were not precisely defined. But there was one concrete limit, the dominance of the communist party in political and economic life, and this was the core of the system's identity. Any real reform could not succeed in these conditions. To overcome this limit meant a change of the system. If someone still wants to defend the thesis that communism is or was reformable, such would be possible only in the case where we understand the reform as the end of a communism. But what type of identity does the post-communist period have, if any?

⁴ The distinction between changes within the system and changes to the system is present in the literature (Boskoff 1976, p. 345). A. Kamiński (1988) makes a distinction between reform (which is implemented within the system's identity) and revolution (which changes this identity). The concept of reform as a change that is radical but still fits the system's rules is accepted by Polish scholars (Kowalik 1988; Balcerowicz 1985). In this three-element typology I use some distinctions presented in the concept of the "fourfold system" (Rychard 1987). I would like also to recall A. Kamiński's (1989; 1992, p. 256) concept of the three policies of the communist state toward society: coercion, corruption, and reform. However, I do not analyze the policies of the state, but rather sources of changes (see also chapter 3.1, pp. 82-3).

Post-communism is to some extent a period of no system, neither communism, nor any new order. By analogy, it also seems to be at first glance the period of no identity. The legacies of previous reforms, spontaneous informal strategies, and the political breakthrough have been mixed together during this time. But within this mixture we can see some logic which created the elements of the systemic identity of the post-communist period.

The collapse of the communist system has provoked one more discussion regarding the economic reforms. According to some opinions, the source of this collapse lies in the very nature of the economic reforms. Attempts at their implementation have eroded the centralistic legitimacy of the system (Nee 1992). On the other hand, we can say that the collapse of this system resulted not from the reforms but from the lack of them. The tragedy of the communist institutional system consists of the fact that both opinions are true. A. Kamiński put it in such a way: "Thus, the Soviet leadership faces a Catch-22 situation: both the decision to reform and the decision not to reform carry dramatic threats" (Kamiński 1992, p. 336).

However, even if the economic reforms were unsuccessful, they contributed to the final erosion of the system, not because of the successes of the reforms but as a result of their failures and rising social expectations. It paved the way to the fundamental change of the system.

1.3. CHANGES AND LIMITS TO IT: CONCLUSIONS

Let me start with one of the theses mentioned above: the sources of changes are simultaneously the limits to it. In the case of the reforms we can say that their "limiting" role consists of some rigidity and inflexibility which is embodied in the reforms' programs. The extrasystemic, spontaneous, and adaptive processes can also slow transformation. The problem is whether their rules and mechanisms are in line with market reform or are spoiling them. I am of the opinion that sometimes they do not adapt themselves to the market environment but adapt market rules to themselves, modifying them. Similarly, many informal processes which survived the collapse of communism (and contributed to it) changed their form though their

nature remained the same. This is the case of corruption which moved from consumer markets to the capital market, but its core features survived. Finally, the political breakthrough and its features also has some constraining influence. This is the case of the main social actors who contributed to the collapse of communism. These were the groups of skilled industrial workers working in the big state enterprises. In the course of the transformation their structural base will be deeply modified, some enterprises will be privatized, some of them can even go bankrupt. This is threatening workers interests and may cause some groups of to tum against the revolution they helped to achieve.

All these phenomena will be analyzed in my book. The thesis that sources of changes are also the sources of limits to them may be understood in two ways. First, it means that some processes simultaneously play the dynamizing and stabilizing role. For example, the informal mechanisms while helping to fulfil peoples' interests and making the system work, simultaneously "implicated" social groups in it and stabilized the system. Second, some of these mechanisms at first played a dynamizing role and then their "limiting" character came into being. This happened to some extent in the case of workers who contributed to the collapse of the communism but for whom the emerging new order can be dangerous.

According to the general assumption of my book, there is a continuity of changes. The legacy of communism seen from this perspective is not only the legacy of stability. Communism has also created the sources of its dynamics, which contributed to its collapse but finally may endanger further transformation. One distinction is very important to me. It is a distinction between the collapse of the old system and the emergence of the new one. More than three years of post-communism has debunked one "transformational" myth: that the collapse of the old regime will instantly result in the creation of a new system based on the market and democracy. This view now definitely belongs to ideology, not to the scientific description of reality. In reality it turned out that we are witnessing a long and complicated post-communist period during which neither full market nor full democracy are in play. On the contrary, one can see many threats to the market and democracy. This justifies the distinction mentioned above. The logic and the social forces of the collapse are different than the logic and the actors of the creation of a new system.

The next myth which was debunked was that post-communism is the period of a chaotic mixture of the "old" and "new" elements and that it has no internal logic and identity. It is now clear that this mixture is not so chaotic and that it has its own dynamics, logic, and identity. This is also one of the assumptions which underlies my analysis.

The study of the role of the three sources of changes and their constraints will start with the analysis of the role of reforms. In the next chapter I will try to identify the main limits to the communist-led reforms and then I will analyze the post-communist reformatory limits.

CHAPTER 2

REFORMS AND THEIR LIMITS

2.1. LIMITS TO THE ECONOMIC REFORMS AT THE CLOSE OF COMMUNISM¹

2.1.1. INTRODUCTION

In the preceding chapter I advanced the thesis that the system of real socialism to a larger degree seemed to be undergoing changes which were unintentional, unplanned, and which were the unexpected results of planned actions, while the planned changes, with their own ideology (e.g. reforms), were usually unsuccessful. They were unsuccessful because the system somehow gained an ability to neutralize the reforms. The reforms themselves, on the other hand, became an element of history so natural, that one could even say that they were an instrument of exercising power, and not a method of changing it. On the whole this leads to a quite paradoxical thesis that the systems of real socialism were undergoing changes rather than reforms. And they were undergoing spontaneous rather than planned changes.

In this chapter I would like to focus on the role of two fundamental, as I believe, types of limits to economic reforms: structural limits and limits of consciousness. Against the background of this distinction I would also like to defend a thesis about a certain evolution of limits to reforms. In some way (which is necessarily incomplete) I will try to illustrate this thesis empirically. In the following chapter I will present an analysis of limits to economic changes in the post-communist period.

¹ I am indebted to dr. S. Gomułka and dr. G. Skapska for their comments on this chapter. This text was initially published in *Spółczeństwo polskie u progu przemian* (edited by J. Mucha, G. Skapska, J. Szmatka and I. Uhl), Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1991. It is published in this volume with minor changes. This chapter was initially prepared as a part of project "Limits to Economic Reforms," directed by S. Gomułka.

2.1.2. THE LIMITS OF REFORMS AND THEIR PLACE IN THE SYSTEM OF REAL SOCIALISM

By

economic reforms I mean the changes which consist in making enterprises independent, in basing the rules of their functioning on market mechanisms, and in a fundamental limiting of political and administrative domination over the whole economic system.

As it is known, several reforms of this type were attempted in post-war Poland. Although they varied in scope and in their degree of radicalism, they had one common feature: they were unsuccessful. There are several reasons for their failures. Such analysis would exceed the framework of this chapter (on this matter see, for example, Kozek 1986). Defining its parameters, however, I should list right at the beginning the types of sources of the failures (and indirectly - the types of constraints) of reforms which will be left outside the scope of this analysis.

I will not be dealing with problems linked to questions of *ownership* in economy. I mention this because, according to various views, it was the ownership structure - in the shape which existed for more than forty years - which constituted the major constraints and the source of the failures of economic reforms. However, discussing this subject would actually require a different type of analysis. Therefore I will leave it outside my discussion, realizing that this will restrict my ability to inquire into the sources of limits to reforms.

Since the point of departure in my analyses is the assumption that reforms were an element of the system's identity, the problem of limits to reforms becomes simultaneously a problem of identity, of limits to the essence of that system. The thesis on the difficulty in defining the essence, the identity of the system of real socialism in Poland, will play an important role in this chapter. That thesis will be my point of departure in defining the limits to reforms.

I am of the opinion that these limits (in the sense of restricting boundaries) cannot be defined through scientific analysis.² Since the essence of real socialism was not completely defined, the limits to reforms could not be defined either, for we cannot equivocally state, for example, that from a certain moment the reform disturbed the identity of the system. This is only one part of the truth. If we were to take the

² In this part of analyses I will rely on the concepts included in my paper 1987c.

above these literally, then the fate of unsuccessful economic reforms could be explained solely by the lack of consequent reformative will on the part of the authorities, or by the social resistance to the reforms. These factors undoubtedly played an important role, but, as I believe, not the fundamental one. Although it is difficult to speak about theoretically defined limits to reforms, the practical constraints to those reforms are easily perceptible. I am advancing a thesis, then, on the *difficulty in demarcating the "theoretical" limits to reforms and on the important role of practical constraints*. In other words, I mean that the system's doctrine and ideology set less clear limits to reforms than did the practice of real socialism. By *practice* I understand above all the way of exercising power and leading the economic system. These constituted the most serious barriers to reforms in the communist period.

Various frequently analyzed incoherences together formed the incoherent identity of the system, in which there were present elements of different kinds of logic (Besancon 1981; Kamiński 1983; Rychard 1983). As I have written elsewhere (Rychard 1983), such a situation could be favorable to reforms, since in a situation lacking a single coherent identity of the system, this identity cannot be changed by reforms.³

It is true that one "side" of those incoherent principles of identity will always be changed, but never all of them as a unit. In this way *one could say that the susceptibility to the continuous undertaking of unsuccessful reforms was an effect of "unfinishing" real socialism*. For the reforms did not change the rules of the system but rather still co-produced them.

Such a situation of reforms leads to certain dangers. The following question arises: if the reforms were in some sense a "normal" way of the system's functioning, can they be at the same time a useful instrument of change, of throwing the system out of balance? Wiesława Kozek, in her analysis of the causes of the failure of Polish economic reforms, formulates the thesis that: "The reproduction of reform is an evidence of adaptive processes of the state and the society and a method of their

³ A. Kamiński wrote about the role of incoherent principles of identity for the chances of reformability; he believed that leaving "several institutional elements of a liberal project" in the state structure gave chances to reforms, although this chance was small (1988, p. 41).

mobilization" (Kozek 1986, p. 59). This thesis reflects well the essence of the situation. If this is the case, then *the major limitation to reforms consisted in an easier absorption of the reform by the system, in its "taming" and neutralization.*

21.3. THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH TO THE SOURCES OF REFORMATORY LIMITS

The widespread in Poland (though not only there) approach to limits to reforms and to the analysis of their conditions often ends in the following dilemma: whether the authorities or society were the foremost factor in either the restriction or the success of economic reforms (see, e.g. Kozek 1986). Not negating the importance of this dilemma, I would like to suggest a different approach, introducing a different typology of limits.

It seems to me that, above all, two types of limits should be distinguished: structural limits and limits of consciousness. By *structural limits* I understand the constraints imposed on reforms by the institutional structure (starting with the structure of the political system, through to the structure of the industry managing system, and to the organizational structure of enterprises) and the social structure (understood in a dynamic way - as a structure of social behavior rather than structure of separate groups and classes). By *limits of consciousness* I understand the constraints imposed by the dominating types of thinking, stereotypes, and economic visions of the people in power as well as the representatives of various social groups. I will attempt to justify this approach below.

Treating structural limits as one common group, I am following an assumption that the functioning of the political system in the post-war period introduced important changes to principles regulating not only the functioning of institutions (e.g. bureaucratization of management), but also of the social structure. There have appeared new types of advancement and of impeding social mobility, new sources of inequality, and new areas of diminishing the differences. These phenomena in the social structure are conditioned in a systemic way, therefore it is worthwhile to analyze them together. Moreover, despite the obvious possibility of separating the socialist political system and defining the boundary between "the authorities and society" (this boundary is particularly visible in the periods of revolt and rebellion), there are periods and "areas" in the system, where this boundary

becomes more fluid and blurred. Just as at the *ideological level* some of the socialist slogans were socially accepted, also at the *pragmatical level* many official solutions became socially rooted, often through various informal mechanisms. In effect, the rules which governed the processes taking place in the social structure cannot be analyzed without considering their institutional conditions, which often constituted the basis and the source of various social interests.⁴ The importance of structural limits therefore does not diminish the importance of clearly political limits. On the contrary - political preconditions had created the situation in which many official solutions were "woven" into the social fabric.

One could point to still different reasons for the proposed distinction. It is the *thesis on the evolution of limits to reforms in post-war Poland, understood as a constant discovering of new barriers*. Because all of the barriers always existed, the evolution refers to social consciousness rather than reality. We can distinguish, then, a period when the barriers to reforms were seen *in the personal traits of the people in power or in the composition of the government* (1956-58). Later came a period, when the role of *structural* constraints, understood twofold, was discovered (once as a political structure - this phase of discussion started clearly in 1980-81). Also the role of social structure was noticed, especially the political and economic interests dominating within it. It has been shown that although there are correlations between them (e.g. Kolarska and Rychard 1982), the lines dividing according to political views and the lines dividing according to economic interests do not overlap (which was shown by Kolarska 1982; 1986). Finally, at the end of 1980's, ideological-civilizational⁵ constraints, related to different "civilizational orientations," became visible. They consisted in, roughly speaking, the dispute as to whether Poland should pursue the escaping modernization - and if so, how - or give up the race, change its aspirations and choose the "rustic-axiological" variant. Also within the modernizational-reformatory

⁴ Here I rely on the concepts introduced by Narojek (1986) and Staniszkis (1984), and on my earlier analyses (1987).

⁵ Here I refer to the distinction between the ideological, political, social, and intellectual limits, introduced by Gomułka (1987). The interesting typology of the limits to the reforms was also presented by Morawski (1988) who distinguished psychological determinants, economic policies, institutional mechanisms and finally fundamental systemic characteristics as determinants for the chances of the economic reforms.

variant there were differences going beyond political and economic conditions. In the disputes about "privatization" or "socialization" there appeared ideological orientations, which point to the role of axiological choices. I will elaborate on that later. This evolution of limits has three characteristic features:

- (1) each subsequent limit was not reducible to the preceding one. For example, limits in the sphere of political structures cannot be explained by personal traits, lack of political will or the composition of the cabinet in power, and the "ideological-civilizational" limits are not reducible to different political and economic interests, therefore they differ from political and economic views;
- (2) all of them always existed, and discovering new ones did not mean transgressing the old ones;
- (3) in effect of the evolution and mutual overlapping of limits and their irreducibility, unexpected alliances could form. For example, one could find advocates of the "rustic-axiological" orientation among the representatives of the authorities as well as among the representatives of the opposition or independent circles. One could say that the discovery of every new limit - from the political will, through personal and institutional-structural limits, to the dispute between the "civilizational" orientations - was at the same time a discovery of increasingly wider barriers facing reform. Reform was not only an internal matter of the power apparatus anymore (personal limits). Neither was it only a subject of the government-society dispute (structural limits). It became also a subject of the dispute between orientations dividing political-economic alliances.

This process was already visible at the end of the communist period. The dispute over the variant of development, crossing the then-existing political divisions, was something new in the communist period. Although it was obscured by the basic political division between the authorities and the rest of society, nevertheless it was already visible. I am pointing this out because the dispute between separate civilizational orientations became fully visible after the collapse of communism. It is reflected in the differences between the pro-market and pro-West option and the rather national, less "market" option. As it is known, these disputes divide the post-Solidarity alliance. The result

of that is, to some degree, a dispersion of the existing political scene. This is not a subject of analysis in this book. I would like to stress, however, the fact that the first indications of deeper divisions between ideological-civilizational orientations were already visible at the close of communism.

The fact that the limits to reform cannot be seen only in the above constraints, was caused, in my opinion, by the more clearly apprehended *costs of the reform*. The political discussion about the reform created a kind of illusion that a willingness to change a conservative structure is enough to carry out the reform. This created a myth of a homogeneous society being in favor of the reform. In a situation when the problem of the inevitable costs of modernization arose, the homogeneity of society became less clear. The dispute was also reflected in the governmental structure.

Was the evolution of limits to reforms an indication of some cumulation of experiences? Were we, in other words - to refer to the concept introduced by T. Gruszecki (1987), who believed that reformatory thinking changes in our country in "leaps" - at that time in a new "leap"? Did this bring us closer to a possibility of true realization of reform? My answer would be no. *Adding new barriers did not remove the old ones. In fact, all of those barriers existed in parallel, and the passing time and experiences did not create new barriers, but rather revealed the existence of emerging ones.* It was a process of social learning - by the government and by society. Initially it was assumed that the reform is only a question of the politicians' will, subsequently the role of structural constraints was noticed, and finally the significance of civilizational orientations, irreducible to politics and economics, was discovered.

Having justified the distinction between structural limits and limits of consciousness by the thesis on the evolution of limits, I will now turn to a discussion concerning the institutional constraints.

2.1.4. INSTITUTIONAL LIMITS TO REFORMS

I will start by discussing these limits at the macro level. The problem concerns the role of the political system in the process of promoting and implementing economic reforms. Its significance for the success or failure of reforms was widely known. I have already mentioned the

frequently arising conflict between the struggle to retain power and the struggle for effectiveness, which has been analyzed elsewhere. Both aims, co-existing in the political system, contributed to the meanders of the fate of Polish economic reforms.⁶ Here, however, I would like to discuss the role of the structures of the political system. By *the political system* I mean a set of institutions and rules designed to retain power and to make central decisions. The limits of this chapter do not allow for a detailed analysis of the system's construction and functioning. However, I would like briefly to point out those characteristics of the construction and functioning of the political system which I perceive as the most important for defining reformatory limits.

First of all, we should discuss two problems: the degree of the system's uniformity and the role of the communist party within that system. Positions concerning the first problem oscillate from approaches stressing homogeneity to those which expose its internal diversity. Other dimensions related to this problem are the dimension of formality-informality of the system and the dimension of the degree of its influence on the real economic processes. It is worthwhile to note the concepts according to which the communist political system was not fully uniform, to a large degree was based on informalities, and had a minor influence on the economy. In effect - some say - since there is no single center of power, the reforms cannot be made "from above". Since the informal processes play a significant role, reforms cannot be introduced by acting upon formal structures (this was one of the positions discussed by W. Kozek in her analysis, 1986). Although in my earlier analyses I myself pointed out the role of "social entanglement" and the entrenchment of the basic systemic choices, I do not agree with these theses. These processes did not result in a loss of an essential part of power over the economy by the political system, which consisted in the control of personal politics (the mechanism of party nomenklatura) and a control through the ability to impede various initiatives. It is true that under real socialism the role of hidden lobbies functioning within

⁶ At the end of 1980's we had first indications of transgressing this limit. Ineffectiveness of the system already endangered the reproduction of the power elite. Thus, possibly *reaching the limit to reproduction of political system was, at the same time, the first indication of transgressing the major political limit, namely the reluctance to decrease the range of control.* The government became interested in the reform to an increasingly higher degree because of its interest in the reproduction of the system.

the industrial system and exerting pressure on the politicians was increasing. It is also true that there have formed informal rules of action. But we should not forget that the mechanisms generating this informal adaptive behavior were *the government and the formal structure*. If their rules would be changed, new types of adaptive behavior could form.

Informality and partial formalization should not be taken, then, for indications of a loss of power. A good example is the activity of the Polish Workers' Party in the economy. The Party, though not fully formalized, played an important role. Moreover, I believe that, in accordance with earlier discussion, this partial formalization could become a chance for, and not only a barrier to, the reform. Thus, I would say that the Party retained a significant amount of power within the state and the economy, but simultaneously - because of its partial formalization - the scope of its power seemed to be susceptible to changes. This interpretation of "partial formalization" of the Party's role in some sense had its confirmation in the communist regime's decision to negotiate with the opposition in 1989, which resulted in the change of the political order and in the initiation of systemic transformation. This partial formalization, however, resulted also in arbitrary decisions and interference in the economic life, impeding and warping the reforms. The point is that at the end of 1980's it seemed impossible to obtain an approval for the fundamental political and social forces for a clear definition of the role of the Party in the economy. In this situation its real role depended on the structure of power and interests in the country and outside its borders. The fact that the role of the party in its doctrine was not fully formalized later helped this structure move in the "pro-reformatory" direction. It provided the so-called "reformationists" with a possibility to act, although their actions were highly limited by the existing political system of power.

The fundamental problem concerning institutional constraints consisted of the relations between the political and the economic system, in particular - the relationships between the shape of the political system (how democratic it was) and the level of economic effectiveness. Let us briefly discuss those relations with respect to the models for "managerial" and self-governmental reforms. Neither of the two models establishes decisive principles concerning the shape of the political system. Both can be implemented in either an autocratic or

democratic system. Polish realities were such that reforms of both managerial and self-governmental type were introduced within the unchanged political system. In the case of the managerial variant, it caused a quick failure of the reforms, because the political system retained full control over management. Under the self-governmental variant it was to some degree a sign of substitution of political democracy by economic democracy (Morawski 1986). On the whole, this could produce a counter-effect in the economic effectiveness.⁷ I rely here on the thesis by W. Morawski (1986a) on the double-sided politization of an enterprise: from above and from below (by self-governments). Thus, both variants hampered effectiveness: under the managerial model the reform was easily neutralized (see Osiatyński, Pańków, Fedorowicz 1985), and under the self-governmental model mechanisms of "negotiation rationality" would be introduced in the economy excessively, which in turn had to clash with the remaining mechanisms of "politization from above". Their conflict, in turn, is unfavorable to economic rationality.

The source of flaws of both alternatives was the lack of democracy in the political sphere. This is related to the dispute discussed earlier, which can be reduced to the following question: whether in difficult economic conditions, when introduction of reform means certain social costs, it is easier to implement these kinds of decisions in a system of democratized political power or in an autocratic system? The advocates of the first option say that it gives a possibility of mobilizing social support or at least provides the society with "something in return" for the costs they have to bear - it provides political democratization. Its opponents, on the other hand, claim that simultaneous democratization and unpopular decision can result in chaos and can increase resistance against those decisions. In my opinion, this judgement is based on the illusion that in a difficult economic situation an autocratic government is able to provide stability. In the meantime, sociological analyses indicate that under difficult economic conditions, systems without political legitimization have greater tendencies to destabilization than do politically legitimized systems (cf. Lipset 1963). In short: under such conditions democracy seems to be a more stabilizing factor than

⁷ This is a classical controversy in social sciences. One of the most significant is the discussion by W. Brus and S. Gomułka (see Brus 1975; 1980; Gomułka 1977).

autocracy, which provides delusive guarantees. Polish society divided its sentiments more or less equally between a judgement that democracy is propitious to effectiveness, and a judgement that the two matters are independent of one another. The belief that democracy bears little economic cost had a very low popularity. A very low popularity gained the belief that democracy is some kind of an economic costs (Kolarska and Rychard 1982). Although the research showed, in fact, that trust in government - and not in a democratic way of electing it - played a crucial role in government's appraisal, in over 40 years of communism in Poland this trust could not be built through the system of autocratic political power.

We can see, then, that depending on the option chosen, *totally opposing models - democratic or autocratic - could be treated as limits to reforms*. Curiously enough, these two variants could be possible both among the advocates of orientation toward modernization (i.e. reformatory) and among those of conservative orientation, both of which did, in fact, appear.

One should not forget that in the Polish situation the success of reforms depended in a specific way on democratization. Because of the delegalization of Solidarity under martial law, the reform was being implemented in a period of a suppressed - but not resolved - political conflict. Social support or at least acceptance were crucial to its success. In mobilizing support the government encountered barriers which it could not overcome. That is why the subsequent attempts at communist-led reforms failed.

2.1.5. SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE LIMITS TO REFORMS

The unclear support for reforms, ascertained in many studies and consisting in a clearer acceptance of general slogans rather than specific mechanisms, can be a point of departure in this part of analyses. This consisted also in a more frequent support for reformatory slogans among groups with a critical attitude toward the government, which in turn, as stated elsewhere (Adamski, Jasiewicz and Rychard 1986), created structural problems with mobilization of a pro-reformatory lobby. In addition, during the last communist period there appeared the "civilizational" division mentioned above, not completely reducible to economic nor to political divisions. All those factors complicated the

general picture of economic orientations in the social structure. Going from "the top," among the representatives of the government we had groups against the reform (for doctrinal or pragmatic reasons), next there were pragmatists supporting the reform, more and more clearly visible groups of people trying to act economically "outside the system" (emigration, sector of Polonia, second economy), small groups trying to support the reform within the system (mainly self-government activists), and finally - large groups of people increasingly endangered by the prospect of costs of the reform (with ideological support in some independent circles). Using sociological studies limited to public opinion analysis alone, it was impossible to estimate the number of people within each group.

One can advance the thesis that the movement of limits to reforms did not indicate increased pro-reformatory consciousness but rather a clearer polarization of that consciousness. Referring to the thesis by L. Kolarska (1986) on the increased role of "anti-egalitarian" orientation in 1980-84, I would say that during the last communist period the "pro-egalitarian" orientation was growing in strength as well. One could infer that the proportions were more or less equal, and the changes consisted in a greater crystallization of views within each of those orientations.

What were the sources of those various economic orientations? It is sometimes said that Polish society is excessively attached to its moral values, and that it lost the way of thinking in categories of interests. The opponents to this position argue that the role of economic interests is increasing, and that interests often lie at the basis of this type of behavior, which we would be inclined to define as motivated by values (Kolarska 1987). However, I believe that in *the final years of communism in Poland, one could not presume that the sources of economic behavior (pro- or anti-reformatory) were in economic interests.* As the researchers referring to the school of "property rights" (e.g. Staniszkis) indicate, in Poland there was a lack of structural conditions for creating economic interests (by which we understand actions concerning the sphere of production, not the sphere of distribution). This, however, does not demonstrate - in my opinion - that basing economic behavior on values rather than interests will always result in "anti-reformatory," "anti-effective" actions. I believe that a substantial part of pro-development and pro-effective economic behavior had at its basis values rather than economic interests. Perhaps, then, it was also

the case that what appeared to be caused by interests, was in reality concealing values.

Such interpretation seems convincing when we look at observations made by sociologists about the role of axiological motives in moving toward the private sector (e.g. Koralewicz 1985), pointing to the importance of autonomy and independence. Some observations cannot be explained by referring to interests only.⁸

The expression "civilizational orientations," used to name two options, pro- and anti-reformatory, becomes clearer after the above discussion. The differences between the two orientations are not only differences of economic interests, but rather the differences of worldview orientations, often based on axiological, not economic, choices. Thus I believe that at the end of the 1980's, the economic orientations of Polish society *not only were irreducible to political dimensions, but they also could not be perceived within a framework of different economic interests.*

As mentioned earlier, sociological research is used primarily to document theses about the degree of support or rejection of particular reformatory options. It seems to me, however, that it would be more interesting to use the research from the fields of the sociology of organization or the sociology of social structure rather than using public opinion analyses. Thus I believe that for the comprehension of limits to reforms there were many interesting conclusions coming from studies of management or the studies of social mobility. On their basis one could advance the thesis that the processes of social mobility in post-war Poland were one of the more crucial pro-reformatory factors. The industrial and educational advancement of a large segment of population undoubtedly was a fundamental issue here. In 1945-56 reforms were impossible not only because of stalinism. There was a lack of industrial labor force, weakened by the war and the post-war repressions. After 1956 there were, however, skilled workers educated in post-war Poland. In addition, the aspirations of the more "industrialized" workers became visible.

The analyses of processes of mobility, however, point also to serious obstacles hampering the reforms. I have in mind mainly the disruption

See studies on self-government (Rychard 1987).

of the relationship between labor input and qualifications on one side, and the possibility of attaining a "good" social position on the other. These constraints worked in two directions. First, they often made an advancement in the formal structure hindered or unattractive for some groups (e.g. people who were not members of the party). Second, they introduced a mechanism of selection based on criteria of political loyalty rather than on substantial criteria for other groups (mainly managing groups, through the mechanism of nomenklatura) (see e.g. Wesołowski and Mach 1986).

On the basis of these and other analyses one could advance the thesis that the processes of mobility had a pro-reformatory character regarding the working class to a certain period, although at the end of communism, mobility "outside the system" was becoming increasingly visible (Wesołowski and Mach 1986). With regard to the management, constraints (the mechanism of nomenklatura) turned out to be more important. However, despite the functioning of this mechanism, which was indicated by other studies (Kostecki 1979; Drażkiewicz and Rychard 1981), the management in industrial organizations was strongly professionally oriented and educated, despite the functioning of the nomenklatura.

On the whole then, *despite certain constraints, one could see in the social structure a chance rather than a barrier to reform*. However - as will be indicated by analyses in the chapters concerning reforms and changes in the post-communist period - these chances had their limits. The cost of radical economic transformations was particularly high in the case of some groups of workers who made a major contribution toward the subversion of communism, but now have to pay the high costs of economic transformation.

As mentioned before, economic actions could take place either within the framework of the state economy system, or in various "extrasystemic" spheres. The latter - of the second economy and private sector type - were (and still are) decisive for the fate of reforms. M. Marody (1987) argued that actions in the sphere of private "small" initiative were an indication of a split between the private and the public spheres, and that they were not translatable into institutional activity. My opinion is slightly different. These actions (to a large degree informal, if we stick to the example of the second economy) were not an indication of the separation of the private and public spheres,

but rather a mechanism obliterating those differences and adjusting both spheres to one another. It remained an open question whether they stabilized the most flagrant irrationalities. In other words - do they constitute a peculiar substitute of the inefficient system or the seeds of change?

At the end of 1980's it seemed that the stabilizing functions of those mechanisms prevailed, although the system stabilized by them was already somewhat different, a bit more adjusted to people's aspirations. However, the institutionalization of those mechanisms could not constitute a path leading to reform, nor could the enlargement of the size of various "extrasystemic" enclaves, like the private sector or the Polonia sector, etc. do so. *Without a fundamental change in the state sector of the economy, the essence of the system remained the same.*

The mechanisms described here indicate that the social structure always creates spontaneous regulators of behavior and ways of adapting to a difficult situation. The reform could consist neither in their simple liquidation, nor in an equally non-reflective copying in the official structure, but in making the use of initiative and creativity. It was simply unrealistic within the institutional structure of that time. And it still remains an open problem as to what degree it is possible in the post-communist institutional structure. I will deal with this problem in the next chapter.

2.1.6. THE DILEMMAS OF THE REFORMATORY IDEAS: BARRIERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND IDEOLOGICAL-CIVILIZATIONAL BARRIERS

These barriers are linked to the specified "ideological-civilizational" orientations. Therefore, my analyses will make it possible to illustrate empirically the thesis about the evolution of limits. Let it be reminded that, according to this thesis, at the end of the 1980's, those limits which were irreducible to the constraints resulting from political and economic interests, were becoming more and more important. There are many different results of empirical studies, which point to the role of extra-political and extra-economic limits to reforms, i.e. "civilizational" constraints. I have in mind here the idea of J. Staniszkis (1986) based on empirical studies, about the "deeper" structures of thinking about economics. According to this idea, the acceptance of the option of "economizing" economics was not related to political

affiliations. Similar results were obtained in another study, "Poles '84," where it was shown that there existed two ways of "rejecting" the existing system: in the narrowly political dimension and in the political-economic dimension, irreducible to thinking in the categories of power only (Kolarska and Rychard 1986). This thesis can also be explained by the role of value systems in thinking about the economy. Finally, the increasingly understood importance of this type of limits was tied to the general discussion on the subject of whether Poland should pursue of the run-away train of civilization or go in a totally different direction and on foot. Different positions in this dispute also overcame barriers in the strictly political and economic disputes.

The discussion below is based on a comparison of four programs of the restructuring of the economy: governmental; that of the official trade unions; Solidarity's; and one reflected in the recommendations of the western financial institutions. A common feature of these programs is that they were published at approximately the same time, in 1987. The question arises as to whether the analysis of the reform programs of that time has a solely historical value. I believe that it does not. It enables us to notice some phenomena, which after the downfall of communism became more visible. I have in mind, for example, the evolution of the approach to the question of self-governments, present both in the program of reforms prepared by the communist government and in the one prepared by the then still illegal Solidarity. I think that at the end of the communist period new dividing lines were becoming visible; their importance has increased considerably in the post-communist period.

Analyzing each of the four options, we have a chance to identify political limits: every one of those programs represents a group with different interests. At the same time, if we look at all of them together, we can discern what was common to all, or what was jointly concealed. These elements could already be caused by extra-political conditions. Such analyses - the results of which I am presenting here - also enable us to see how the structural limits were as well as the limits of consciousness perceived by the authors of particular reform programs.

A comparison of various programs and ideologies, including proposals of reforms, can be done in at least two ways. First, they can be of interest as suggestions of certain practical actions seen as

desirable. Secondly, they can be of interest as an articulation of a vision of the social world, politics and economics, without regard to the intention of their authors. In this case, we are interested in the programs as indicators of a certain social philosophy and ideology. We can inquire about some hidden principles included in them or about the interests represented by them. This second type of analyses is of greater interest to me, which does not mean that I will set aside the practical realm of particular programs.

Discussing each of the programs I will pay attention to three main groups of problems: (1) the vision of the economy; (2) the vision of the relationship politics/economy; and (3) the vision of the social forces which could be the addressee of a given program, of promoting and hampering forces. In each of these points I will try to find the limits to reforms visible in a given program. After presenting short characteristics of each of the programs I will give general conclusions concerning all of them.

THE GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAM⁹

This program underwent an evolution of a sort. In 1981 some matters, in particular in the sphere of the relationship politics/economy, were accentuated differently than this was done in "The Theses of the Second Stage of Reforms". Let us begin, however, with the basic vision of the economy. The main driving force of its development was supposed to be *initia the*, the leading slogan in the theses. As it has been indicated (Kolarska-Bobińska 1987), the slogan was limited to the economic sphere, actually ignoring the socio-political conditions for initiative (see also Kamiński 1988). In the economic vision of the governmental program, what was striking was the accentuation of the problematic of economic equilibrium as one of the main goals, e.g. theses 2 and 6: "The common element of all diagnosis is the assumption that there will be no success of reform without equilibrium, just as there will be no equilibrium without the reform" - wrote the authors. The costs of attaining this equilibrium were strongly accentuated; in April these costs were being hidden behind a quite enigmatic phrase about

⁹ In the analysis of this program I rely on two basic documents: "Kierunki reformy gospodarczej," 1981 and "Tezy w sprawie drugiego etapu reformy gospodarczej" (propozycje do dyskusji), *Rzeczpospolita*, April 1987.

the need for undertaking a "price-income operation" (thesis 3), but in the autumn of 1987 they were discussed in a more straightforward manner.

The assumptions and proposals concerning the relations between Politics and the economy (both at the macro and the enterprise level) included in the governmental program, were very interesting as far as the limits to reforms are concerned. The program proposed (in one of its variants) the substantial enlargement of the possibility of the economic self-organizing" of society, consisting in giving up the domination of the state administration in the creation of enterprises (thesis 120).

Surprisingly, these deep possibilities of changes were actually Proposed *without referring to the role of the communist party in the economy*. On this issue the position of the government underwent evolution in 1981-87. The "Directions of the Economic Reform" (1981) addressed the issue of changing the role of the party in the economy (in principle it was supposed to act only through its members, not as an institution), but in the April 1987 theses nothing was said on that matter, except for some generalities. The reading also gave the impression that the party did not exist in the country and in the economy. This could mean two options: a quiet desire to continue the *status quo* or a revolutionary assumption that the communist party does not have a significant role to play in economics (in the institutional sense).¹⁰ The above-mentioned proposals of serious changes in the way of creating enterprises made the first option unlikely. It probably was not a desire for quite continuation, but at the same time there was no visible possibility of a revolutionary change - it would rather be something of a "quiet change" type.

A hypothesis comes to mind that the governmental proposals could mean the opening of the path to the transformation of relations between politics and the economy, including the diminishing of the Party's role, but for ideological reasons this was not openly declared. The incomplete formalization of the party's role, resulting from the incoherence in the identity of the system supported the

¹⁰ I would like to stress that I mean exactly the institutional role of the Workers' Party in the structure of the system, and not its ideological role which the Theses accepted by referring to the decrees of the 10th Congress of the Party.

pro-reformatory orientation on this issue. This incomplete formalization, as I mentioned before, was sometimes viewed only in a critical manner. Meanwhile, since the role of the party in the economy was not guaranteed in a formal way, no formal rules had to be broken in order to change it, because they did not exist. It would suffice to add new mechanisms, decreasing this role in practice. However, as it is known, none of the communist attempts to reform the economy made use of this apparent option. Despite the lack of formal barriers, the real shape of the power system disallowed true reforms. The positive result of the incomplete formalization consisted in the fact that it could create favorable conditions for the initiation of negotiations with the political opposition - which started two years later.

The vision of society included in the governmental program was not clearly outlined. Although in effect it was supposed to gain (which was vaguely defined), first it had to bear the costs of reforms. The program also took into consideration a probability of conflicts caused by the economic reform, resulting from a clash between the economic rationality and the interests of particular socio-professional groups (thesis 2). It discussed only generally the issue of unemployment, calling it a problem of people "temporarily without jobs" (thesis 102). On the whole, the program did not include a precisely defined social addressee, whose support would be sought by the authors. It did not say to whom in particular would the proposed changes be attractive, and which group would mainly bear the costs. It is difficult to infer, in which parts of the social structure the authors expected major resistance or social support.

THE SOLIDARITY PROGRAM¹¹

This was a comprehensive economic program. It stressed different issues, but also in this program we can see an evolution of orientations.

This document was sharper in tone, and accentuated serious civilizational danger for Poland. Its approach to the economic order and forces driving the economy was somewhat different, but there were also some similar points. The basic postulate was the release of natural

¹¹ This analysis is based on the document "Stanowisko NSZZ Solidarność w sprawie przebudowy gospodarki polskiej," Warszawa 1987.

forces of economic activity and initiative. While the governmental Program stressed the importance of balance, the program of Solidarity emphasized social dynamism in the economic sphere. Multiple sectors of the economy and the role of the private sector and market mechanisms were stressed in particular. It was exactly on this issue where we see an evolution of position. While in 1980-81 there were already two conflicting tendencies within Solidarity: seeing a remedy for the economy in socialization (self-governmental) and in privatization, in the following period a greater emphasis was put on the socializing processes. Meanwhile, after a few years, an emphasis in the analyzed Program was put on the private sector and market mechanisms ~ retaining to some degree the questions of self-governments.

In the sphere of relations between politics and economics, the solidarity program stressed the relationships between the improvement of the state of the economy and democratization, pointing to the role of self-organization in economic activity, to the ability to create extra-material motivation through democratization, and to its importance for the western creditors. Since the communist party was Perceived as a constraint to reform, the program included a postulate to get rid of the nomenklatura.

One of the most crucial features of this document concerned the politics-economy relations. I have in mind its internal contradiction between exposing the need for depolitization of the economy (the role of market mechanisms), separating politics from the economy at the level of enterprise, and the emphasis on the development of self-governments. The authors of this program did not seem to notice that self-government is also a form of politization but "from below," in contrast to the governmentally-led politization "from above" (which was pointed out by Morawski 1986a). This contradiction would disappear, if it was shown that self-governments were centers of economic rationality, which was indicated by some fragmentary conclusions of sociological studies.

The vision of society in this program was that of a dynamic and self-organizing society. The authors directed their program particularly to the young generation of Poles. Also in this program, the proposed vision of "economization" of the economy included social costs. Although it did not see the danger of unemployment, some 15 percent of workers were supposed to move to the sector of services.

PROGRAM OF THE TRADE UNIONS¹²

It was not really a program of economic reforms, but rather the position of the official, non-Solidarity trade unions on the question of "the theses of the second stage of the reform." Despite this limitation it had comprehensive ambitions.

What distinguished it from the two preceding programs the most, was the generality of the language used, the relatively small number of specifics, but in turn a large number of slogans. A strong emphasis was put on the need to restructure the economy in order to make up for Poland's civilizational decline. Restructurization was supposed to decrease the pressure on the capital-absorbing areas, e.g. mining, and lead to development of new market sectors. According to the program, aiming at weakening the pressure from industrial branches was necessary (pp. 12-3), as was the stabilization of food prices. The program included obvious inconsistencies and contradictions. On one hand, emphasis was put on the need for restructuring (in, for example, mining), on the other - nothing was said about the costs or the problems, which this could cause for the union (except for a general declaration of a firm defence of the interests of workers in the companies undergoing liquidation). The program criticized the pressures of industrial branches despite the fact that the union structure itself strengthened them. The food was supposed to be inexpensive and available, but the same should hold concerning housing, cars, and personal computers (p. 9). Implementation of this program (even if it would be possible), would cause serious internal conflicts both within the unions - separating "the top from the bottom" - and between specific unions and federations. There was no indication in the program that this was expected.

It seems that it was the adding of new accents of "civilizational acceleration" to the traditional picture of official unions as a force concentrating on the sphere of distribution and claims, which introduced these contradictions. An example is also the attitude to the private sector, which on the one hand is supported (p. 12), and on the other is perceived as a privileged sector, which should be subjected to limitations (p. 10).

¹² Its analysis is based on the document "Alternatywna koncepcja realizacji założeń reformy gospodarczej. Punkt widzenia," Warszawa: OPZZ, March 1987.

As to the politics-economy relations, the program accepted the *status quo*, expressing a fear that continuation of the economic policy of that time, criticized by the unions would lead to "attempts to negate socialism and the role of the Party" (p. 3). Interestingly, the program did not formulate any vision of relations between the unions and the self-government (the word "self-government" did not appear in it at all). Along with a declaration of support for the principle of one-person management, would it mean that the unions favored rather the "managerial-union" model?

A few times the program defined the social addressee of the union proposals. It considered the poorest strata of society and the retired. Their relatively high membership in the structures of non-Solidarity trade unions was probably one of the reasons. One could also find signs of "anti-wealth" orientation. We read: "It is necessary to increase taxes (up to confiscation) on fortunes which do not have any legal grounds" (p. 10). This tone was well known in Poland. But it is difficult to reconcile it with the need for the civilizational acceleration declared by the unions. *The addressees of the program (mainly the poor and underprivileged) was not the one who would implement this program, what more - some of the addressees could be in opposition to that program.* This was another inconsequence in the position of unions.

In sum, I would not hesitate to define many formulations of the program as demagogical. These are: the acceleration of development, but without wealth (for example, as the source of capital), inexpensive food and availability of housing, along with the civilizational race, the need for restructurization stressed stronger than in other programs, and the emphatic protection of workers. Thus there were clear union and "anti-union" elements. In the search of new identity, the unions decided to combine many contradictory options.

THE POSITIONS OF WESTERN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REGARDING THE REFORMS¹³

This is not an analysis of a reformatory program, since none of these institutions has formulated one. But being interested in Poland's

¹³ Based on the lecture by prof. W. Trzeciakowski "Stanowisko MFW wobec problemów wychodzenia Polski z kryzysu," presented during the OW PTS Conference, June 5-6, 1987, entitled "Społeczne problemy zmian w gospodarce polskiej," on my commentary to a speech by prof. Trzeciakowski presented during the same conference, on the work by Gomułka (1987).

regaining the position of a credible borrower, they formulated their recommendations as goals to be attained by the economy, and not as means, although they clearly favored the ideas of market reform. Recommendations of financial institutions implicated mainly the need for "hard" economic measures, tied to making the enterprises independent, but not to the "socialization" of those enterprises. Political conditions, when they were expressed, were understood as political rather than economic democracy.

However, from those recommendations we can deduce two models for the introduction of socially costly modernizational changes: under the cover of an autocratic government and under democracy. This does not mean that both models are included in them. If any of the two is, it is rather the prodemocratic one mentioned in the reports done by political institutions (e.g. the US Congress). I would just like to say that from the point of view of western capital interests it did not seem to matter whether the chosen path would be democratic or autocratic.

It is worth consideration which social forces could be interested in the autocratic variant and what unexpected alliances it could cause. This variant, of a strong political authority with an internally independent economy, though it would require substantial changes in the politicians' approach to economy, could, however, support consolidation of the political *status quo*. Paradoxically, the interests of financial institutions and of the communist governmental elites could turn out to be objectively concurrent: the economy would become more "market-type" (which was the desire of the western capital), and the political system would not undergo significant changes (which was the desire of the government of that time).¹⁴ A possible social antagonism formed as a result of this variant would mean that also at the other side of a probable conflict we would encounter a quite unexpected alliance. The following citation indicates the alliance I have in mind: " Polish trade unions - whether those based on Solidarity or the new official unions - gave a firm negative opinion on the majority of moves which will probably be recommended by IMF" (February 27, 1985) (Jan Vanous, cit. after Gomułka 1986). Attaining social support in this

¹⁴ I am indebted to J. Wertenstein-Żuławski for this remark.

variant was illusory; on the contrary, it could integrate the hitherto existing opponents.

This process became visible in the period of economic changes introduced after the collapse of communism. As many analyses and the course of some strikes in 1991-93 indicate, frequently the Solidarity and non-Solidarity (OPZZ) trade unions cooperate against the economic changes advocated by the Solidarity governments. These facts confirm the thesis advanced in this chapter that already at the close of the communist period the attitude toward reforms divided both political groups: the Solidarity and the non-Solidarity. Thus the disputes over reforms could not be reduced only to the differences between political groups.

In sum, although the recommendations of western financial institutions were an objective reformatory factor, they defined neither the character of this reform, nor the political conditions necessary to its implementation.

* * *

Let us now move to the analysis of features of those programs and to the presentation of general conclusions resulting from those features.

First of all, the ability to compare few reformatory concepts formed more or less simultaneously was a precedence of a sort in the post-war history of Poland. For the first time, four socio-political forces presented their positions regarding one question - in this case the economy. This in itself constituted, in my opinion, crossing some limits to reforms and indicated a pluralization of political life.¹⁵

Interesting is the fact that in principle all of these forces presented comprehensive concepts about changes in the economy. Although they represented different "functional" sectors of society, i.e. the government, trade unions, independent social movements, and western financial institutions, they all focused on a comprehensive analysis, not limited to the specifics of their role in the socio-organizational

¹⁵ An example was the session of Polish Sociological Association "Social Problems of Change in Polish Economy," where these four concepts were presented, although in a more "individual" version, and not as a presentation of the documents discussed here.

"division of labor." These concepts, despite significant differences, had many common features, among which the conviction about the need for the restructurization of Polish economy and about *the ability to do it by the means of reform* can be considered to be the most important ones.

These concepts functioned to greater or lesser degree in public discussion. I would like to advance a thesis, that *each of those institutions presented itself in its program in such way that it modified somewhat its hitherto existing picture in the eyes of society and its partners*. It is not certain whether this was their intention, but the results are visible. Thus, the government strongly emphasized efficiency and initiative, proposing changes which would modify its role in the economy (although in April 1987 this was not openly declared yet). Solidarity presented a program, which included an emphasis put on self-governments together with, much clearer than before, market-privatizational accents. The pro-communist trade unions, commonly viewed as a somewhat "artificially" radical product, added to their program equally radical postulates of acceleration and participation in the civilizational race (in order to attain a different type of legitimation). Only western financial institutions remained in concordance with their social picture, but they did need to change their image - the interests of capital were justified and well defined.

The evolution of reformatory programs, consisting among others in an increased emphasis on privatization, indicates the way in which directed and planned changes, as well as extrasystemic and intrasystemic changes, were entwined. In 1982-87 privatization was mainly an extrasystemic phenomenon. Its appearance in reformatory programs meant cooption of formerly "extrasystemic" mechanisms by institutionalized ideologies (here: programs).

From this point of view the most interesting is the strong emphasis put on changes in the ownership structure. This is particularly visible in the governmental program. Although the term "privatization" was not used in the program, there is no doubt that this was the general direction of the proposed changes. The Solidarity program too put more emphasis on the question of privatization compared with the position of the union in the 1980-81 disputes. *Thus the beginnings of further changes and the chances for agreement between a part of the communist elites and part of the Solidarity movement are visible when we compare these programs*. To some extent the general features of changes

which took place in the Polish economic system in the 1990's are embodied in these programs. This also shows that political limits were not so important at the close of communism, as the communist government and Solidarity were quite close to each other in their visions of the future economic system.

However, in 1987 communists probably assumed that this would be "their" privatization. The idea of privatization embodied in the governmental program was the "privatization from above." Stress was put on transforming state enterprises into stock companies and there were no ideas as to how "average" citizens could create private enterprises. This may shed some light on later disputes on "privatization by nomenklatura."

The fact that the programs were in a way "anti-programs," could be useful in public discussion and could indicate a negotiational attitude of the forces behind those programs. Therefore it could favour breaking anti-reformatory limits, since the authors of given programs turned out to be flexible. This phenomenon caused however the creation of many internal inconsistencies within each of the programs, as indicated above. These inconsistencies were also an unavoidable result of the fact that the programs articulated the positions of larger groups and institutions. This had to lead to compromises which produced either dull or internally contradictory formulations. Thus a more negotiational attitude resulted, as always, in identity problems both before the forces being represented by a given institution and before its partners. In effect, this could have led to alliances between representatives of various "parts" of different programs. Consequently, the governmental and the Solidarity programs seemed to come close to one another in accenting the "marketizing" option. Although both sides discussed self-governments, the option of "socialization" was emphasized somewhat more weakly. This aspect was also visible in the program of the unions, where self-governments are not mentioned at all. There was no disagreement on this point with recommendations of western financial institutions. Clearly then, self-governments were losing their institutional support.¹⁶ Possibilities

¹⁶ The increasing role of market-privatizational option could be perceived as dysfunctional for the government system. Perhaps in 1987 the communist government believed that it will be able to use a variant of this option which would not require intrasystemic changes, but rather the creation of certain "niches" next to the system (see also Staniszkis, 1987).

of alliances appeared also in other spheres - for example in the above mentioned convergence of interests of the western capital and of the conservative part of government in the case of the "effective-autocratic" variant, where at the opposite side there would be some convergence of the positions of Solidarity and of new unions. Let me add to that the possibility of the above mentioned alliances within the group advocating "acceleration" and within the group advocating the "simplistic-rustic" variant (e.g. some circles in the government and some independent groups), and the thesis on the irreducibility of disputes over the models of reforms to disputes resulting from different political and economic orientations will become much clearer.¹⁷

Summing up the preceding discussion one can say that this irreducibility is associated with:

- (1) the role of "civilizational" orientations in thinking about reforms, with the orientations being irreducible to politics and economics;
- (2) the role of values and axiology as sources of economic motivation;
- (3) the internal contradiction within the programs resulting from the change of their image and their need for representing differentiated groups;
- (4) possibilities of seemingly paradoxical alliances mentioned above.

The possibility of the creation of four models for changes, indicating these complicated lines of division, is on the whole functional for the reforms overall, since it allows for reaching the "deeper" limits which would remain undiscovered if it was not for the public articulation of different stands. This alone seems to be a crossing over of one barrier: that of knowledge and consciousness.

2.1.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

A comparison of different programs of reforms, demonstrating the creation of many tangent points between these programs (with preservation of equally important differences) illustrates a more general process. I have in mind the following dilemma: were the spontaneous processes of mutual adjustments, in the course of which the initial programs of reforms undergo modifications, a pro-

¹⁷ Compare with the analogy of the West, where frequently the socialists introduced privatization.

-reformatory or anti-reformatory factor? Could they result in a coherent program of reforms or, rather, in the course of mutual compromises would the reforms neutralize themselves and become, as before, "tamed?"

Going back to the dilemma sketched above, which can be reduced to the following question: whether the mechanisms of mutual compromises and agreements are overall a pro-reformatory or an anti-reformatory factor, I would answer in this manner:

The answer to this question varies depending on what will be considered the most serious obstacle to the reform. If we regard as the main obstacle the socio-political conflict of late 80's, then the chances of compromises of various kind were a pro-reformatory factor, since they could contribute to the weakening of the level of conflict. But if we regard the lack of cohesive and radical program to be the main obstacle, then the mechanisms of agreements and compromises, hampering the creation of such program (since the essence of compromises is the neutralization of radicalism), would be an anti-reformatory factor.

It seems that the specific case of Poland consisted in the coexistence of both obstacles, which created structural limits to the economic reform. We were dealing with a conflict, and its resolving required compromises, and those compromises were dysfunctional as far as coherence and radicalization of the reform are considered. This did not, however, change the fact that at the end of 1980's in Poland both a radical reform and solution to the conflict were needed. The point is that the subsequent course of events has confirmed that not the reform (and so a change within the system) but rather a radical transformation the whole system is possible. Only this transformation could make solving of the socio-political conflict possible. In some sense then, the postulates of reform (and thus the changes within the framework of the hitherto existing system) and solving the conflict were mutually exclusive.

The problem also consists in the fact that the evolution of boundaries of limits to reforms has yet another dimension. Already in the 1980's, smaller and smaller part of society was still interested in the reform. I do claim that the state of social apathy could be a barrier to the reform. I believe that in some sense it is the opposite. The communist offer of reform came too late. More and more social groups, not

perceiving any chances for reforming the system, started to manage their problems on their own, in a way "apart from" the system (second economy, emigration, temporary work abroad). To those people and to the groups being formed the reform was not what they waited for any more. In this way we return to the dilemma outlined in the introduction to this chapter. Although as a result of these actions *the specific reform did not receive support, the sum of spontaneous mechanism has transformed the system in the long run*. Actions undertaken by the people were therefore a faulty substitute of real reform. The point is whether the transformations which took place as a result of those actions have facilitated a radical reconstruction of the economy in the post-communist period, or have they constituted a blockade to this reconstruction. The analysis of this problem will be undertaken in the next chapter.

Studies on the limits to economic reforms at the close of communism, take as their point of departure the obvious fact that the main blockade to the real reform was the hitherto existing political system. Attempts to change the situation, begun in 1987 (through, for example, public discussions over different programs of reforms), were the first step to a radical change. Its realization, begun in 1989, could not be undertaken under communism, even most liberalized.

2.2. LIMITS TO THE ECONOMIC CHANGES DURING POST-COMMUNISM¹⁸

2.2.1. INTRODUCTION

After the collapse of communism in 1989 it seemed at first glance that there were no limits, was no communism, and that economic changes were much more radical than the traditional "reform." But this is only

¹⁸ I am indebted to Stanisław Gomułka who gave me invaluable help providing constructive critiques and comments in all stages of my work on this study. This chapter was prepared for the project "Limits to Economic Transformation" headed by S. Gomułka and has never been published before.

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half of the truth. There are still many limits to the ongoing changes though they have changed their character compared to the "limits under communism." It would be also an oversimplification to say that there is no communism at all in Poland. One can see many communist legacies at the level of the social structure, and in the social consciousness and social organization. Perhaps these are not legacies of communism *per se*, but rather permanent features of the society that cannot be changed as rapidly as the formal structure. Last, but not least, the general direction of the ongoing economic changes has some similar points with the goals of the communist-led reforms, though the latter were never implemented.

All these reasons make it appropriate to analyze the limits to the economic changes being currently implemented now in Poland. The first Solidarity government proposed to draw a "thick line" in order to make a clear demarcation between the past and the present. Such a thick line can be easily understood as a political willingness to reject the former communist order and to mobilize people by means of an attractive vision of the future, but the socio-technical aim of such an idea is one thing, and the correctness of the description of the social reality implicated in it another. In reality there is no single thick line distinguishing between the past and present. There are rather many thin lines and networks linking the old and the new order, and not all of them were destroyed by the political breakthrough of the 1989-90. In Post-communist reality we can find both legacies of communism and former reform ideas.

This is why it still seems reasonable to speak about limits to economic transformation. But this transformation is much more general and radical than reform and this is the reason why I prefer the term *change*. This change toward a market economy faces many constraints which I will try to analyze in this chapter.

The preceding chapter has described the limits to the economic reforms under communism. As a matter of fact, these reforms had to collapse because the most important limit to them was communism itself. From this point of view the real reform started after the political breakthrough of 1989. However, this change was the change of the system, not the change in the system, as "normal" reforms were. On the other hand, some features of this change, as mentioned above, its planned, designed character, and a centralistic way of implementation,

resembled some characteristics of a reform. I think that it is quite reasonable to adopt a third thesis: radical political breakthrough enabled the promotion of real economic reform. Transformation started with the radical change of the political elite. However, the economic structure with the dominance of state ownership, the artificial price system, etc, remained the same at the beginning. The process of changing it took the form of the economic reform being implemented in the "friendly" political environment or even promoted by the politicians, the reverse of the situation during communist era.

The radical reform - or change - being implemented in the post-communist period is facing its limits, too. Some of them already emerged during the last communist attempts at reforms. I have in mind here the deeper, non-political limits described in the preceding chapter. In other words, non-communist reform has inherited some "communist" limits to it. This will be analyzed in the chapter. .

When I speak about change and limits to it I have in mind the limits to the program of economic transformation the implementation of which started in January, 1990. This program has had two main goals: the stabilization of the economic situation, with the reduction of the near hyperinflation as one of the most important tasks; and a general systemic transformation of the Polish economy toward a market economy. Both goals, and, respectively, both stages of this economic program have their specific limits. The most obvious one, which is common to both, is the intellectual limit: nobody knows how the transformation from a communist to a market economy should be achieved. According to Balcerowicz (1990), who is the main architect of the economic transformation, the future model, i.e. the market economy, seems to be clearer than the way in which it can be achieved.

The main goal of the stabilization stage was to reduce inflation by eliminating government subsidies, devaluating the Polish zloty, liberalizing prices, and imposing controls on wages. The second stage of the economic program is devoted to the general restructuring of the economic system. The privatization of Polish state-owned enterprises is its main element and this is supposed to improve the competitiveness and the performance of the Polish economy. As a result, the spirit of entrepreneurship should be the main driving force of the economy (Balcerowicz 1990, 1990a).

In the first months of the implementation of the stabilization plan, monthly inflation rate decreased from the 78.6 percent in January 1990

to 3.4 percent in June 1990 (*Rzeczpospolita*, 30 July 1990). But the volume of sales of industrial production in the first six months comparing with the first six months of 1989 was lower by 28 percent (*Rzeczpospolita* 30 July 1990) and real wages dropped by 36 percent between January and May 1990 (*Wstępna informacja...*, 1990). The previously unknown phenomenon of unemployment emerged, grew quite fast and reached 4.2 percent outside of agriculture (*Rzeczpospolita*, 30 July 1990). Three years later at the beginning of 1993, inflation was still present though controlled, the first signs of overcoming the recession had emerged, and the rate of unemployment had exceeded 12 percent.

Some recession was planned as a tool of restructurization but the majority of the state enterprises at the beginning of the program's implementation reacted in a rather passive way to the demand constraints: a "wait and see" strategy seemed to be predominant (*Czas recesji*, 1990). But generally, the main goals of the "stabilization stage" of the program were fulfilled. Then the second stage, that of structural changes, was to have come.

Although my analysis is mainly devoted to the first stage of Post-communism, which covers also the first stage of the economic Program (1989-90), I will also present some hypotheses on the constraints in the transition from the first to the second stage of a program.

The starting point of my analyses is one of the theses of the previous chapter, that during the process of the evolution of the communist system, and also during the transitory period of post-communism, new limits and constraints were discovered. Each stage of development Produced its own limits. It is an open question whether this evolution of limits is the evolution of reality or rather the evolution of the Perception of limits. Nevertheless, different elements were considered to be the main obstacle to the economic reforms in the middle of the 1950's, during the 1970's, during the decade of 1980's and also now, in the transitory period of post-communism. Although the main aim of my analysis is the description of the "post-communist limits," I will also be comparing them with the "old" communist limits. Moreover, I would also like to repeat the thesis that the characteristic feature of the evolution of the limits to transformation is that the new limits did not replace the old ones. Rather, each period creates its own limits, which combine with at least some of the previous limits to the reforms.

Limits to economic change differ not only in time, they are also socially differentiated. For many years, the ruling elite attributed obstacles to the reforms to the attitudes of society, while the latter considered the ruling elite to be one of the most important barriers to real economic transformation. We can ask: how does this social perception of limits look now?

We can see that limits to economic changes were changing and flexible both during communism and post-communism. This flexibility of limits to changes reflects the flexibility and the unclear nature of the system's identity. Never, even during the darkest communist period, was it clear what was socialist and what could be labeled as "antisocialist." These definitions were the elements of a political game, and they could be changed very easily.

From this point of view, the post-communist situation is even more unclear. It is not known what is the identity of this transitory period. On the other hand, the nature of the future model is described by the concepts of market economy, parliamentary democracy and civil society.¹⁹ These seemed to be precise enough to mobilize people against communism, but after its collapse their motivating capacity decreased. As a result, real limits are discovered in everyday economic and political practice, and they can differ from day to day. This is why it is so difficult to analyze these limits during the ongoing process.

The main period which is covered by my analysis is the spring 1989 - autumn 1990 phase of economic change, which was an element of a broader systemic transformation which started with the Round Table Agreement (spring 1989). This is the period of the primary stage of post-communism; the old system collapsed and the beginnings of a new one were created. The choice of this period can be justified by the fact that during that time the decisive changes in the Polish economic system took place. It was the first non-communist government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki which implemented the crucial measures of the stabilization plan. Three subsequent governments, those of Jan K. Bielecki, of Jan Olszewski, and of Hanna Suchocka, have continued the general line of this policy and were still trying to implement the second

¹⁹ See "Uchwała programowa II Zjazdu delegatów NSZZ Solidarność (projekt)," *Gazeta Wyborcza* 23 March 1990.

stage of the program, that of structural changes. I will also refer to these problems of the transition from the first to the second stage of the program.

According to the main thesis of my paper, limits to the economic changes result both from the past and from the logic of the ongoing transition. The next section is devoted to the analysis of ideological, political, and social limits resulting from communist legacies and from the dynamic of the transition itself.

2-2.2. THE OLD AND NEW LIMITS TO THE ECONOMIC CHANGES IN THE EARLY 1990'S

TYPOLOGY OF LIMITS

Any typology of limits to economic change should recognize both the sources of limits which were presented in the first chapter, and the types of the limits, which will be presented in this part. But first of all, it is necessary to answer the following question: limits to what? This means: what types of economic changes are the objects of the limits?

Poland is moving toward a market economy of the West European type. This is to be achieved through the so-called "Balcerowicz plan," which began to be implemented at the beginning of 1990. This plan was probably only one of the possible ways toward a market economy, although no other complex and detailed programs were prepared. As I mentioned in the introduction, the general ideas of this program were continued during 1991 and even in 1992 by the Olszewski government, without Balcerowicz as a Deputy Prime Minister. Thus it is important to distinguish between the goal, the market economy, and the way to achieve it, the economic program of the government. Both of these phenomena can face, or create, their own limits, limits to the goal of a market economy and limits to the way charted by the "Balcerowicz plan." Of course, many of the limits to the economic program of a given government are the universal limits facing every transition to a market economy, but some of the limits result from the specific way chosen to achieve this goal and may not be important if some other way to the world market economy is chosen. In spite of these two types of limits, a third one is also possible: We can consider some elements of the economic program to be the limits to achieving a market economy.

In that case, the very way to a market economy would be the limit to it ("the way as a limit to the goal"). This seems to be rather speculative at the first glance, though in practice it is not. As I will try to show, some elements of the program can be analyzed in that way, especially from the sociological point of view.

The distinctions presented above are in my opinion very important, though sometimes it is very difficult to draw them into an analysis of economic life. I would like to stress that in order to understand the ongoing changes in Poland we should not be too preoccupied with the economic program. We should also watch more general problems from a perspective in which the present program is just a step, though a very important one. This kind of analysis is also a way of avoiding the danger of the analysis becoming outdated, which is a real danger in a period of fast changes.

The next part of my analysis will be devoted to a more detailed presentation of the different types of limits according to their typology. Constructing this typology means for me a typology of the sources of limits, a typology of the objects to limits and, finally, the typology of limits in their narrow sense. The first two typologies were presented in the first chapter. Let it be remembered that I there have proposed a thesis that the three main sources of changes are also generating barriers to changes. Thus, it is possible to consider reforms, adaptation processes, and political breakthrough not only as sources of changes, but also as limits to them.

Concerning limits in a narrow sense, I propose to divide them into four categories: intellectual, ideological, political, and social.²⁰ All these can be regarded as potential constraints to the economic transformation. Table 1 presents the typology of limits (see p. 61).

Underlying my analysis is the general thesis that there is an evolution of limits. There was a period during which the barriers to economic changes were located mainly in the personal characteristics and composition of the political elites, but starting in the 1980's, the role of structural constraints could be perceived. These constraints were of two kinds. First of all there was the role of the political structure with the dominant role of the communist party that made crucial economic

²⁰ The role of the intellectual and ideological limits to the transformation was stressed by S. Gomułka.

Table 1.

The analytical typology of the limits to economic change in Poland

SOURCES OF LIMITS:	TYPES OF LIMITS:	OBJECTS OF LIMITS:
Previous reforms	Intellectual	Limits to the market (limits to the goal)
Spontaneous adaptive Processes	Ideological	Limits to the program (limits to the measures)
	Political	
Type of political breakthrough	Social	The program as a limit (the way as a limit to the goal)

reforms impossible. The role of the social structure was also important. According to many analyses, (Narajek 1986; Staniszkis 1985; Rychard 1987) the patterns of social behavior, the informal ways through which people were incorporated into the system, made the system's change difficult. Also, some welfare mechanisms were deeply rooted in the social structure and consciousness. The structure of Polish industry Produced its own social structure. Strong branch lobbies, with strong groups of workers and enterprises, proved to be one of the most important political institutions (Morawski 1986, p. 133). On the other hand, according to the results of many sociological studies the majority of the population rejected the communist system in the political and economic area. During the elections of 1989, they also rejected it in practice. This internal inconsistency between structural cooption on the one hand, and ideological, or even behavioral, rejection on the other creates many tensions in the system and may be the source of the limits to the transformation. As per my thesis, after the collapse of communism we see more clearly this type of limits, a matter always Present though masked by the predominant role of the political limits.

Resulting from the thesis on evolution there is the thesis on the change in the character of the limits. Some of the previous limits have now become a chance for economic change. This is the case with the Political situation, though some features of it can still create limits to transformation. On the other hand, some of the previous factors Promoting change are now constraints. This could be the case with crucial social groups' attitudes and behavior. During the communist

period the majority of society rejected the political order. Sometimes the slogans of democracy were popular ways of expressing protest against communist rule. Also the slogan of the market was used in a way that created the myth of a free market economy (Kolarska-Bobińska 1990). Will the support for them survive the conditions of the painful economic program and the difficulties with the beginnings of the democracy? This is the crucial problem for contemporary Poland.

INTELLECTUAL AND IDEOLOGICAL LIMITS

The most important ideological limitation to the ongoing changes toward the market economy is the problem of the incongruence between the legacy of Solidarity and the direction of these changes. Solidarity is still in the process of changing its identity from a symbol of the national will toward a set of heterogeneous units. The trade union is one of the most important of these units, but there is the problem of the rest of the "Solidarities," of their separate identities.

Until the autumn of 1990 the lack of institutionalization caused the overideologization of economic disputes and this was another limit to economic transformation. Such ideological labeling was more popular, but these labels were sometimes used in a very peculiar way. The first Solidarity government (and following governments too) was sometimes described as neoliberal, and at other times as too leftist. The ideological labeling process was a way through which political actors tried to structure the social space. The danger of this phenomenon was that in a country in which these labels were artificial and not deeply rooted in any serious tradition they could at the same time limit the flexibility of the actors. There was one factor counteracting this process. This was the pragmatic and ideologically free orientation of the first non-communist government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki and its economic group. This government was trying to avoid ideological labeling and to present itself as a force trying to promote a normal economic system, without any ideological bias. This was a very interesting phenomenon in a country in which formerly everything was so strongly ideologically biased. The notion of a social market economy was used by Prime Minister Mazowiecki in his Sejm presentation in January, 1990, but without any elaboration. One can assume that constructing this notion was a way of compromising between certain traditions of Solidarity

and the demands of the program. Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz said in June 1990: "Privatization does not mean Poland's transition to wild capitalism in its 19th century version" (Balcerowicz 1990b). The notions of a market or normal economy were used more frequently than was the notion of capitalism.

I am of the opinion that the need for ideological labeling and ideological vision was greater among the politicians opposing the government than within society. The pragmatic orientation of the government fit social attitudes quite well, because people were fed up with ideological visions. This was the real end of the era of ideology in Poland. Attempts at the ideologization of economic disputes can be regarded from this point of view as obstacles to transformation. They resulted from Poland's peculiar political structure and from the lack of Political pluralism. Mazowiecki's government successfully avoided these traps, and its strategy met social expectations. A pragmatic strategy in defining the future goal was also a way of decreasing the tensions that resulted from the inconsistency between the workers' legacy and the transformation. Using the word "capitalism" would be much more counterproductive from this point of view than the word "market."

The liberal government of J.K. Bielecki was more "ideological" in a "market" sense while, on the other hand, Olszewski's government was sometimes rejecting some market slogans. But paradoxically, both of them were continuing the main line of the reform.

One of the important ideological limits to the economic transformation was the lack of real programmatic differences between the political parties and the domination of "overrideologization" in economic disputes. This was present in the first phase of post-communism, before the emergence of a multi-party system, but continued after that. Even today, three years after the collapse of communism, many analyses point out that the differences in economic Programs between political parties are not very clear. They are substituted by ideological differences. Sometimes some of them resemble the general options of a "civilizational" character: between pro-western and more autarchical orientations. These types of divisions had already emerged in the communist era and were analyzed in the preceding chapter.

These types of limits result from the political breakthrough in which many legacies of the past still exist. The legacy of the Solidarity

tradition, with a strong bargaining power for the workers, is also a case in point. These are, in my opinion, the constraints to the general direction to the market economy. Part of the ideological and intellectual constraints result from the legacies of the former reform paradigm. The non-violent and evolutionary character of the changes reflected the obvious similarities between them and the previous reforms. The changes were implemented "from above" and the role of society was rather passive; this is also similar to the communist-led reforms. We should also add here some similarities in the general direction of the post-communist changes and previous reforms and some continuities in terms of individuals in important positions. Taking all these into account, it is hard to say that the reform paradigm was not working in Poland, at least in the first phase of post-communism. In reality, changes revealed many features of the reform, but they were implemented in a more radical way and in a completely different political environment. None the less, many reform features can be regarded as the limits to the ongoing transformation.

The program of the transformation (especially the first phase of it, during Mazowiecki's government till the end of 1990) was the result of work done by people who during the communist era were well known reformers of that economy. Such continuities and legacies of the reform paradigm can be an obstacle from the intellectual point of view, but in order to answer this question conclusively, an economic analysis should be undertaken. From the sociological point of view we can only ask whether it is possible for such one-time reformers to conceive and carry out a truly radical transformation.

This character of the reform could result in the overintellectualization of the transformation by raising issues to a level that is too scientific and thus well beyond the practical problems of private businessmen, managers, and so on. From this standpoint, with some oversimplification we can say that the methodology of change rejecting communism is to some extent similar to the previous methodology of constructing communism. The question could be summed up as: is it possible to reject the planned economy in a planned way? This way of transforming the economic system was analysed by Claus Offe, who used the term "political capitalism." He writes: "In contrast to its western pendant, the market economy that is emerging in Eastern

Europe will be, if it in fact emerges, 'political capitalism.' It is a capitalism designed, organized and set into motion by the reform elites" (Offe 1991, p. 17). This is precisely the picture of the Polish transformation at the beginning of the 1990's.

The carry-over of individuals from the previous reform efforts could also account for the inflexibility of the current program. There are two additional reasons for this inflexibility. First, the government in 1989-90 was building its identity through opposition to the identity of the previous communist governments and their way of undertaking reforms. Those governments were effective in the process of creating communist but not in the process of reforming it. They were inconsistent and ideological, and social constraints neutralized their reforms. This was not the case with the first non-communist government. Consistency and perfection seemed to be very high in the consciousness of the Polish reformers. The second reason for some inflexibility stemmed from the electoral success of 1989. The new Political elite was the child of this electoral success, and it had no Practice in coping with problems and difficulties of the type they faced. Paradoxically, in such a situation the willingness to use some former communist strategies to deal with difficulties can occur. Scapegoating, artificial unity, and ignoring the difficulties could be such strategies. To adopt these strategies would be very unfortunate, because Polish society understands the meaning of such signs very well. Whenever a situation was getting better according to the state's propaganda, it was a sign that in reality it was getting worse.

Also, Solidarity, which in 1980 protested against the pathologies of socialism but not against socialism itself, was and still is a slave to the reform paradigm to some extent. Ten years later, it started to promote radical systemic transformation and reject socialism. Was it possible for Solidarity to do so without any tensions and conflicts with its own tradition and social base? Until the middle of 1990 Solidarity was quite successful in doing this, when it became necessary to institutionalize the social divisions resulting from these tensions. I will refer to this later on.

We can hypothesize that the reform paradigm is to some extent the limit to the change. Reform as limit to change, this is one of the Paradoxes.

The voices proclaiming the acceleration and radicalization of the political changes in Poland started getting louder since the middle of

1990. They resulted in the presidential elections of December 1990, and then in the emergence of new governments (Bielecki, Olszewski, and Suchocka). These were the first steps toward the institutionalization of the internal splits within the Solidarity movement. With it we reached the end of the first phase of post-communism in the autumn of 1990. But to what extent did these processes accelerate or constrain economic change? I shall referring to this question in the next paragraphs.

POLITICAL LIMITS

In the first half of 1990 political limits resulted from the peculiar political structure that existed in Poland during that time. Although it has changed since that time, it is still far from being clear and still a constraint to economic transformation. It is very difficult to write about this type of limits in the middle of the process of political transformation. The peculiarity of the existing political structure results from the type of political breakthrough that has occurred and may impose some constraints on the economic transformation.

The Round Table Agreement of the spring 1989 resulted in the June elections and in the formation of a government in which Solidarity had the majority. Still, some important areas were controlled by former communist politicians. This was a very peculiar situation: both sides of the political contract signed at the Round Table had their representations in position of power. However, the communists practically disappeared in a political sense and Solidarity had not appeared as a political organization.

The first stage of post-communism was the period of a peculiar dichotomy, in which there was an undefined Solidarity movement on the one side, and, after the formal dissolution of the Communist Party, an empty space on the other one. I will refer to in subchapter 3.2 while describing the post-communist legitimacy crisis. This peculiar political structure influenced the politization of the economic disputes. In a situation where there was no well established political orientation, economic issues could be one of the most important instruments of political struggle. Paradoxically, this would be a continuity of the mechanism that was in play during the communist era. But during the first stage of post-communism (till the middle of 1990), criticism of the economic program of the government was not as strong as the criticism of its political program. It seems that it was a success of the economic

group within the government that it has managed to stay, at least to some extent, outside the political and ideological struggles.

However, in the long run the lack of real political pluralism and the lack of an alternative economic program could result in a generalization and totalization of the critique. Lacking such an alternative, the only way of disagreeing would be to criticize the government's entire program. It is important to notice that according to the surveys, the opinion that the government's program was our last chance was held by 18.9 percent of those surveyed and the opinion that it was one of the possible ways of improving the economy was supported by 20.3 percent ("Społeczna ocena..." 1990). Thus, public opinion did not support the non-alternative way of thinking. The Problem is that there was no (and still there is no) other alternative that has been elaborated, and this could be a real limit to the transformations that arises from the political structure.

The first sign of the end of this phase of post-communism was the moment in which this peculiar dichotomous political structure began to be transformed. It happened in the middle of 1990 when the first Political divisions in the Solidarity movement were institutionalized and then during 1991 when the first elements of a pluralistic political system emerged (among them the Democratic Union headed by T. Mazowiecki and the Center Alliance: two groups which emerged more on the basis of their attitude to L. Wałęsa, than on the basis of a program). Finally, following the Parliamentary elections of November 1991 there were about 30 political parties in Parliament and many of them having only a few MP's.

This process reflects the evolution from peculiar dichotomy to Peculiar pluralism. These are different phenomena but both of them can constraint the economic transformation. And, paradoxically, the Peculiar form of the present pluralism is to some extent the legacy of the peculiar dichotomy of the first half of 1990. This is one more reason why this first post-communist phase was so important.

First, the political parties which have emerged represent to a greater extent the divisions in the political elite itself than in society. Splits between the reformers and trade unionists, between market and non-market orientations, and finally between losers and winners in the "transitory game," were not fully institutionalized. What was mainly institutionalized were the personal connections and affiliations. As

a result, the political scene is very unclear. Those who are left-oriented in the economic sense could be at the same time right-oriented in the political sense (Grabowska 1992).

Second, although there were three governments, and two of them contradictory at a first glance (Bielecki's and Olszewski's), all of them were continuing the main direction of stabilization measures and none of them to date have succeeded in passing to the second stage of the program (that of restructuring the economy). The only important difference between two of them was that while Bielecki was openly using market slogans, Olszewski was sometimes criticizing while simultaneously implementing them (which made his position more difficult from the sociotechnical point of view).

These two phenomena show how the legacy of the first stage, represented by the peculiarities of the political structure, the lack of programmatic disputes, and the lack of real representation is still functioning.

Although the direction toward pluralism is the most probable, it is not the only one possible. A new post-communist autocracy can also be imagined. Such an autocracy could be associated either with a market or with an anti-market orientation (Kolarska-Bobińska and Rychard 1990a). Thus right-wing or left-wing autocracies are possible scenarios for the future, but it is very hard to say whether an economic transformation would be possible under a right-wing autocracy. I want to emphasize that the political vacuum of the first stage of post-communism and the peculiar pluralism of 1991/92 can still be filled with different structures. Their shape will depend mostly on the popular support given to them. This brings us to the problem of social limits.

THE SOCIAL LIMITS TO THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION

Social limits can be analyzed on the level of structure and on the level of consciousness. The importance of this distinction can be justified by the following thesis: in 1990 there was a discrepancy between the high popular support for the ongoing transformation on the level of consciousness and between the structural conditions, possibilities, and interests that could activate this support. This general thesis underpins my further analyses.

The economic views of Polish society are by no means clear and consistent. Many views and beliefs are still politically and ideologically loaded and it is very hard to estimate the support for general market slogans. Still, support for the market seems to be more a support for

a general and ideal type of an order than a support for the concrete solutions (Kolarska-Bobińska 1990). As I wrote before, the government in 1990 tended to present the market economy as the normal economy, without any ideological bias. The day on which this tendency becomes popular within society will be the day of overcoming one of the important limits to economic transformation. Of course, after general acceptance of the idea of the market, is the question of what type of market will arise - but this is the next step.

In spite of this unclear but visible and conscious support, there is the Problem of the structural constraints embodied in the Polish system. According to many researchers the level of cooption in the structure of the communist organizational system was quite high. The same people who rejected communism at the level of their responses to questionnaires played their petty everyday games trying to gain as much as possible. I will analyze these strategies in the next chapter. I am not talking about the nomenklatura group, although this, too is also a problem. I mainly have in mind the hidden nomenklatura group, which is quite large. At the level of institutions this group can be identified as industrial lobbies whose interests are oriented toward a preservation of the industrial structure of the communist economy. These are not only the interests of the managers, these are also the interests of large numbers of workers (Celiński 1989), whose vested interests would be threatened in case of bankruptcy or the restructuring of the Polish economy. In my opinion, these lobbies are still more Powerful than the economic program of the government. At the beginning of the implementation of the program, recession was greater in light industry, where output fell by 40 percent in 1990 as opposed to a 15-20 percent fall in heavy industry (*Polish stabilization...*, 1990), where the strongest lobbies exist. It would be a misunderstanding to call the representatives of these interests pro-communists. In many of these cases their enterprises were the origin of the Solidarity movement. This reflects the tensions inside the Solidarity movement I described before.

Despite these large structural interests, which could be limits to the economic transformation, there are also at play small, everyday networks of interests, of informal bargaining processes, of relations between supervisors and subordinates that also could be destroyed by the market program. These represent the legacy of the former spontaneous processes of adaptation.

The next limit to the goal of the market is the nature of Polish solidarity. This is the result of the past communist years. Several years ago, the leading Polish sociologist Stefan Nowak wrote an article in which he posed a thesis that Poles are integrated on two extreme levels: on the level of national and religious symbols and on the level of the microstructures. The communication between these two levels is very weak (Nowak 1979, p. 160). The world of institutions placed in between these two extreme levels was perceived as alien. According to Nowak, only through informalities was it possible to adapt to this hostile world. According to the views of Elżbieta and Jacek Tarkowski, at the level of microstructures there is a struggle between the small groups that are integrated internally but aggressive toward one another (Tarkowska, Tarkowski 1990).

These are pictures of society as a set of competing small groups, who sometimes refer to such values as the Nation or Church and who are surrounded by hostile institutions that become domesticated only when corrupted. How does this correspond to a picture of society in which the leading role is played by a movement called Solidarity? I think that Polish solidarity, as a feature of the social structure and not as a movement, has some peculiar characteristics. First of all, this is more the solidarity of protest *against* something than solidarity *for* something. The prevailing role of the integrative function of protest was frequently noticed by students of Polish reality. Secondly, there still exists solidarity on the two extreme levels: macro and micro. The mezzo level, that of social groups and organizations is an integrating force only during protests. This level is the crucial one for the creation of a market economy and parliamentary democracy. The weakness of this mezzo-integration, the weakness of the institutional traditions of the associations, the difficulties in the creation of organizations from below can be regarded as one of the more important constraints to the economic transformation. This means that potential interests can emerge only on the micro level, since the macro level is dominated by moral values and there are no mezzo interests to serve, as the instrument of integration (Rychard 1987a, p. 100). This pattern of social integration was enough to destroy the communist regime, but it has not been sufficient to create a market economy. Finally, three years after the implementation of the program, some new tendencies in social self-organization have emerged. They will be analyzed in the last chapter of the book.

I have described above the limits to the goal of a market transformation resulting from the incompatibilities between social consciousness and social structure. The way to the objective, i.e. the economic program of government, faces similar limits.

I would like to start with the phenomenon of the social support for the politico-economic establishment in the decisive first half of 1990. It is quite interesting to see what the relations were between the economic performance and the support for individual political figures during the first months of the implementation of the economic program. As the data in figure 1 show, the social support for the Balcerowicz plan decreased as the inflation rate decreased, and as real wages decreased. On the other hand, support for Prime Minister Mazowiecki was rather stable.²¹




Figure 1. Relation between economic performance and social support

Sources of the economic data: (1) Real wages (August 1989 = 100): Polish stabilization program after two months (material for Economic Council of Government), (2) Monthly inflation rates: *Rzeczpospolita*, 30 July 1990. Report of the Central Statistical Office.

²¹ Support for Balcerowicz's program and for Tadeusz Mazowiecki is net support. Sources of these data: results of the CBOS surveys published in *Serwis informacyjny...*, 1990, no. 8.

Below the highest and slowly decreasing line representing the support for Prime Minister Mazowiecki there is a jungle of lines representing the changing economic performance and changing support for the economic program of Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz. This is the first impression.

But behind this first impression there is a certain logic, let us say social logic, underlying these results. We see that overcoming the inflation did not increase support for the economic program. This support, beginning from January, was decreasing, and the fall of real wages is correlated with it. This does not mean, of course, that the decrease of the inflation rate is the cause of the decrease of the support for the program. It means, in my opinion, that the gains resulting from the overcoming of inflation were perceived as less important than losses caused by the lowering of real wages, and, possibly, by unemployment and recession, which are not included in the chart. For the popular perception of the economic performance the "individual" perspective was of much more importance than the systemic one (represented by the inflation rate).

Another important feature of the data presented in figure 1 is that there was a weaker connection between the support for T. Mazowiecki and the economic performance than between the support for the economic program and the economic performance. Support for Mazowiecki was also much higher than support for the economic program. This means, in my opinion, that there were two dimensions of support. The first one, strongly connected with economic performance, was the support, or the weakening of this support, resulting from threatened economic interests. This support, based on economic interest, was represented by the support for the Balcerowicz program. The second source of support was that based on moral values, symbols of Solidarity's success, and represented by the support for Mazowiecki. This type of support could absorb the possible social unrest caused by threatened economic interests as was the case during the first months of the implementation of the economic program.

This dual nature of popular support seems to be the crucial feature of the first phase of transformation. There is a question how long this moral type of support could last without any support based on

economic interests or sometimes even in spite of these threatened interests. We see that this moral support was slowly decreasing, but interest based support was not increasing. This tendency could be dangerous if not stopped. The increase of the role of the interest based support would mean the real beginning of the second phase of post-communism. Some answers to this question will be presented in the last chapter of my book.

The two types of support described above are characteristic of the two stages of the economic program: stabilization and reconstruction. Moral-based support was sufficient during the first stage, while during the second one interests were to stimulate economic restructuring. The transition from the first to the second stage engenders many tensions and these can be regarded as limits to the economic change caused by the type of the program. Below I present some of the possible tensions.

There are two contradictory philosophies of social change embodied in the government program. The philosophy of the first stage, stabilization, was negative and "from above." Inflation had to be overcome and wages decreased, and these goals were to be achieved by central decisions rather than by spontaneous social activity (Rychard 1991). The philosophy of the second stage is completely different. It is positive and "from below." The economy should be restructured and the activity of the private business sector is to be crucial. "We create the economic system of the resourceful (entrepreneurial) people" said the Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz in the first public announcement of the need for the second stage of the program in April, 1990 (Balcerowicz 1990). These two contradictory philosophies were presumably necessary, but the transition from one to another cannot be easy.

These philosophies require two different types of social behavior. The first one requires a passive personality, which will adapt to the Program and tolerate it. This was the nature of the moral-based support that was described above. This type of support was very effective in the first stage of the economic program, but is not sufficient during the next stage. This is supposed to be a stage in which an active society should enter the arena of economic life. It has to be a society that bases its activity not only on values but first of all on its interests. At least two problems arise here.

The first one is the question whether society can be easily transferred from the passive to the active state. The assumption that society can change itself easily is not justified. It was in the era of communist rule when the political elite believed that society can be easily molded. Such comparison is, of course, a great oversimplification, but it reflects, in my opinion, some elements of the reform paradigm in the designing of the present changes.

The second problem is that according to many opinions there are structural limits to the activity of society. The process of demonopolization of the economy is starting very slowly, and privatization is the long range program. It is still simply very hard for people to implement the government's appeal to go and be entrepreneurial. The assumption that many of the unemployed will become the new class of entrepreneurs (Balcerowicz 1990a) turned out to be rather optimistic due to the fact that many private businesses were the victims of the recession and that the majority of the unemployed are not entrepreneurial in a psychological sense.

During the first stage of the implementation of the economic program there was a consistency between the philosophy of the program, the type of popular support and structural conditions. In the second stage of the program, an inconsistency among these three elements can occur; the active philosophy can collide with the passive support and with the weakness of the structural possibilities of economic activity.

After two years of the economic transformation the general popular support for changes remained unclear. According to the data gathered in September 1991 the results of the Balcerowicz plan for Poland were as good as bad in the opinion of 43 percent of the respondents of a national sample and more bad than good in the opinion of 35 percent of them (*Przemiany gospodarcze...*, 1991). On the other hand, the support for J.K. Bielecki, J. Olszewski, and H. Suchocka as Prime Ministers was lower than the exceptionally high support for the first non-communist Prime Minister, T.Mazowiecki. After two years the general, moral based support for transformation resulting from the rejection of communism has declined. This is a normal phenomenon.

The support for the economic program (represented by the acceptance of the Balcerowicz plan) is still differentiated. The question arises as to whether this differentiated support is based on interests.

There are some signs that interests-based support is emerging very slowly (in 1991 the Balcerowicz plan was accepted mainly by groups located higher in the social structure) but these are only the first signs. The crucial factor here is the restructuring of the economy through Privatization, which will create real interests. This process is starting very slowly.

As a matter of fact, there is a possibility of the development of active economic behavior based on interests, but the problem is that it could be directed rather against the economic program. As I wrote with L. Kolarska-Bobińska, the success of the economic program depends on the functioning of the enterprises and individuals according to its rules. But Polish society well knows how to ignore any inconvenient rules. This is the reason why through the mechanisms of corruption, the second economy and the black market, many rules of the program can be avoided (Kolarska-Bobińska and Rychard 1990). Also some wait and see passive strategies of the enterprises seem to reflect this phenomenon. This limit to the economic transformation results from the legacy of spontaneous adaptive processes, which are the universal and stable feature of any society.

Other empirical results also show some peculiarities of the social support for the program in early 1990 and after. In early 1990 it was rather the program of the young, not the poor and educated persons working in the state-owned sector and being members of Solidarity ("Społeczna ocena..." 1990). We can hypothesize that the support for the program was located more in the groups of the intelligentsia than in others. Could this mean the continuity of the process described earlier, while analyzing the communist-led reforms, that the transformation in the beginning of 1990 was more the issue of intellectual-political support and not the support given by interests groups? From that point of view, the situation would be quite similar: both communist-led reforms and the present transformation would be promoted mainly by their political supporters. The essential difference was in the scope of this support and its character. It was much greater in 1990 and based on the moral conviction of its necessity, while previous communist-led reforms were supported because of political loyalty.

However, other data show that there are some important changes in the social support for the changes as compared between 1988 (the last

year of communism) and the end of 1990. In 1988, as I noted earlier, the authorities and intelligentsia were perceived to be the most important supporters of the economic reform. At the end of 1990 authorities were still highly located (although these are completely different authorities, non-communist) and - what is more important - the representatives of the private sector are perceived to be also one of the main supporters of the reform (which was not case two years earlier). This shows some beginnings of interest-based support.

These data inform us also that the support for the economic transformation is diversified and the differences among groups are quite high. This could mean that there will be no national consensus on the program and that its implementation will cause many social conflicts.

* * *

The future of the Polish economic transformation is very unclear. It is facing many limits and some of these limits are created by the transformation itself. This is a normal process in which spontaneous and directed mechanisms interweave. Each day shows us new challenges and limits, but the most important difference between this period and the communist one is that now, in spite of many difficulties, society can feel that the general direction of change is consistent with its aspirations. This is a major opportunity for the transformation. The problem is how to nurture this belief and not to waste it.

Polish society was always very capable of avoiding and neutralizing official measures which were not in accord with to its values and interests. These "everyday reforms" took the form of the adaptive behavior. They still last and can modify the transformation. Their sources lie in the communist era when people were trying to substitute real reform and real legitimacy by individual adaptation strategies. The next chapter is dealing with these phenomena.

CHAPTER 3

ADAPTIVE PROCESSES AND CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY

3.1. BEYOND LEGITIMACY: ADAPTIVE PROCESSES DURING THE DECLINE OF COMMUNISM¹

3.1.1. ACTIVE ADAPTATION

A significant part of literature devoted to the systems and societies of "real socialism" contains, in my opinion, a serious gap. It is dominated by a picture of systems rejected by society "en masse," the history of which was a continuous sequence of rebellions and conflicts. The causes and the course of those conflicts have been discerned far more successfully than what has happened in the periods between them. The assessment presented above has been intentionally exaggerated in order to outline the purpose of this chapter more clearly. I am going to search in it for an answer to the question why did people "join" a monocentric system imposed from above (and often rejected).

What are the advantages of studying the adaptation processes during the decline of communism? They were a substitute for legitimation. Although the degree of legitimacy of the system after the downfall of communism has risen considerably, there have remained certain problems with legitimation, which sometimes allow us to speak about a new form of crisis of legitimation. There have also remained various forms of adaptive actions. Discussing these phenomena in the subsequent chapters I will therefore refer directly to the concepts and conclusions of this chapter. The concept presented here is, in an indirect way, a discussion with the totalitarian approach as a way of explaining the communist reality. I am proposing here a competitive

¹ The initial version of this chapter was a part of a project "Crisis in Soviet Systems," coordinated by Z. Młynar. This chapter is being published for the first time. Some of its preliminary ideas are included in my article "Konflikt i przystosowanie: dwie koncepcje ładu społecznego w Polsce" in M. Marody and A. Sulek (eds), *Rzeczywistość polska i sposoby radzenia sobie z nią*, Warsaw University, 1987.

model of explanation, which accentuates the role of the internal dynamics of the former system and its ability to meet with "social entrenchment."

I will present here an outline of a theoretical concept, which could explain the sources, forms and conventions of the people's "joining" the functioning of this type of institutional system with the example of Poland at the end of the 1980's. Thus it is an attempt to answer the question about the mechanism stabilizing a monocentric system. Empirical studies clearly show that, although the institutional system was evaluated rather low, there was, however, something that caused this evaluation to be differentiated (positive aspects were perceived as well), and which, above all, caused the negative opinion in a "symbolic sphere" (i.e. manifested by attitudes) to result less often than it would be expected in contesting behavior.

Hence the main purpose of the work presented here is to identify the cementing and stabilizing factors. I should, however, point out at the beginning what will not be the subject of this analysis, although it had a certain stabilizing effect. I will leave outside this analysis the role of Poland's position in the Warsaw Pact, and (in principle) the role of repressions and the fears of those repressions. Many people could say: what, in that case, is there left to be analyzed and studied, since those were the main factors stabilizing the system? Perhaps this is true. But I am interested in those stabilizers, which the system had worked out in Poland during its history of over 40 years - those which did not consist in repressions. This chapter will aim at proving their existence, understanding their sources, and showing their functions.

I will start the analyses with an introductory outline of concepts of active adaptation as the most general conceptual framework, in which I will analyze the sources of stability. Next I will undertake a discussion (theoretical and empirical) with the concepts of legitimation as a way of explaining stability. In my conception, rejecting violence as the main stabilizer, I similarly question (or similarly point out significant limitations of) the concept of legitimation in explaining the sources of stability. In the following part I will attempt to analyze more thoroughly the forms of "active adaptation," with a special consideration given to the role of values and interests, as well as to the role of informal mechanisms. Next I will present an outline of a concept generalizing mechanisms of active adaptation, i.e. the concept of

a "fourfold system." In the last chapter of this book I will refer to this concept, analyzing its usefulness in the description of post-communist reality. Naturally, analyzing the adaptation processes, I will also discuss the "conditions of moving" from the state of peace to a state of social uprising, from adaptation to revolt. Some adaptation mechanisms can also be analyzed as initially stabilizing, but secondarily and indirectly destabilizing. Theses on that matter will be presented in the last part of the chapter.

In a discussion about adaptive processes, it sometimes seems that these are processes in which passive individuals or groups adapt to the requirements of their partners (in our case, to the requirements of an institutional system). I propose a different concept, according to which adaptation is understood as an active process, in the course of which not only an individual or a group is undergoing transformation, but also the "system" is modified by those who are adapting² (Rychard and Sterniczuk 1985, pp. 16-9). I will be interested mainly in those adaptation processes which, although they did not always consist in aiming at general values of the type of democracy, they caused certain modifications of institutional systems. As a result, the real needs and values of individuals did not have to be realized solely in the private sphere. A specific feature of those adaptive processes was the fact that a majority of them occurred not in the people-people, but in the People-system relations. People's partners in those processes were not

² The processes of a spontaneous modification of the system in the course of adaptive actions in Poland were described most thoroughly in the conception of Jadwiga Staniszkis (e.g. 1976), who analyzed these phenomena on the level of industrial organizations (see also Beksiak 1982, p. 110). Activism as a feature of some individual or collective adaptive processes is also emphasized in the works of Koralewicz-Zębiak (1983), Turski (1985), Sułek (1984), Narojek (1986). The adaptive processes would consist, therefore, in a creation of possibilities to realize personal or group goals and aspirations within the structure of the existing system. This phenomenon has been described by Koralewicz-Zębiak (1985) and Wnuk-Lipiński (1985) as a process of "taming" the hostile society created from above into a friendly society (mainly - according to the authors - through democratization, although they also clearly point to the role of a private sphere and small groups). In foreign literature we could point to the already classical work of Selznick (1966) or the work of Crozier and Friedberg (1982). The proposal presented here would belong to the trend of this type of analyses. In Polish literature see also Sterniczuk (1984). From among recent works we could also list Marody's (1988) concept of "collective sense," or a comprehensive analysis of the functioning of Polish society under real socialism (Marody [ed.] 1991).

other groups of people (most often), but institutional structures. This is a result of structural solutions in the sphere of politics, which gave the state structure a certain omnipotence and limited "horizontal" relations. W. Narojek (1986) calls this process "putting human interaction under state control." This does not mean that horizontal relations did not exist. They were important, especially in the periods of open phases of conflict (e.g. 1980-81). This only means that I see the importance of people-system relations as an indication of identity of this type of order, and that I am analyzing adaptation processes taking place at this level. The domination of vertical relations over the horizontal ones has, moreover, a fundamental significance for the forms of adaptive processes. For this means that they always require a reference to the system, that these processes and mechanisms exist only as long as we discuss them along with their relation to the system. Concerning this matter we can see a fundamental difference between these processes during the communist and the post-communist periods. As the analyses in the last chapter will show, in the so-called second phase of post-communism adaptive processes had mainly a horizontal character, and concerned the relations between people (individuals and groups), not between people and the institutional system.

When I am writing about a system, I have in mind a set of institutionalized rules of behavior, which mostly have a form of specific organizations functioning in the political, economic, administrative, and other spheres. Among those rules and organizations, the most important was undoubtedly the part which referred to the rules of exercising power (therefore, the system in a political sense), although analyzing the adaptation processes I will often discuss those which existed in the economic sphere as well.

We can view the period of almost 45 years from the end of the Second World War as a dramatic time, during which both sides - i.e. the "system" and the society - tried to adapt to each other. This means that the representatives of government tried to shape the society according to their doctrinal and ideological goals, and society, not wanting to give up its traditions, culture, and value systems, tried - in various ways - to "adapt" the system to its expectations. I do not mean to suggest here that this was a game of two equal partners: the superiority of force and means of influence on the side of the

government seems to be obvious. But in this case it is even more worthwhile to take into consideration the limited effectiveness of those actions of the government in Poland, which were supposed to "build socialism." There are various indicators of this limited effectiveness, but as the most important among them one could recognize certain structural features (e.g. the fundamental significance of private ownership of land in agriculture, the role of the Catholic Church in Public life) and certain social processes (the continuity of serious political conflicts and rebellions directed against methods of governing, a certain pluralization of social life). These two sides had not, of course, equal possibilities of activity. The system of power, controlling the economy and other spheres of life, had at its command as mechanisms of influence mainly the control of processes of work and employment and the control of political activity, thus making the behavior of classes and social strata dependent on the ideal preferred by the doctrine and ideology. However, society did not lack influence. The point is that its influence was being realized not within the formal structure of the system, but usually in spite of it, or "next to it." It often took a shape of outbursts of discontent, usually combined with strikes in the state industry system. As a result of these open conflicts, some elements of the system were undergoing change and started to suit social aspirations better. However, usually after those periods there was a "comeback:" changes were hampered, and sometimes the structural methods were becoming even more "repressive" than they were before the moment of outburst. In spite of that, the system was somewhat "different" than before the outbreak of conflict, although the degree and scope of this difference are not easy to define.

Apart from violent struggles for change, there were also other, more "hidden" mechanisms of adapting "the system to the people." These mechanisms functioned during the so-called "normal" periods, i.e. without strikes or rebellions. I have in mind here the whole sphere of informalities, deviations from official rules of functioning. I have described them in the first chapter.

The analysis of informal processes and phenomena has a certain tradition in Polish sociology. For a few years now, there have appeared new perspectives in their study. In sociology, the perspective of "pathology" has almost disappeared, while a tendency to analyze systemic functions of those informalities, and to study their role in

micro-arrangements in group life, has started to dominate. These problems are being dealt with under different theoretical perspectives.³ At least two essential features distinguish those theoretical approaches. *Firstly*, their authors assume a various degree of intentionality of the government's functioning in allowing the informal processes to form. Thus we encounter opinions that the authorities themselves in a way "created those informalities" in order to level the ineffective functioning "from above" of the created system. There are also opinions that those processes were being created spontaneously, and were at most tolerated and/or strengthened by the authorities when they were propitious to their goals. I am inclined to share this particular view. *Secondly*, the analyses may concentrate on macro-social or micro-social results of actions of this type. The subject of analysis in this chapter are the macro-social results of this type of phenomena.

Among the recent works on these problems one should mention the analysis of A. Kamiński (1992) who interprets mechanisms of corruption as one of the three strategies adopted by the communis state regarding society. The first strategy, coercion, has been replaced by corruption, which is negative in character. The only positive strategy is reform. However, its implementation can be dangerous for the political system (Kamiński 1992, pp. 256-59). Although the adaptation

³ For example, scientists analyzing the industry and the sociology of organization, described various types of bargaining and games for adjustment. As an example, we could point to the works by Staniszkis (e.g. concept of authodynamics of structures, 1976), Kurczewski and Frieske (1974), Kolarska-Bobińska (1984), Iwanowska (1982), Sterniczuk (1982; 1984), the collective work by Federowicz, Iwanowska and Żukowski (1986) presenting the concept of "reciprocal services" as an adaptation mechanism, or the works by Federowicz (1992a) and Poleszczuk (1991). The same subject - but not in reference to industry, but as an element of the whole order - appears also in the concept, introduced by Krzemiński (1984), of a feudalization of the social system in the Gierek era. There are also interesting perspectives for analysis of other subjects: of local authorities (e.g. the client-patron concept of Tarkowski, 1981), theoretical concepts of corruption (Kamiński, 1986), "micro-organizational" and "macro-organizational" perspective (mainly Narojek 1982; 1986; Nowak 1979). I should point here as well to the analysis of the "economics of daily life," describing informal processes with reference to the theory of exchange, by Pawlik (1985). I have in mind also studies of individual and collective strategies for "survival" (Marody 1985; 1987), for "innovational adaptation" (Turski 1985), or the "reaction to a situation of an outside compulsion" (Koralewicz-Zębiak 1983; 1985). We could also include here the analyses by Nowak (1984) about various ways of going "outside the system."

strategies analyzed here are much broader than the corruption mechanisms and I do not consider them to be the strategies adopted by the state but rather by society I would like to point out Kamiński's idea that the corruption has to be studied from the macro perspective. This is an important mechanism penetrating the institutional structure of the communist order together with two other mechanisms analyzed by Kamiński - coercion and reform.

The concept accepted here does not restrict adaptation processes only to informal phenomena. They constituted and still constitute their important part, but only a part of them. The next assumption of my analysis is thus a conviction that the processes of active adaptation often take the forms of informal phenomena, although they can also appear as very "formal" processes.

The concept of active adaptation is, however, in no case equivalent to accepting the convention of a game, or the "negotiation" convention. Except for short periods in history when these categories described real social processes according to their original meaning, I do not see their usefulness in the analysis. Firstly, as I mentioned before, analysis in these categories assumes equality of partners, which was not the case in the Polish situation, when one of the partners could change the rules of the game while it was being played, could invalidate its results, etc.⁴ Secondly, the convention of a game and negotiations assumes that both players have a strategy directed at a positive outcome of the game. I believe that both sides played somewhat different "games." The communist authorities played for "real socialism," while the people played for individual or group self-fulfilment. What I mean is that not always at the foundations of a majority of the people's actions modifying the system, in the course of active adaptation processes, lay a conscious desire for such modification. Not always was there a conscious *Policy* directed at changing the system, but there was a conscious desire to make the system more bearable to oneself (Rychard and Szymanderski 1985). These last remarks refer to the so-called normal periods, since in the periods of open forms of conflict such conscious policy was followed.

⁴ M. Crozier and E. Friedberg (1982, p. 111) argue that these conditions are not necessary for the game.

I would incline to a thesis that in the post-war period both the system and society have changed in the course of those twofold adaptation processes.

Referring to the above observations, I would like to stress that I do not perceive government-society relations as a process of easy and continuous "plastical" shaping of society by an effective and purposeful government. Such a view is to me as equally simplified and untrue as the opposing view, according to which the relations between the two forces were an unending sequence of rebellions, rejections of the system by the society, and repressions of that "disobedient society" by the authorities. I reject both of these extreme views, for although each has some elements of truth, none of them alone touches the essence of the problem. It is clear to me that the dynamics of relations between the institutional communist system and society should rather be perceived as an unstable balance between the desire of the state to "etatize society" (a phrase used by Narojek 1986, and Krzemiński 1984) and the desire of society to "socialize" the state. Both sides used different tactics adapting their partner to their visions and ideals, but they also adapted themselves and changed in the course of this process.⁵

It sometimes also occurred that both sides were giving up part of their original goals or had actually modified them. I am inclined to suppose that the government gave up its original goals at least a few times. I also believe that the authorities gradually became used to the thought that in Poland the realization of the "ideological program of socialism" will be marked by certain differences, compared to other countries of real socialism. These differences - initially only tolerated - during some periods were becoming legalized differences, and were made into elements of programs (e.g. the slogan of the "Polish road to socialism" or the constitutional entry about individual farms).

What, then, stabilized the system, which was perceived as an element in adaptation processes occurring between the government and society? As the above analyses indicate, I see the sources of that balance and stabilization neither - on the one hand - only (or even mainly) in "legitimation," i.e. in a conscious political support, nor - on the other hand - only in terror and fear of repressions. *What really built that unstable balance, was the whole, difficult to define area spreading*

⁵ In sum, this was a process of "dual dependency," described by W. Adamski (1985).

"between" classical legitimation and the terror and fear of repressions. Exactly between those boundaries lies most of the above-mentioned adaptation processes. These processes sustained the system in spite of its low social acceptance. The system had, of course, other, more powerful safeguards, resulting from its placement among other communist countries and from military alliances. These were self-evident. However, to sociologists more interesting seem the "internal" stabilizing mechanisms, resulting from the dynamics of mutual adjustment processes taking place between the authorities and society. This type of balance was socially costly. Lack of alternatives and pragmatic adaptation in behavior with a simultaneous lack of acceptance in attitudes - these phenomena deepen the divergence between the sphere of "thinking" and "acting," between the "private" and the "official." However, the essence of real socialism in Poland consisted of the existence of such splits and divergences in various spheres of life. They were an effect of inconsistency in the normative Principles of the system. The analysis of adaptation processes in categories of legitimation also points to the existence of those incoherences.

3.1.2. LEGITIMATION AND ADAPTATION: LIMITATIONS AND CHANCES OF THE CONCEPT

Emphasizing the limited usefulness of concepts of legitimation in explaining the sources of stability, I am at the same time indicating the direction of analysis which I will not follow. This choice, however, requires a theoretical and empirical justification. From the discussion of limits of this concept will simultaneously emerge more clearly the direction of analyses to be developed in the subsequent parts of this chapter.

From the sociological point of view, concepts of legitimation⁶ are a convenient tool for analysis because they create a theoretical

⁶ From among Polish authors the following have discussed legitimation with reference to the final years of communism in Poland: Staniszki (1979; 1984), Pańków (1981), Jasińska and Siemieńska (1981), Jasińska (1984), Wesołowski and Mach (1983), Morawski (1980), Nowak (1984), Mreła (1984), Lamentowicz (1983). We could also include here the collective work edited by Rychard and Sułek (1988).

framework for the study of processes taking place between political and economic systems and the society. It is the legitimacy (or the lack of it) which creates a perspective through which the particular strata of the society perceive their country. A study of processes of legitimation, must therefore mean in practice an analysis of relations between social interests and aspirations, and the shape of the system of power.

Most generally speaking, as a legitimized system we would consider a system, in which the conformability of its citizens' behavior to the decisions of the governing centers is the result of a normative acceptance of the principles creating the legitimacy of the system and the decisions resulting from those principles. Thus we can speak about legitimation of the political as well as of the economic sphere. We can also analyze the degree of legitimation of the social structure understood as the degree of acceptance of the rules governing social promotion and degradation, rules of attaining various social positions. In the general definition given here I have tried to distinguish the concept of legitimation from obedience resulting from sources other than conscious acceptance - e.g. from fear or from a certain pragmatic adaptation. This way we touch one of the theoretical dilemmas. For if we restrict the concept of legitimation, it will be easy to defend a thesis that the main sources of obedience and stability lie outside of legitimation, and that they can often be found in a specific pragmatic adaptation resulting from instrumental motives (Mann 1975; Mayntz 1975). In such a situation we clearly point to limits of the usefulness of the concept of legitimation, and it seems reasonable then to speak about consent and adaptation (for the purpose of describing those pragmatic sources of obedience) rather than legitimation.

Actually, the discussion presented here refers to this theoretical dilemma. The main question is: *did the sources of obedience lie in some type of legitimation or rather in a pragmatic adaptation?* Here I transcend the framework of the perspective of legitimation. I am looking for the sources of systemic stability, the sources of "joining" the institutional system (Mann 1975). The source of these processes is not always legitimation. With such an approach we have a chance, then, to define the limits of usefulness of the perspective of legitimation. For one could assume that the specifics of the Polish situation meant the low degree of legitimacy of the system at the level of rules of exercising power, with a simultaneous, more widespread, consent to

a number of definite solutions visible in daily life. This type of consent created adaptation resulting mainly from pragmatic motives. I will attempt to continue this discussion later.⁷

Empirical research of the "Poles" series, undertaken in Poland in the 1980's, convinces that a centralized political system, and in particular the hegemonic role of one party, did not possess mass legitimation. The percentage of those who supported this model oscillated from 14 Percent to 28 percent, depending on the way of asking the question (Rychard 1985; 1989). Moreover, as I will show in the next chapter, this already very weak legitimization underwent an apparent erosion at the end of the 1980's. Other studies indicate that a possibility of consent appeared at the level of social micro-organization (e.g. in the industrial enterprises). A systematic analysis of the perceived sources of obedience has demonstrated that Polish society saw those sources less often in the democratism of the government, in the charisma of the leader (less than 50 percent believed that the majority of people in Poland obey the authorities; in fact, 45 percent did obey), and more often in negative-pragmatic factors and in the legality of the government. The first three motives of obedience mentioned were: fear of punishment, advantages in daily life, and belief in the legality of the government (all three were chosen by over 70 percent of those respondents who believed that people are obedient, [Rychard and Szymanderski 1986]). Thus it was a peculiar conglomerate of negative,

⁷ Distinguishing between the political-ideological sphere and the practical-pragmatic one already has a certain tradition in Poland (e.g. Lamentowicz 1982; Wesołowski and Mach 1983, 1986; Nowak 1984, the concept of "consent" of Morawski 1980, or the concept of legitimization included in the works by Staniszkis, e.g. 1979). Relationships between these types of legitimization have been discussed in various ways. It has been noted that one type of legitimization can substitute the lack of legitimization of another type, but only to a certain degree (e.g. Tarkowski, 1988), that political legitimization can hamper the building-up of a revolutionary situation as a result of decreased level of satisfying the needs (Pacewicz 1983, p. 173). Some argue that also the legitimization of the pragmatic type cannot take place without "doctrinal grounds" which, although originally of eclectic character, in the period of stabilization of the new system is increasingly being perceived as more uniform (Wesołowski and Mach 1986, p. 23). Foreign authors point to the increasing role of pragmatic legitimization as the political order stabilizes (e.g. the concept of the system's "normalizing" of Heller 1982, or the role of paternalism in legitimization: Feher 1982). The role of pragmatic factors was also described by Markus (1982) in his concept of the "overt and covert" types of legitimization, and by Mann (1977) in the categories of "institutional fit."

pragmatic, and legitimizational factors (other elements of legitimization were mentioned less often, among them the democratism of elections, and trust in the leader the least).

To the largest groups of respondents among those convinced about obedience to the authorities, this obedience resulted from the fear of repressions, from expecting advantages in the daily life, and from the legality of the government. Legality was mentioned quite often, despite the relatively low popularity of the view on a democratic procedure of election. To some respondents, then, the legality did not have to be an effect of the democratic procedure of electing the government.

These results can be seen as a *partial* confirmation of the hypothesis on the role of extra-legitimizational "stabilizers" in the social system (partial - because some elements of legitimization, e.g. legality, scored high, while some extra-legitimizational, e.g. geopolitics, relatively lower). They remain in concordance with theoretical concepts describing the reality of the countries of real socialism. One could assume that they confirm a more general regularity as well: after all, M. Mann's concept regarding "institutional fit" (1975), or the work by R. Mayntz (1975) on the sources of stability other than legitimization, referred to the western realities. The phenomena of the "deficit of legitimization" and of the substitutional character of other stabilizers would have, therefore, a more universal character, though, of course, the sources of the lack of legitimization in the two systems would be totally different.

The results of studies indicate moreover that the conviction about the importance of pragmatic sources of adaptation was significantly less dependent on the declared political views than was the conviction about legitimizational sources of obedience. Thus one could advance a thesis that *adaptation was (is?) in some sense apolitical, which means that both the advocates and the opponents of the existing institutions in the system of power could agree on the fact that the system was based on the extra-legitimizational sources of stability*. Going further, one could assume that both the advocates and the opponents of the political system could accept the adaptation mechanism and use it in practice in daily life.

The results of various studies, being referred to here, confirm, therefore, the rightness of the initial assumption of the research consisting in separating the sphere of legitimization and the sphere of

adaptation. Such separation allows for advancing theses on political delegitimization and on a simultaneous adaptation as a structural factor describing the relations between the "system" and society. The analytical step of separating both spheres of phenomena does not mean, of course, that we cannot speak about interrelations between them. The lack of possibility of pragmatic adaptation (consisting in, for example, satisfying material needs) can be a factor additionally delegitimizing the political sphere (on that matter see, for example, Pacewicz 1983, p. 173). This was, it seems, a process occurring in Poland, where references to economic needs were often used as means to legitimize the government (Tarkowski 1988), while inability to satisfy those needs deepened the deficit of political legitimization.

The next part of my deliberation, although it concerns mainly the analysis of certain adaptive processes, will include theses on the interdependence of various spheres, or the levels of adaptation and legitimization.

3.1.3. ACTIVE ADAPTATION: AN ATTEMPT TO SPECIFY THE PHENOMENON

The initial characteristic of processes of "active adaptation," presented in the first part of the chapter, included some of their features, which I would like to present here in a more ordered manner. Although I am describing here processes functioning in real socialism, many of them, as the analyses in the subsequent chapters will show, have survived the downfall of the system.

Firstly, these processes are characterized by the fact that they always take place between society and the system. As I wrote before, it is more often a relation towards institutional structures than a relation towards other people.

Secondly, these processes have an active character, which means that adaptation did not consist solely in a plactical transformation of the adapting individuals, but also in a modification of the system, in its "redefining" in the course of adaptation.⁸ Activism is, therefore,

⁸ The analyses of Ph. Selznick have shown this in an already classical way. He wrote: "— our search for the meaning and significance of the grass-roots policy verifies the hypothesis that the channelling of administrative responsibilities through previously existing institutions results in consequences for the role and character of the initiator

understood here as a characteristic of both "sides" of the adaptation process: the people and the system.

Thirdly, modifications of the system as a result of adaptive actions are characterized by a various degree of intentionality. Among them there are those which are undertaken with the intention of a conscious change of the system, its modification even in the micro dimension, or at least they are accompanied by a reflection, an awareness of this modification. There are also those among which a desire for such modification does not exist, which is forming as an unintended consequence, and the only intention here is "making it" individually or as a group (Rychard and Szymanderski 1986). A thesis could be advanced here that the higher the degree to which we are dealing with adaptation processes motivated by axiology or political interests, the more apparent is that intentionality. Such processes which concern the sphere of material interests usually do not have any modifying intention (although this is not a rule). At the same time, "transformations" taking place within the society are usually the effect of conscious systemic pursuits resulting from the ideological program, although they are not always effective and some of them were given up by the government. On the whole, this two-way process means that the "system" consciously wanted to change the society, while in effect the "society" (not always consciously) changed the system.

Fourthly - and this is a feature directly related to the previous one - the adaptation processes in the sense being developed here, although they describe the behavior of large groups of people, usually do not play the role of integrating people during those actions. Most often, individuals act during those processes exactly as individuals. Integration is practically limited to small groups (e.g. certain types of "micro-arrangements," in which individuals are aware of being a part of the arrangement, which creates the "esprit de corps" of such a group). I believe that these processes do not generate integration on a mass scale, e.g. that of class. W. Narojek (1986) has advanced a thesis that the adaptive behavior motivated pragmatically has an

which were not anticipated by the formal theory or doctrine" (Selznick 1966, p. 184). This "activism" takes place through various types of mechanism of cooption (see also the analyses by Kamiński 1976, p. 156, in which he emphasizes adaptation of the system to the external interests as a result of informal cooption. Crozier and Friedberg (1982) clearly point out the activism of an "actor" directed toward the "system," describing these relations in the categories of game.

individualistic character. However, in his work he analyzes group-making phenomena forming during the course of processes of this type. Thus, if I assume here that the discussed adaptive processes do not have a group-making character, then maintaining this position is possible on the grounds of such a concept of a group when it is perceived as an entity aware of its group character and when, in principle, groups are being discussed in the micro-social sense.

Fifthly - these processes fulfil dual functions. On the one hand they stabilize the existing institutional order by the fact that they make the realization of individual and group interests possible. This is, after all, an almost definitional feature of all adaptation Processes. On the other hand, some of their forms can disintegrate society (e.g. second economy), produce a destabilizing effect (numerous pathological phenomena fulfilling "adaptive" functions), or create a favorable climate for an outburst of social discontent (when these processes are grounded in an ineffective economy and the system lacks other stabilizers, e.g. political legitimization).

The features of the adaptation processes presented above describe their functioning in so-called normal situations, i.e. in the periods of hidden phases of conflict. When the conflict enters its open phase, the individual adaptation processes change into collective actions, integrating large groups of people, undertaken with a conscious intention to reform the system. I will discuss some of the conditions of the transition from the state of adaptation to the state of rebellion in the subsequent part of the chapter.

The sources of these processes thus understood are sometimes seen in the divergence between the interests, aspirations, and values of the society and the shape of the system (e.g. Sharlet 1984; Adamski 1985). This divergence generates social tensions, which result in attempts action: of the government wanting to adapt society to its conceptions, and of society wanting to adapt the institutional system to its conceptions.

In order to characterize the nature of adaptation processes more precisely we should consider the fact that this divergence is different at different levels of the system. On the basis of concepts and results of studies done in industry (Rychard 1987d), confirmed later in mass representative research, I have advanced a thesis on three levels at

which we can analyze the degree of legitimacy of the existing system: ideological, institutional, and behavioral (pragmatic).⁹

The multi-tiered character of the phenomenon of legitimacy consists in the fact that the ideology of the system and its main slogans were relatively more accepted socially than the institutional solutions, especially those concerning the political sphere (as the results of the studies mentioned above indicate). Still, at the third, behavioral, level, people's behavior was often (except for the periods of rebellion) acquiescent to the "systemic requirements," but not because of their normative acceptance, but rather because of pragmatic adaptation. In effect, the system was to some degree (and to a certain moment) legitimized "ideologically," accepted "behaviorally," and the area of the deepest "deficit" of legitimacy was the middle level: of the institutional structure.

⁹ The interpretation of legitimization accepted here, referring to the classical concepts of M. Weber and using my earlier analyses based on empirical studies, accentuates two aspects of legitimization: subjective and objective. On one side there is the existence of belief and claims to legitimacy. On the other, we are dealing with objective norms (e.g. "to each according to his work done"), institutional rules (e.g. "governing role of the party"), and behavior. This objective sphere can be a subject of claims to legitimacy or can be endowed with belief. We could say that this objective sphere legitimizes the system through the fact that it simultaneously defines and justifies the rules of people's participation in the functioning of the system. According to the reasoning accepted here, the objective sphere legitimizing the system exists at three distinct levels of social reality: ideological, institutional, and behavioral. As the results of empirical studies indicate, the degree of legitimization of these three levels is perceived differently by public opinion. Let us add that the ideological level fulfils in this distinction dual functions. On one hand it one of the three areas *being legitimized*, on the other it supplies the lower levels - institutional and behavioral - with *legitimizing* norms. For example, the principle included in this level "to each according to his work done" can be analyzed as a norm which itself is legitimized or not, and it can be analyzed as a norm which is supposed to legitimize institutionalized rules of distribution of goods, existing at the second level.

On the whole, then, we speak about legitimization when there exist the ruling and the ruled (according to M. Weber, legitimization always refers to systems of domination, see e.g. Weber, 1978, pp. 952-55) and some spheres of reality (e.g. the three levels distinguished by me) - this is the objective side of the phenomenon. The rulers advance claims to legitimacy regarding particular spheres of reality, and the ruled endow these spheres with legitimizational beliefs - and this the subjective side of the phenomenon. I abstract here from the sources of legitimizational belief. In an ideal situation of full legitimacy there is a balance between legitimizational claims and belief regarding each of the three levels of reality. However, as observation and results of studies indicate, in Poland such balance did not exist. Distinguishing the three levels, at which we can analyze legitimacy, allows

However, even this relatively strongest legitimacy of the ideological level has undergone a dramatic breakdown at the end of the 1980's. In 1987, 58 percent of young people still believed that "it is worthwhile to continue building socialism in our country," while in 1989 only 29 Percent accepted this view (data from CBOS, after Marody 1991, p. 255). This fall was probably caused also by the fact that the level of general values and ideology was not consistent in Polish society. Apart from a certain attachment to the ideology and slogans about "socialist" origins, at this level there always also existed "non-socialist" values, rooted in the tradition of western Christian culture (this inconsistency was discussed by scientists, see Bakuniak and Nowak 1984, p. 221). In the situation of dramatically increasing erosion of the system of real socialism, the values associated with it radically lost support. The Position of the opposing universe of values rooted in western culture has then risen considerably.

I will return to the idea of levels of acceptance in the next chapter, discussing the problems of legitimation in the post-communist period. At this point I would like to discuss more specifically the third, behavioral (or pragmatic) level of acceptance of the system. Its importance was particularly visible at the close of communism - when the remains of belief in "socialist" values declined, while the institutional level - as I noted earlier - was never legitimized on a mass scale.

This sphere is the level of pragmatic adaptation, during which the system was accepted through behavior, even if in the sphere of values and political institutions people opposed it. We could say that it is

us to identify various types of legitimizational deficits or the legitimizational imbalance. It can be the case that the claims of the government fail to "meet" the legitimizational belief of the ruled: to the government legitimization of certain spheres is most important, while the society is inclined to endow with belief other spheres. It can also be the case that the society endows with belief certain spheres which in reality are not fully shaped yet (the legitimizational belief exists to a higher degree than the sphere being legitimized). Finally, there is also possible a situation in which the society is inclined to endow certain spheres at most with a consent, and not a legitimizational belief. Still another situation is not rare, in which there exists a kind of inconsistency of some spheres or reality, which concerns mainly the axiological level. The ruling advance claims to legitimacy (or use them as legitimizing lower levels) regarding different norms than the ruled, rooted in different traditions. In the subsequent part of the chapter and in other parts of the book the above distinctions will prove useful in the analysis of the Polish communist reality.

a sphere of "daily interest." The distinction proposed here is grounded in the presented results of my own studies (Rychard 1983) and it refers in its present form to the distinctions made by M. Pacewicz (cit. after Pacewicz 1983) and P. Pacewicz (1983). I have in mind the concept of an axiological and pragmatic pattern regulating behavior and the analysis, developed by P. Pacewicz, of the role of "basic values." We could say that the first level is a regulation through values, while the second - through interests. As the earlier deliberations have indicated, this sphere of values can activate both "prosystemic" and "antisystemic" actions. However, usually a "normal state" is the situation in which the sphere of values is separated from daily life, and reality is being perceived through the prism of pragmatic interests (Jedlicki 1985). This means that: "Basic values do not fulfil a regulative function, members of society do not confront it with common experience..." (Pacewicz 1983, p. 153). Activating basic values as a way of organizing perception of reality is viewed by the above author as one of the symptoms of a revolutionary situation. Therefore it can lead to an outbreak of an open phase of conflict.¹⁰

However, according to earlier remarks, a "normal" state would be the separation of the axiological sphere from the sphere of pragmatic interests linked closer to actions. This thesis certainly is not true in such general form - apparently as during the "normal" times there are groups representing "axiological" types of thinking, during the periods of open conflict the significance of the sphere of pragmatic interests does not disappear completely. The thesis should therefore be taken as a description of a certain tendency. The situation in which behavior is not steered by values is a situation of anomy, and the seeming balance is secured for as long as the system can be stabilized by satisfying pragmatic interests. For the description of such situations and periods the idea of active adaptation is suitable.

Among the many possible mechanisms providing adaptation, the fundamental role in real socialism was played by those which provided individuals with the realization of their personal aspirations and

¹⁰ This process has been analyzed by J. Staniszkis (1985) as the "rhythm of structuralization and destructuralization" (p. 29). The author writes that during the "normal" periods the vision of structure does not exist in social consciousness, but there is a vision of divergence, while during the periods of crisis the vision of structure is polarized, based on moral judgements.

interests (mainly those which concerned daily existence). These mechanisms could function both within the formal and the informal structure of the system. Formal solutions were above all those mechanisms which were supposed to link the material situation of citizens with their input of work. As we know, this type of mechanisms did not function fully in the period of real socialism because of the domination of political criteria in economic practice, among other reasons. The significance of those mechanisms was visible mainly in the sphere of argumentation and in the attempts to create "economic legitimacy." This was the whole type of justifications for the legitimacy of power, when the government referred to social needs which it satisfied (e.g. Staniszkis 1979; Pańków 1981; Wiatr 1982).

As the results of studies indicate, this way of creating balance between the shape of the system and social expectations would succeed as long as the government was effective in the realization of the declared goals. We can arrive at such conclusion indirectly, on the basis of the analysis of answers to a question about the perceived sources of disobedience to the government. It turned out that the majority of respondents (51 percent, if we take as 100 percent those who believed that the majority of Poles was disobedient to the government), saw the sources of disobedience in such categories as the lack of trust and the government breaking its promises. Few responses pointed to such characteristics of the government as its repressiveness (6.4 percent), imposed character (5.6 percent), or its incompetence and profiteering (15.9 percent) as the sources of disobedience. This would mean that *the vision of "broken promises" was during the decline of communism in the view of the majority of respondents a decidedly more serious source of disobedience than those characteristics of the government which resulted from the way it was elected, its method of rule (repressiveness), its competence, and the interests which directed its actions* (Rychard and Szymanderski 1986).

The basic problem of the adaptation mechanisms, functioning within the framework of official systemic solutions, is, however, their ineffectiveness. From that point of view, more effective seem to be those mechanisms which function within the "informal" structure of the system. I have in mind here all types of informal actions, during which people tried to "modify" the system (by departing from formal rules) in order to adapt to it more easily.

These principles functioned at different levels of the system, both in its macro- and its micro-structures. Undoubtedly, the *informal bargaining processes of the Polish economy* had a macro-structural character. I am referring to the institution of informal bargaining for resources or for the extent of planned tasks. This institution was a fundamental way of regulating the economic order under real socialism.

Another informal (but consciously tolerated) mechanism functioned in industrial enterprises. I have in mind here the *role of an enterprise as a channel for articulation of diverse interests*. The industrial enterprise, because of the shortage of other forms of articulation of public, civil, and consumer's interests, often played this role. The threat of strike action or of decreasing the tempo and quality of the work was an effective, though very costly, mechanism of exerting pressure. This is a good example illustrating the concept of "active adaptation:" the enterprise (an element of the "system") was somewhat changing its identity, becoming partly a political party and an element of a quasi-welfare state (this process was described by Mreła 1984, pp. 14-5; 1984a, p. 30), while the people were given a chance to realize some of their interests, and were becoming tied to the "system" by stronger bonds of cooperation. Some of these solutions were grounded in the ideology of a "socialist industrial enterprise," understood not only as producing a institution, but also a social, educational, and a political one (Narojek 1973, pp. 143-54; Mreła 1984, p. 14; 1984a, p. 41). Although the sense of this definition has changed considerably during over 40 years of communism (e.g. the enterprise remained "political," but as a means of exerting pressure on the government rather than as an instrument to shape attitudes by that government, see Morawski 1986), these functions of enterprise were, however, to some degree justified by the ideology of the system.

The third fundamental type of the adaptation mechanisms functioned mainly in the social micro-structures. I have in mind here the diverse ways of using an organization to satisfy private interests in an extra-formal way and not registered by the system. A basic example here would obviously be the "second economy," though in reality it was only an example of a broader phenomenon of "secondary purposes"¹¹ in

¹¹ I use this expression to describe the mechanism which let members of an organization satisfy their needs in a situation when the basic goal of the organization is to its members unattractive (after Gawda, Kowalczyk and Rychard 1974, p. 110).

the functioning of all formal organizations. There was a "secondary school system" and "secondary health services" (see Bednarski 1984; Rychard 1984), as well as - to a certain degree - "secondary politics" (in this case it would not be the opposition, but rather the whole sphere of informal deviations and possibilities to realize private interests through the political system). On the subject of the second economy in the final period of communism in Poland a number of works have been written (Bednarski 1984; 1985; Wiśniewski 1985). There is however, very few analyses of the whole class of mechanisms, which would go beyond the perspective of organizational pathologies. This perspective is also often used in descriptions of the parallel economy. I believe that this approach is decidedly insufficient. Phenomena of this type should be seen not only as actions aimed at decreasing the effectiveness of the system, but often as means to enable the system to reach any kind of effectiveness. This is why attention should be paid not only to the irregularities in the sphere of *distribution*, formed as a result of the functioning of those kinds of mechanisms, but also to their "*income-creating*" role, which - in a sense - made functioning of the system possible. These mechanisms were in a way independent from the political order (I discussed their functions in the post-communist period in the preceding chapter).

There is no doubt about the fact that these mechanisms were costly to the system, for they lowered its effectiveness. But it should be remembered that we can speak here about a "decrease" in relation to the "ideal" standard, which would be an efficiently functioning, centrally supervised economy. Such a standard remained only in the sphere of ideology, therefore it is more reasonable to discuss the functioning of those mechanisms with reference to a real system. It may then turn out that the mechanisms of "organizational secondary purposes" were an attempt to vitalize the structure of the system, and that their "coexistence" with the formal system was a form of symbiosis rather than that of parasitism.

I believe that more unequivocal are the social consequences of those mechanisms. A thesis is often advanced about the duality of the social life in Poland under real socialism, usually defined by dichotomies like: private-official, we-they (see, for example, Wnuk-Lipiński 1992). I think that these mechanisms can be perceived as ways of reducing and erasing this dichotomy. Such a conclusion can be drawn from the

analyses by W. Narojek (1982) and W. Sterniczuk (1984, p. 150), as well as the thesis of S. Nowak (1979) on the informalities as "bridges" linking the world of people with the world of institutions.¹² We could say that exactly through this type of informal mechanisms those dualities were being integrated and partially erased. In the course of daily interactions, the "enemy" (in the symbolic sphere) was often becoming a partner, because it allowed people to settle their individual interests. In effect, people were to a greater degree becoming a part of the system's structure, although at the same time the system was not exactly the same anymore.

The above deliberation would mean that I am noticing only the stabilizing effects of those mechanisms.¹³ I believe that we can speak about three types of effects of the functioning of mechanisms of active adaptation: stabilizing, evolutionary, and "revolutionizing" the system. Let me discuss the possibilities of the occurrence of each of them.

From the analytical point of view, we can speak about *stabilizing* effects when the behavior aiming at realization of individual interests, values, and expectations, has a chance for realization mainly in the "informal" structure of the system and when at the same time the reform of the system is not realistic. I would see chances for *evolutionary* effects of this type of mechanisms when there would be a possibility of a reform of the system, which would "formalize" the hitherto informal mechanisms. And finally, we could speak about "*revolutionizing*" effects when there is neither a possibility of rebuilding the system, nor is there a possibility of realizing individual interests through informal mechanisms.

How did the Polish situation look in the view of those three possible types of effects? For example, the economic behavior of people,

¹² Although this way of linking the society with the institutional system can be named corruption, since it is interpreted as blurring the line between the private and public (Kamiński 1992, p. 124). I am of the opinion that not all "links" of this type can be interpreted as the corruption. However, this is true that one of the few ways of making communism less hostile and more "socially rooted" was to corrupt its institutions. To some extent the whole sphere of informalities (and belonging to it corruption) was officially tolerated as substitute for democracy.

¹³ On the subject of stabilizing effect of the "second economy" see Staniszkis (1984).

realized within the structures of the parallel economy, can be perceived as a stabilizing factor, an evolutionary factor, and as a potentially "revolutionizing" one. It stabilized because in effect it strengthened the existing system of supervising organizations and it constituted its natural base (see, e.g. Hankiss 1987, p. 47). However, we could also say that this sphere (keeping the example of the parallel economy) was the only one to retain the remains of rational-economic thinking and to function according to the economic interest. L. Kolarska (1985) advances a thesis that exactly in the activities undertaken in those spheres (among others) one could see the source of "proeffective" orientations, which could be Propitious to the acceptance of the economic reform. Thus a problem arises: can the behavior within the parallel economy be really regarded as an example of behavior conforming to economic rules? I believe that it does not always have to be so. A large part of informal actions (including those undertaken within the second economy) can be described in categories of a peculiar "social economy." I mean that in spite of strong ties with the formal structure, this economy was governed neither by the rules of a "central planner," nor by *purely* market rules. With reference to the Soviet system, this has been discussed by A. Besancon (1981). The fundamental role was therefore played here not by material ties, but Personal ties of various types. Perhaps then, its rules cannot be "transferred" to the "official" system, and its natural location - though a very important one - would be on the fringes of the system. The structural reasons for the impossibility of making the "second economy" a dominating economy have been described by J. Staniszkis (1984). Some economic analyses also incline to a pessimistic view on the evolutionary chances of the informal activity of this type. M. Bednarski argues that work in the unofficial sector decreased the chance of themotivating role of financial incentives (available in the official sector), because in the official sector the available financial rewards were much lower, and the financial incentives were becoming unattractive (Bednarski 1985, Pp. 559-60). Thus, **a reform could be** "non-competitive" for the unofficial sector, which decreased the chances for the existence of evolutionary effects. This regularity seems to occur also in the Post-communist period. It seems, however, that the adaptation mechanisms played a certain role in the erosion of the communist system for they had to rely on an organizational-economic system, which Provided them with a minimum of effectiveness (in order to obtain resources). The total breakdown of effectiveness of that system meant

a loss of sources of pragmatic adaptation (see Narojek 1986). If this happened in a system which, as in the case of Poland, suffered from a deficit of political legitimacy, it was propitious to the acceleration of systemic change.

An additional destabilizing factor was also the perception of injustices and illegitimacies of the rules of distribution created by the second economy, which has been noted by L. Kolarska (Kolarska and Rychard 1984). This led to the erosion of the official ideology (Markus 1981), as the people perceived more sharply the divergence between the proclaimed slogans and the reality. On the whole, there occurred a process, described above, which consisted of using moral and ethical standards in the evaluation of reality, which formerly was perceived mainly in the categories of pragmatic interests. This is a specific example, illustrating the theses referred to earlier on the destabilizing effect of perception in the categories of values of the daily sphere, perceived until then through the prism of interests.

In sum then, I would incline toward the view that the informal mechanisms of active adaptation (here discussed mainly with the example of the second economy) fulfilled rather *stabilizing* functions, and were propitious to "*revolutionizing*" changes, while rather rarely they could be seen as a factor influencing the "*evolutionary*" changes of the system. In other words: they contributed to the downfall of the former system to a greater degree than to the building of the framework of the market economy. Their functioning is, therefore, a good illustration of one of the theses in this book, namely that the factors leading to the downfall of communism turn out to be at the same time barriers to the process of building the new system.

The forms and consequences of mechanisms of "active adaptation," outlined here, illustrated the principle thesis of this chapter, on two-sided changes: of the "system" and the "people" as the essence of these processes. The concept of a "fourfold system" is a generalization of this thesis. The last part of this chapter is devoted to the presentation of this concept.

3.1.4. THE "FOURFOLD SYSTEM" AS A FORM OF ACTIVE ADAPTATION

The point of departure in the presentation of this concept can be the thesis advanced at the beginning of this work, about the post-war

Period as a continuous process of mutual adaptation and modification of the "people" and the "system."¹⁴

The concept, the initial outline of which I will present below, is a trial typology of institutional and structural consequences of adaptation reactions of this kind - the effects of the divergence between the system and the social needs and aspirations on the shape of the institutional system in Poland during the decline of communism. I should make reference here to the distinction made by A. Besancon (1981), who, writing about the Soviet economy, has distinguished three principle sectors in the sphere of production and in the sphere of consumption: (1) providing power (in the sphere of consumption restricted to those in Power); (2) the socialist sector (in principle - the "official" planned economy); and (3) the non-socialist sector (which includes elements of the legal and illegal economy). These three sectors interact with one another, and the citizens also make use of the production and services of various sectors. All three are in a sense indispensable to one another. This type of thinking about various sectors is useful in my concept. I do not restrict, however, the usefulness of such analyses to the economy only. Moreover, in the approach of Besancon - if I have understood his intentions correctly - the three-tiered character is in a sense a result of intended practices or the effect aims of economy. The disintegration of the institutional system in Poland, which I am going to analyze, was not an effect of conscious, intended practices of the system's steersmen,

¹⁴ At this point we can find useful the analyses of sociologists attempting to present typologies of various adaptation reactions (stating it in a simplified manner). Thus, for example, J. Koralewicz-Zębik distinguishes the following reactions to the situation of "external pressure:" attempts to change the system, withdrawal (which can cause an attempt to change the situation-system from outside, e.g. opposition), attitude of controlled courage (i.e. partial changing of the reality through informal practices), and conformism (Koralewicz-Zębik 1983, pp. 29-30). Sometimes the analyses of processes of this type refer to R.K. Merton's theory of anatomy. We could also point to the concept of S. Nowak (1984a), whose author presents a modification of typologies of the anomic ways of adaptation, or to the work by R. Turski (1985), who has distinguished conformist adaptation, innovative (by which the author understands informal practices) withdrawal, and alternative orientations. T. Żukowski (1986), who analyzes adaptive Processes, also refers to the theory of anatomy. Many works of this type have appeared recently, and their common feature is apparently an attempt to describe and explain the reaction of the Polish society to the situation of crisis. I should also mention here the Works of the scientists studying lifestyles, concentrated around A. Siciński (1983; 1984), especially the concepts of "alternative" lifestyles.

but rather a result of processes adapting "the system to the society," to a certain degree unintentional.

The problem of systemic disintegration in the East European countries has been developed in the academic literature for some time now. We can point here, for example, to the concept of R. Sharlet (1984). The author describes the sources and consequences of the formation of "counter-systems" in the Soviet Union and in the countries of Eastern Europe. Their existence resulted from the incongruity of the official system to the people's needs (see also Hankiss 1987, p. 50). It assumed various forms - it could be the second economy, a parallel culture, religious practices, ethnic nationalisms, youth subculture, double morality, etc. With reference to the Polish situation, a typology of those phenomena was presented by E. Wnuk-Lipiński (1984), who analyzed them at the level of politics, economic life (where he has distinguished three types of market: free market, controlled market, and elite market), and in the socio-cultural sphere. The existence of crevices in each of those spheres was caused by the inability to satisfy needs in the sphere of official politics, economics or culture.¹⁵

My proposal is also a typology of those systemic disintegrations. Thus I am presenting in it a specific model of the institutional structure of communism, or real socialism. This model departs from the normative, ideological picture of that political order. However, it is at the same time different from the classical approaches to totalitarianism, which emphasized homogeneity and centralization as the basic features of the system of institutional communism.

I believe that already at the beginning of the 1980's we can hardly speak about the existence of one institutional-organizational system in Poland. There existed a number of systems. Of course, not all of them were formed as a result of adaptation processes, but some of them can certainly be perceived as a consequence of those mechanisms.

¹⁵ In Hungarian academic literature, a comprehensive description of this type of disintegration in the economic, public, cultural, social, and socio-political spheres has been presented by E. Hankiss (1987) in his concept of a "second society," distinguishing the "first society" (in its formal and informal sphere), second society and alternative society. The difference between the last two consisted, according to the author, mainly in the fact that the second society was characterized by a lack of a number of features of the "first society," while it did not develop the features which appear fully only in the "alternative society."

I am advancing, therefore, a *thesis on the disintegration of the system as a result of adaptation processes - processes which aim at a reduction of the divergence between social expectations and the shape of the system*. I believe that we can distinguish four basic systems, or rather that we can speak about a fourfold system. It consisted of the following elements:




Figure 2. The Fourfold System

*The official system*¹⁶ is in a way the "core" of the whole four-element structure. It included a set of norms, institutions, and organizations grounded in the principles of the socialist order. The system functioned in the sphere of politics as well as the economy, administration, health care, culture, etc. Thus it constituted the official side of "real socialism" (see Hankiss 1987, pp. 47-7a). *The unofficial system* to a large degree overlapped with the "secondary purposes," described above, of various organizational activities in Poland. The majority of informal adaptation processes took place exactly within this system. Its existence was to a certain degree a result of the modification of the official system in the course of processes of active adaptation. Hence it was both an effect of those processes and an indication of their existence.

The non-system, or actually a number of "non-systems" is a relatively incoherent category, and the principle common feature of its elements

¹⁶ The distinction of these four elements was largely influenced by a joint work with Prof. Magdalena Sokołowska on *The Alternative Solutions in a System with Formally Restricted Alternatives* (1988).

is the fact that they were derived from the former system, and were genetically alien to the ideological principles of socialism. In the economic sphere it was the private and Polonia-foreign sector of the economy (although we could argue whether the private ownership of land in agriculture did not become an element of the official system, since the official system displayed an ability to adopt initially alien elements). In the ideological sphere there was certainly the role of the Catholic Church in the public life. We can place here also the institution of temporary stays abroad used to improve one's own situation. It is obvious that the elements of the non-system mostly were not a result of adaptation processes, since they were historically older than the official system. They may, however, be treated as a form of processes of this type.

Finally, *the anti-system*, which in fact can be described as a set of oppositional groups diverse in their programs, degree of organization, degree of influence, and degree of activity. Usually the existence of opposition is perceived as an indication of a deep conflict. It is certainly so, but this in my opinion does not exclude perceiving those groups also as one of the consequences and forms of the processes of active adaptation. A specific feature of the anti-system was the fact that it existed more clearly in the spheres of morality and politics (although even here it is difficult to speak about its uniform identity), while in the economic sphere it was practically nonexistent.

The four elements listed above remained at different "distances" from one another, in different mutual relations. I believe that these distances are close to the hierarchy (from the top) of the systems presented in figure 2. The closest to the official system was the unofficial system, and often it is difficult to draw a clear boundary between them, since the unofficial system in a way "outgrew" the official system "in each of its tissues." The non-system is easier to separate - it was, after all, a separate world of formal organizations. Its relations with the official system, however, were not hostile. Undoubtedly the most distant was the anti-system, in the programmatic as well as organizational sense. Both the fact that it could not act legally, and that its dominating methods were underground and semi-underground practices contributed to its alienation.

The fundamental feature of the model proposed here is therefore the assumption that each of those systems can be defined by describing its

relation to the official system. This assumption applies fully to the non-official system and to the anti-system, but only partly to the non-system. Some institutions of that system (e.g. the Church) did not need to define their identity through their relations with the official system, since the sources of their identity reached much further.

The basic problem in the separation of the four elements thus defined is the question in what sense can we speak here about "systems?:" W. Wesołowski, formulating remarks to the initial version of this work, suggested addressing rather four types of the social environment of Polish people - the more so since there is an awkwardness in saying that the whole system includes a "non-system" and an "anti-system." We can avoid this awkwardness when we realize that these designations describe the relation of both elements to the official system. It is true, however, that if by the "system" we understand an entity with a certain degree of institutionalization and formalization, with a clearly separated internal structure, then not all of the four elements fulfilled these conditions equally. In fact, only the official system and main elements of the non-system (the Church, private agriculture, trade) took the form of a formal organization and precisely as such organizations they were accessible to their participants or clients. Both the unofficial system and the anti-system did not have (in principle) the character of formal organizations. Contacts with them were rather contacts with various informal social groups. We can see, then, that the most formalized character had either the elements of the official system itself, or the elements of the non-system which was tolerated and legalized by the official system. What did not become legalized in Principle remained not formalized. The "systemic" designation used in the typology should, therefore, be understood in a non-rigorous way. They are mainly an expression of the desire to separate the four elements in order to be able to speak about the relations between them.

The four elements of the general system of real socialism presented above can be separated in an empirical manner - they represent distinct rules of practices, often also distinct organizations. The partner of those four systems, called the "society," is a somewhat different matter. First of all, the separation of the "society" from the four systems is an analytical step. I have to stress that in reality each of the four elements of the system constituted at the same time an element of the society. There is however a difference. Although we could separate within the

society its specific parts being in relations with only one element of the system, it would be an artificial move. That is why the divisions within the society were marked with a dashed line. In the case of society the division lines, in my opinion, run *not between distinct groups, but between the social roles of each individual*. The same people entered relations with various elements from among the four systems specified above. Few groups (perhaps even individuals) were in a relationship with only one system. Thus while the division into systems has an empirical character and it separates distinct organisms, the division of the society has a rather analytical character and its purpose is to separate distinct social roles played usually by the same individuals.¹⁷

In the concept briefly sketched here, the most important is not the description of the model's elements (i.e. the four systems and the society), but the description of the relations between these elements. I assume that *these relations can be described well in categories of exchange*. This does not mean that in the analysis presented here I will refer to a certain theory of exchange developed in sociology. What I mean is that between particular systems, as well as between particular systems and social roles, various types of exchange took place. People exchanged work for money, support for accommodation in daily life, the risk of conspiratory activities for realization of values dear to them, etc. On the whole, then, the majority of those exchanges could be described in categories of interests and values.

These exchanges took place between the systems as well as between the systems and "social roles," as I mentioned above. I am advancing a *thesis that both types of exchange constituted the main factor integrating the disintegrated entity composed of four systems and society*.

¹⁷ This view can be justified by the thesis of J. Koralewicz-Zębik, who wrote regarding her typology of the reaction to a situation of external pressure: "If individuals could be classified into certain types according to their most frequent attitude, we could speak about opportunists, conformists, and independent oppositionists. More often, however, the same individuals represented different attitudes at different times" (Koralewicz-Zębik 1985, p. 15). We could also cite the view of A. Besancon that "the Soviet citizen, with few exceptions, does not belong to only one sector of production and does not provide himself with goods from only one sector of consumption" (Besancon 1981). W. Narojek (1986) points to the fact that every citizen plays both the role of a functionary and the role of a petitioner (p. 128). We should also recall the view of Hankiss (1987, p. 27) who argues that people functioned within different societies.

The exchanges between the four segments were very important for the durability of the whole system. We could attempt, for example, to describe in economic categories the flow of resources from the official to the unofficial system (and perhaps to other systems as well) and probably the flow of the outcomes of those systems to the official system (Besancon did that with the case of the Soviet economy). It so happened that the resources of the official system made the functioning of the unofficial system possible, but thanks to that fact the official system functioned as well (receiving in exchange, for example, the minimum of loyalty). Going beyond the sphere of economy, we can say that even the anti-system - to a limited extent - played a stabilizing role: it was indispensable to the official system because it enabled that system to retain its identity through the chance of defining itself in relation to the anti-system. We could say in an even broader manner that each of the two systems (the official and the anti-system) provides its partner with an identity, and sometimes suggests solutions to be used within each system (on different strategies of the official system regarding the "counter-system" see Sharlet 1984).

The majority of exchanges between the systems, however, occurred in the system-people relations. In effect, this meant also that in practice there were no direct exchanges between "the people," since usually these exchanges took place between the people in their roles as "elements" of the particular systems. This is why in the subsequent analyses I will concentrate on the exchanges of the people-system type.

Referring to the most general assumptions of the theory of exchange, I assume that people aim at equivalent exchange. Of course, this is the ideal state, disturbed by the inability to recognize precisely all possibilities and by the difficulty to determine one's own preferences.¹⁸ However, often exchanges between the people and the particular elements of the system did not have an equivalent character. Hence, I am advancing a thesis that *people tried to compensate themselves for the non-equivalence in local exchanges with a given system through more equivalent exchanges with other systems*. Two kinds of such compensation were possible. Firstly, the needs which were not satisfied in exchanges with the official system could be satisfied in exchanges

¹⁸ This is a classical problem of a bounded rationality, discussed by the theorists of organization (e.g. March and Simon 1964) as well as by the theorists of exchange.

with another system. For example, in the sphere of need for political participation this could mean turning to "anti-systems." Secondly, we were dealing with substitution of those unsatisfied needs (keeping the example of political participation) by satisfying other needs (for example, giving up political participation in exchange for advantageous "economic" reciprocities with the non-system or the unofficial system). On the whole, the system (as an entity consisting of four elements plus society) would have a tendency to strive for an equivalent change at the macro level. Hence we can infer that for the balance of the system was necessary an ability of the people to compensate themselves for the local non-equivalences in certain exchanges through equivalent exchanges (or even "overpayments") in relations with other systems. Let us examine a simple example illustrating the advanced thesis. Not rare was a situation in which an individual who, in the course of his interactions with the official system, did not receive sufficient gratifications concerning his interests or values, "turned" to other systems in order to compensate himself for these non-equivalences. The individual could thus satisfy some of his economic interests in exchanges with the unofficial system (e.g. through practices in the secondary sector of the economy), while he could realize his value system in exchanges with the non-system (e.g. the Church) or the anti-system (e.g. satisfying informational needs).¹⁹ Many people in Poland behaved in a similar "dispersed" way, although the representatives of each of the four systems would probably want the people to be the "clients" of their systems only.

A question arises whether this "dispersion" put a strain on individuals or whether it was not troublesome. It is difficult to find an answer to this question in the academic literature. Until now, researchers have concentrated mainly on the analysis of consequences of various "dualities" in the social life (e.g. private-official, in accord with one's own convictions - extorted by external circumstances). In the presented concept we are dealing with a "fourfold character." I believe that the problems of individuals resulting from the "duality" and from the "fourfold character" are similar. In the academic literature there is no unequivocal position on the subject whether these

¹⁹ This way of functioning of the people in Poland has been discussed by A. Kamiński (1986).

dualities, a necessity of different behavior, e.g. in private and official situations, put a strain on people or not. J. Koralewicz-Zębik (1985) argues that practices conflicting with one's own convictions generate tensions. E. Wnuk-Lipiński, the author of a concept of "dimorphism of values" analyzing this duality at the axiological level, argues that it was socially harmful (1992, p. 68). J. Lutyński (1986) on the other hand, believes that the incoherence between the private and the public sphere was not troublesome. Apparently a unequivocal settlement of this question is not possible, since the degree of distress was to a certain degree dependent on the significance of convictions and on the sphere of values of a given individual. However, one could notice in the Polish situation a functioning of specific mechanisms reducing this discordance, the tension created as a result of duality or the "fourfold character." Functioning for many years in situations of contradiction between the private and the public sphere, between fiction and truth, Probably created in the Polish society a norm which I would call the norm of legitimized duality, or - more broadly - *the norm of legitimized ambiguity*. This norm would consist, speaking simply, in the internalization of these ambiguities as common conditions. For in reality, people realizing the inevitability of the functioning in the "multidimensional arrangements" had to, if only for pragmatic reasons, "get used to" them in some way. That is why probably not always and not every duality created tensions, about which the following quotation convinces us: "They belong at the same time to the world of institutions and are perceived by others as 'they,' and simultaneously - when leaving their occupational roles they become ordinary people - they are aware of their own aversion to all other institutions which make their life miserable through their negligence and inefficiency. Surprising is the easiness with which people move from one attitude to another" (Nowak 1979, p. 162).

There was still another mechanism reducing tensions created by the duality of the private-official type. This role was played by the Phenomenon of disintegration of the system, that systemic "fourfold character." *For it meant that it was not the case that some values or Practices could be realized only in the private sphere and not within institutions.* The systemic disintegration gave a chance to realize the "private" sphere within one of the systems, outside the official system. There existed institutionalized models for satisfying those aspirations

and they were not limited only to groups of family and friends. Speaking metaphorically, but perhaps more illustratively: the "fourfold system" corresponded with the "fourfold personality" and this balance somewhat reduced the tensions.

Hence the system was not fully without alternatives. Its fourfold character was simultaneously a form of an alternative.

In the concept presented here, the relations between social roles and the distinguished systems are of fundamental significance.²⁰ As I mentioned before, I believe that these relations can be described in categories of exchange. Drawing from the sociological works on the theory of exchange seems promising here. However, we encounter a certain problem. There exist concepts of exchange describing inter-organizational relations (e.g. already classical analyses by Blau on the complex systems of exchange or Levine and White 1961). There also exist successful and interesting analyses describing Polish reality in categories of the theory of exchange, but between individuals or social groups (I have in mind here the work by Pawlik, referred to earlier, on the economics of daily life, 1985). In the case of my concept, we would need a theoretical interpretation of exchanges between "the people and the system," i.e. between individuals and more or less organized entities. Of course, with the acceptance of a certain perspective, this question is always reduced at the end to exchanges between individuals. However, what I would need is to take into consideration in this concept the institutional and macro-social aspects on one hand, and micro-social on the other. For the question about exchange between "the people and the system"²¹ is to a certain degree a question about relations between micro- and macro-structures, about relations between the "social" sphere and the institutional one.

As I wrote earlier, the balance of the whole institutional and social system (i.e. the four systems and the society) was secured by the possibility of compensating for the non-equivalent exchanges with one

²⁰ From the theoretical point of view, other kinds of adaptative processes are also possible - e.g. between organizations (Kamiński 1979). A distinction of various kinds of these processes has been included e.g. in the work by M. Federowicz, A. Iwanowska and T. Żukowski (1986). On the role of organization in adaptive processes see also Żukowski (1986).

²¹ I have to point out the contributions of M. Crozier and E. Friedberg (1982) to this matter, although the main category in their work is the game.

system (the official system) through exchanges with the remaining systems. In the view of P. Blau's theory of exchange, the process of attaining and losing balance has a continuous character. He writes: "Reciprocity on one level, however, entails imbalances on others" (Blau 1967, p. 336). Jonathan H. Turner (1985), analyzing Blau's theory, puts it this way: "...to balance relations in one exchange context by meeting reciprocal obligations and conforming to norms of fairness is to put into imbalance other relations. Thus, the imbalances potentially encourage a cyclical Process in which actors seek to balance previously unbalanced relations and thereby throw into imbalance currently balanced exchanges" (p. 325).

On the whole, then, in the relations of exchange there is always a source of future imbalance. With regard to the "fourfold" system this means that the overall balance was a dynamic state, that there always somewhere existed imbalance, and that the processes of compensation for the non-equivalent exchanges with the official system created new imbalances. This type of imbalance, however, was not of crucial importance for the whole institutional-social order. A problem arose when compensation did not have the "dispersed" character, when those exchanges concentrated on one, other than the official, system. We could advance a thesis that the hitherto dominating, in the sense of providing the whole social order with an identity, would become that system which took over the majority of exchanges. Such was the social movement "Solidarity" in 1980-81. However, domination of any system other than the official one disturbed the balance from the point of view of the official system, which could tolerate at most the dispersed reciprocities but not the concentrated ones. Thus a counter-action followed. It restored balance from the point of view of domination of the official system, but it destroyed the integrity of social balance.

From the above deliberation we can infer another *thesis, saying that one of the causes of tensions and conflicts in the structure of the whole system was a different designation of points of balance: the domination of the official system and securing the equivalence of exchanges*. These two Points of balance created conflict when compensation for the non-equivalent exchanges ceased being dispersed and began to concentrate on one system, other than the official one. In reality, then,

at the basis of conflicts lies the question of systemic identity.²² The situation of dispersion of compensational exchanges, however, did not disturb the identity, since no entity was formed which could create an identity competitive to the official one. *The dispersion of exchanges, then, could be perceived as a spontaneous way of overcoming the inconsistent identity of the system: the official system still dominated, but in spite of that also the identity of the society received chances for realization.* The problem of relations between social identity and the identity of the system is one of the most important and possible to be analyzed through the model of relations between the "fourfold system" and the "fourfold society."

We could ask a question whether we could subjugate some types of "exchanges" to each of the specified systems? This problem is difficult to solve, since according to the theorists of exchange (e.g. Blau 1967, pp. 94-5) an immanent feature of those processes is the ambiguity of reciprocal values. This ambiguity is greater in those types of exchanges which take place in the informal sphere (which, with regard to the processes of exchange within a local population, has been shown in the analysis by Pawlik 1985). However, we can probably analyze only the types of exchanges (and not the concrete evaluation of the exchanged goods) between the people and the particular systems. Were there some types of reciprocities characteristic to certain systems? J. Gęsicki, Z. Rykowski, and J. Wertenstein-Żuławski (1986) distinguish different variants of the young people's ways of dealing with the situation: the economic variant, the cultural, the political, and the religious variant.²³

²² This thought is an elaboration on the concept of contradiction in the principles of identity-legitimacy of a system when strengthening the "centralistic" principle destroys the "market" principle and vice versa (Rychard 1983, pp. 112-13). This distinction is analogical to the thesis by A. Kamiński (1983, pp. 139-40; 1984, pp. 221-22) on two kinds of balance: of the institutional system with regard to an agreement between "... material and non-material products of the system and the needs and aspirations of the society..." (Kamiński 1984, p. 221). According to the cited author, attaining one state of balance destroys the balance of the other type, there also occurs a reverse relation. In my concept such negative feedback (when balance from the point of view of the society is irreconcilable with balance from the point of view of the official system) occurs only in a case of concentration of compensational reciprocities on one of the systems other than the official system. For only then will the identity of the system be disturbed from that system's point of view.

²³ This distinction is similar to the types of duality analyzed by E. Wnuk-Lipiński (1984): economic, political, and cultural.

It seems that using - for example - categories mentioned here, we could not describe the suggested four systems and the types of exchange between those systems and the society. For example, through the non-system one could realize the cultural variant, as well as the economic and the religious one. Despite that fact, we can ask a question in more general categories: whether, for example, it was not the case that reciprocities with some systems involved to a greater degree the sphere of pragmatic interests, while with others - the sphere of values? Going further, we can ask which exchanges had a greater chance for integrating around them social groups. The exchanges with the unofficial system concerned mainly the sphere of pragmatic interests. Although they involved large segments of the society, these exchanges did not have a group-making character - people participated in them as individuals. The unofficial system did not create its own culture either.²⁴ However those exchanges which involved to a greater degree the axiological sphere and values, i.e. exchanges occurring mainly between the people and some elements of the non-system (e.g. the Church) and of the anti-system, had integrating possibilities.²⁵ I believe that one of the problems consisted in the fact that the systems which had an "integrating power," concern to a greater degree the symbolic sphere than material interests (e.g. anti-system), while those which referred to material interests did not integrate people but rather organized individual adaptation processes. In effect, in the phase of open conflict integration occurred rather in categories of values and axiology. In some sense then, the difficulty in overcoming the crisis was caused by the fact that there existed a dichotomy: either individual

²⁴ This thesis is perhaps too categorical. For, as J. Koralewicz-Zębuk (1985) believes, some types of unofficial practices could serve the realization of values or the well-being of institutions, not only the pragmatic interests. However their group-making and axiological role was weakened by an often extra-legal character of those practices (this thesis was advocated by Staniszkis, 1984) and by the fact that people undertook those Practices usually treating them as a "necessary evil" - an evil, because it was discordant with their convictions, and necessary because it allowed to settle matters otherwise impossible to settle (empirical data convince about this attitude, see Koralewicz-Zębuk, Wnuk-Lipiński 1985, p. 192).

²⁵ I rely here on the thesis, referred to before, of W. Narojek, on the individualistic character of pragmatic behavior and on the integrating character of moral behavior, although, as I wrote before, the author argues that pragmatic practices have group-making consequences as well.

adaptation processes or thinking in the sphere of axiology and values. *The contrast: individual interests - group values, did not have a space for the category of group interests.*¹⁶ Creating structural conditions enabling suppression of this limiting dichotomy was - and to some degree still is - one of the steps necessary to overcome the crisis.

The weakness of "anti-systemic" practices in the economic sphere, and domination of the moral perspective in oppositional activities, had their consequences after the downfall of communism. We can see in that fact one of the reasons for the successful transfer of the former communist nomenklatura into a newly-created class of businessmen. Oppositional activists were far less successful here.

3.1.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

I presented in this chapter the concept of active adaptation, departing from the critique of approaches to legitimization as a way of explaining the sources of stability. This concept is also different from explanations on the grounds of the totalitarian model. A certain generalization of the concept of active adaptation is the model of a "fourfold system," which has been briefly outlined, and the continuation of which will be included in the last chapter of this work. This type of concept should be treated as a kind of discussion with the thesis on the lack of alternatives as a source of obedience. For in reality, according to the idea of a fourfold system, the source of adaptation processes was a kind of alternative, provided by the disintegration of the system into four elements.

In my analysis I concentrate mainly on the study of behavior; outside this analysis remains the world of normative rules which constitute the basis of the analyzed behavior. This type of analysis has been

²⁶ M. Markus points to the fact that Polish society integrated itself around values rather than economic interests (1981, p. 47). He saw in that a new chance for building a "civil society." I believe, however, that this was rather a constraint. W. Narojek writes: "As long as the movement for restoration remains a movement for moral revival, it is not able to express any definite socio-political interests..." (1982-84, p. 152). J. Staniszkis (1985) argues that material interests could not exist in this kind of system at all. I would incline here to a medial view: political and economic interests existed both in the official and in the unofficial structures, but they did not fulfil group-making functions (for the reasons, among others, mentioned by Staniszkis with reference to interests in the "second economy").

developed as a part of the concept of "collective sense" of M. Marody (1987; 1988).

Active adaptation and the "fourfold system" which was the result of this adaptation, were a social strategy for dealing with the imposed system. Some of its forms still exist, and they are discussed in other parts of this book. In the next chapter, however, I want to analyze problems of legitimacy and of its crisis in the first post-communist period. As we will see, this crisis was essentially different from the crisis of legitimacy during the decline of communism: the first one resulted from the lack of legitimation, while the other results from insufficient adaptation of the formula of legitimation to the nature of changes.

3.2. BREAKTHROUGH AND THE POST-COMMUNIST LEGITIMACY CRISIS²⁷

3.2.1. THE CHARACTER OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

In this chapter I present the basic dilemmas in the relationship between government and society after the 1989 turning point in Poland. In order to describe these relations I will draw on the concepts of legitimation as they provide a suitable framework for the analysis of the processes taking place between the political and institutional system and society. I will be concerned with the basic chances of, and threats to, political legitimacy during the transitional period in Poland. Before moving on to a detailed presentation of my major theses it is essential to define the transitional period as this will bring out the nature and problems of legitimation in post-communist Poland.

It has become increasingly popular to describe Poland in the early 1990's as a post-communist country. Although this term is

²⁷ The first version of this chapter was written in 1990 during the author's stay in the Sociology Department of the University of Chicago as part of the Ford Foundation Fellowship Program. He wishes to thank these institutions and to acknowledge their assistance in facilitating the completion of this chapter. It was published in a book "Democratization in Poland, 1988-1990. Polish Voices" (G. Sanford [ed.]), The Macmillan Press Ltd., London 1992. Author wants to express his thanks for the Publisher and for the editor for permission to publish it in this book. This chapter was also reprinted in a book *Political Participation and Democracy in Poland and West Germany* (G. Meyer and F. Ryszka, [eds]), Warsaw 1991. The current version is updated and modified.

rarely defined, intuition tells one that it is an accurate description of the essence of this period, which is a state of transition. It can be defined as the absence of both fundamental communist institutions and arrangements and of the finally shaped mechanisms of the new order. Communism no longer exists but new systemic arrangements still have not fully crystallized. This state of affairs is well expressed by the term "post-communism" which puts the emphasis more on *the type of system which we are moving away from rather than the one we are aiming for*.

The above description of post-communism is oversimplified however. Above all we do not know the final destination and shape of the emerging model. The transformations taking place in Poland are to lead the country to a market economy, parliamentary democracy, and a civic society. These are the aims of Solidarity's program which is the country's dominant political force.²⁸ There is a basic lack of clarity however about what these aims mean in practice and how they will be achieved. It is in this area that problems of legitimacy appear which I will discuss later. A further simplification in the above attempt to define the post-communist period is that it is not wholly clear in what sense we have really entered onto the post-communist stage. There are many indications that the system has undergone more rapid erosion in the formal, rather than in the deeper social, sense of consciousness and institutional traditions. This inheritance also causes further problems for legitimation.

In sum therefore, the view that post-communism signifies the simultaneous absence of both the old and the new system, and that it is a transitory process in the strict sense of the absence of any system, needs to be modified. We know, after all, the basic shape of the final model while at the same time basic remnants of the previous one survive in the social-institutional system. And - last but not the least - the very post-communist period has shaped its own logic, dynamics, and mechanisms of reproduction.

One of the basic features of the first stage of post-communism in Poland is the changed balance of social forces. It is often said, particularly by journalists, that Poland together with the other East

²⁸ Cf. the draft "Uchwała Programowa II Zjazdu Delegatów NSZZ Solidarność" in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 23 March 1990.

European countries, has moved from communist domination to political pluralism, in other words from a monocentric to a polycentric system. It is true that this would appear to be the basic direction of the evolution. A more precise examination, however, provides a somewhat different view. The previous state was admittedly monocentric in the political sense but on the social level there was a dichotomous balance of forces of the "them and us" type. At the beginning of Post-communism the situation was not so much that pluralism has been achieved but that one of the pillars of the dichotomy, communist domination, had been removed. This was admittedly an indispensable breakthrough on the road to pluralism as it constituted a fundamental barrier. All the same one can regard the first stage of transformation not as a *movement from monocentrism to polycentrism but rather as a change from a state of full to peculiar dichotomy in which one of the pillars vanishes* (as I put it in the chapter 2.2).²⁹ This provides a more accurate definition of the transitional post-communist stage. The balance of social and political forces which characterizes this period of imperfect dichotomy and an absence of clarity as to how the political scene was to be filled was also the source of legitimation problems.

In discussing legitimation in the previous chapter, I was concerned with the analysis of normative sources, the principles on which people accept and subordinate themselves to the existing institutional system.³¹ Legitimation, understood in this sense, affects three levels of social reality on which its appearance can be examined. Let us review them: the first is the ideological level, in other words the basic principles of the system. The second is the institutional level, mainly political but also economic insofar as it concerns the systemic aspects. The third level is that of "everyday reality," where relations towards the system are expressed in the behavioral sense of support or rejection. The objection

²⁹ The results of CBOS surveys on the political preferences of Poles reflects the remarkably non-symmetric balance of political forces in which the only significant one is Solidarity; "Panorama polityczna w społecznej świadomości 1990" in *Komunikaty z badań CBOS* (Warsaw, January 1990), p. 2.

³⁰ According to Jadwiga Staniszkis in *Tygodnik Solidarność*, no. 1, 1990, the legitimacy gap is caused by the absence of an opponent. In this chapter I will concentrate on the other reasons, apart from the absence of an opponent, for the legitimacy gap.

³¹ The Weberian view of legitimation as a normatively based form of obedience is widely accepted by analysts of communist countries. Cf. Krisch and Rigby, in Rigby, Feher (1982); Lamentowicz (1988).

can however be made that it is difficult to talk of legitimation here, as the relationship towards everyday existence is expressed rather more by a type of pragmatic permissiveness. Let us note however that on this level one can see the normative building of support.³² Full legitimacy is a state in which the axiological norms and institutional rules of the system are accepted and where behavioral submission to the latter is based on an acceptance of the fundamental norms of the system. This is therefore a situation in which the claims to legitimacy formulated by the authorities are recognized as justified on all three levels of reality.³³

The problem of legitimacy has been a popular subject in Polish sociology for some time and its salience is now even more justified. Until the collapse of communism the profession concerned itself with the issue of obedience towards the authorities. It was inferred that obedience stems from other sources. The significance of the analysis of legitimacy up till now has been, therefore, the inevitable conclusion that communist power was not legitimized, which I analyzed in the former chapter. This had political significance as the whole doctrinal system was based on the premise that it was legitimate. Consequently, discussions of legitimacy often became the victims of either formal censorship or other forms of discouragement. The problem can currently be approached in a completely different, and one would have thought deeper, manner. One can enquire freely into the sources and forms of legitimacy and also into the new problem of the legitimacy crisis and the identity crisis associated with it. *Insofar as the crisis previously stemmed simply from the absence of sufficient bases of legitimacy current legitimation problems are caused by the inadequate application of forms of legitimation to the program the implementation of which started in 1990.*

This is the main difference between the communist and post-communist legitimacy crisis. The first one was analyzed in the former chapter. My main thesis was that active adaptation mechanisms

³² Weber emphasized the behavioral aspect of legitimation in his writings, cf. Weber 1978. W. Wesołowski clarifies some of Weber's inconsistencies on this aspect of the behavioral and normative application of legitimation concepts. Cf. Wesołowski 1988, pp. 39-41.

³³ I follow Weber here in accepting that the recognition of these demands as justified is the basis for the existence of a state of legitimacy between rulers and ruled. (Weber 1978, p. 214).

were the main substitutive mechanisms for the legitimacy. In this chapter the legitimacy crisis in the first post-communist period will be analyzed. One of the theses which I will present in this chapter is that there is an evolution of the forms of adaptation. During the decline of communism *active adaptation* was the dominant form while in the first phase of post-communism the main mechanism was *passive tolerance* (or passive support).

The problem of legitimation, its chances and the threats to it in the new situation, boil down to the basic question; in what way could the new socio-political order created by the Solidarity government be legitimized? Could this government base itself on the inheritance of the workers' revolt against the pathologies of socialism as a justification for its program of fundamental systemic change?

I believe that an answer to this question can be supplied by the blockages of the legitimation process in Poland. I formulate the problem as two preliminary theses which I will attempt to substantiate:

Firstly, there is a certain paradoxical contradiction between the existence of a government which enjoyed a high degree of confidence, and which therefore had a basis for legitimacy denied to the previous communist authorities, and the existence of certain blockages to legitimation.

Secondly, these blockages were caused because the first Solidarity government was creating a system which has no clear addressee and which could no longer be legitimized by Solidarity symbolism without changing its identity. It is possible that difficulties in creating this institutional order and in introducing this system stem from this. This thesis suggests that the legitimation problems of the new order concern three aspects, social, institutional, and symbolic. Basically they reflect the three earlier mentioned levels of reality: ideological, political-institutional, and everyday-behavioral. These three levels therefore, encapsulate my thesis on the subject of the blockages and the legitimation potential of the new order.

The dilemma of legitimation mentioned in the second thesis, which is in this sense characteristic of the transitional post-communist period, is that the pluralist-market order now established is difficult to justify in terms of an inheritance arising from the struggle, not so much against socialism itself, but against its pathological and deformed aspects, out of which to a considerable extent Solidarity was born in 1980. That is

why some programmatic documents emphasize so strongly that the basic ideas of the 1989-90 breakthrough were already present in the Solidarity program of 1980-81. It was, after all, an attempt to fill in the "legitimacy gap" between the Solidarity of 1980, when it was only a trade union, although admittedly one mainly so in a formal sense as in reality it was much more, and the Solidarity of early 1990, which is a force fundamentally rebuilding the whole political and economic system.

The analysis of legitimation problems in such a heated and changing political period is weighed down with the danger of rapidly becoming out of date. At the same time the need for attempting to interpret and to give some sense to the ongoing changes becomes stronger. It would appear to me that the solution to this problem is that one should accept a narrower time-scale for the analysis. This is, therefore, an analysis of legitimation problems in post-communist Poland, defined in the earlier terms as a period of imperfect or peculiar dichotomy. This time-scale therefore, establishes it in a specific historical period which to some extent safeguards it from becoming out of date (from the June 1989 elections to the middle of 1990). This will cover the first phase of post-communism and this is the period analyzed in the chapter. However, many theses still apply to the next phases taking place in the years 1991-93. It would also appear that the legitimation dilemmas of the post-communist period, although hopefully transitional ones, are, however, highly significant for all European countries, and not only for those of the East.

The structure of my chapter is as follows: first, I will present a short analysis of the reasons for the collapse of the communist order, based on the concept of legitimation. Next, I will present a hypothesis on the type of legitimacy which dominated the first phase of the post-communist period. This section of the chapter is devoted to a more detailed examination of the two theses presented above on the problem of legitimacy. Finally, I will deal with the consequences of the dilemmas of legitimation for the identity of the whole social order.

3.2.2. WHY DID THE OLD ORDER COLLAPSE?

The main reason for the fall of the old order was the exhaustion of its main stabilizers, which one can recognise as a pragmatic "active"

adaptation strengthened by the external situation of the country and the possibility of using force within it.

By "pragmatic adaptation" I mean that other stabilizers existed apart from force. What I have in mind is the whole of the "grey area" between naked force and full legitimacy. This grey area, made up of various informal and everyday adaptive activities moderating the sharpness of the "them and us" division contributed to the stabilization of the situation by making it more bearable for people and more socially grounded, as I described in the preceding chapters.

I will examine the reasons for the breakdown of the sources of stabilization under a number of headings; I will describe the decreasing effectiveness of adaptation strategies and the collapse of the legitimation system among the elites as well as the continuing absence of legitimacy within society. I will leave changes in the international system out of my analysis although they had a fundamental influence on the course of events within Poland. I will however indicate the significance of the road taken by the Polish communist elite in what led up to the breakthrough.

The adaptation strategies ceased fulfilling their stabilizing role, as all such informal processes need resources for their effective functioning.³⁴ For example, the whole sphere of the second economy cannot fulfil basic stabilising functions without a minimum of efficiency by the first economy. Further, trips abroad which basically functioned outside the system were available, but not for everybody. The same remark applies to work "for oneself" outside the framework of the state economy. All these processes naturally affected the kernel of the official system and, what is more they can appear currently in new forms in fulfilling adaptive mechanisms for the difficult economic program (Kolarska-Bobińska and Rychard 1992). According to some new data, the majority of these informal adaptation processes have survived, though they changed their form. For example, the prices in the black market now are lower than those in the normal market. This is the only way for the black market to be competitive. This is quite contrary to the

³⁴ R. Turski has formulated the thesis that one can speak of the two types of transformational and adaptive capacities of the monocentric system. While agreeing with the author that the system lost its transformational capacity to the greater degree one can assume that in the final analysis the cause of its downfall was also the loss of its adaptive capacity. Cf. Turski (1989).

situation in the communist era: goods on the black market were more expensive because there was a scarcity of them in the normal "official" market (Bednarski 1992). Generally, according to the same author, the second economy during communism was of an "antisystemic" character and is now located more inside the market system. This would confirm one of my theses (chapter 1) that some sources of changes which were located outside system, on its peripheries, are becoming a part of the core of a system. They could not substitute for a fundamental change in the kernel of the system itself. However, they contributed to its erosion.

As I mentioned earlier, a certain role in breaking the old order was played by a decline in belief in its legitimacy within the previous communist elites themselves. The institutional system was stabilized not only by informal adaptation strategies used by ordinary people but also by the elites. I hold that the basic reason for the breakdown of the former regime was its increasing inefficiency among the elites as well. This led to the destruction of belief in legitimacy amongst these groups. One can defend the thesis that the legitimacy crisis stemmed not so much from the decline in legitimacy amongst the masses, as this was always insufficient, as from the gradual erosion of this belief in the eyes of the communist elites. I will illustrate this point by referring to theoretical conceptions as well as to certain empirical studies.

I agree with A. Heller when she writes, basing herself upon Weber, that "a social order is legitimated if, at least, one part of the population acknowledges it as exemplary and binding" (Heller 1982). According to this conception a legitimacy crisis only leads to the downfall of the system when it is not legitimated even by communist party members and the rest of society accepts an alternative order. One can also cite A. Przeworski's belief that the existence of an alternative is an inevitable precondition for the transformation of the authoritarian system (Przeworski 1986). According to a poll carried out in early 1988 the legalization of the opposition was supported by 38 percent of PZPR and 41.6 percent of OPZZ members; the increase of support among these communist party and trade union groups between 1984 and 1988 was somewhat greater than among the rest of the population (Rychard 1989). If one accepts membership of these institutions as an indicator of closeness to the authorities in ideological and worldview terms one can say that the system was de-legitimated in the eyes of a substantial

section of its partisans. One can add that close to 30 percent of PZPR members (28.4 percent) in early 1988 also either wanted a decrease in communist control or were undecided on the issue. Similar findings were obtained by CBOS surveys; beginning from August 1989 PZPR's activity was approved by less than half of its members ("Opinia społeczna..." 1990). The first condition was thus met, as was the second in the form of the existence of an alternative. This role was fulfilled by the movement for change supported and symbolized by Solidarity. Even a third condition - not formulated by Heller - was also realized in that the alternative vision was supported by a substantial section of PZPR members.

The final but most fundamental reason for the breakdown of the old stabilizers was the factor of the almost continuous absence of political legitimacy among the masses throughout the whole of the postwar period. This was the reason why one could in effect talk about a continuing, unextinguished political conflict (Adamski et al., *Polacy 88*). The minute stock of political legitimacy was most clearly manifested in the results of the June 1989 election. But all the same, the legitimacy deficit was already apparent in earlier sociological surveys as demonstrated by the following indicators; the legalization of the opposition was supported by 39.4 percent of respondents in 1984 but by 47.3 percent in 1988. On the other hand the strengthening of PZPR's leading role in the exercise of power never enjoyed the support of more than barely a third throughout the whole of the 1980-88 period; the fraction expressing *desinteressement* in the extent of its power increased all the time. The following figures illustrate this legitimacy deficit further. In 1980 32.8 percent supported the above principle and 11.5 Percent were undecided but the figures for 1981 were 20.4 and 11.2 Percent, for 1984 28.3 and 22.5 percent, and by 1988 they had reached 25.6 and 28.8 percent (Rychard 1989).

Society was conscious, at the same time, that the main stabilizers of the social order were of the negative-pragmatic character (the Possibility of punishment for disobedience and the possibility of an easier life and for various matters to be arranged if one were obedient), as I described in the previous chapter (Rychard and Szymanderski 1986).

In sum therefore, large sections of Polish society appreciated the role of pragmatic stabilizers while at the same time the legitimacy of such

a basic political institution as the communist party was negligible in society and was decreasing, even among its members. A situation in which the low efficiency of the economy caused the ineffectiveness of the pragmatic stabilizers of the institutional system and where the PZPR was deprived of political legitimacy both among the masses and to an increasing extent among its own elites could not survive without change. A breakthrough took place arousing hopes of an evolution towards a democratic and market order.

The above-mentioned factors were essential, though not fully sufficient, in effecting the breakthrough. One should remember the events which led to the breakthrough and which determined its character. The basic change in the system was begun by the Round Table Agreement as a result of which the communists abdicated a significant part of their power. Although later events went far beyond the framework of this agreement one cannot exaggerate its significance. It was unprecedented for the elite in a communist country to agree to an evolution leading to its "self-liquidation." As a result of these agreements a self-generating social movement was initiated whose roots lay in the Round Table even though the extent and depth of the changes soon constituted a qualitatively new reality. These agreements were reached as a result of the compromise between the opposition and the Polish communists.

The reasons for such a decision by the Polish communists will no doubt provide the subject for long academic debate. An important role was surely played by the authorities' realization of the ineffectiveness of the policy which had up till then sought ways of stabilizing the system either through rationalization, reforms from above, or repression. The state of the economy deteriorated and the socio-political conflict remained unresolved. Simultaneously the pragmatic stabilizers, discussed above, exhausted themselves, political support remained absent while the erosion of political legitimacy within sections of the elite began to appear. The group exercising power could not fail to observe these phenomena.

The beginning of the Polish breakthrough through the road of agreement affected its character. It has taken place, so far, in a non-violent way. An important role in leading to this breakthrough has been played by General Jaruzelski. This politician has been able to successfully change his image: from an individual who was mainly

identified with martial law to one who also contributed to leading Poland to full democracy. This basic change would be difficult to believe if it had not really happened. Although he is hardly likely to be a major political figure in the "Poland of the future" his influence on the "non-violent" character of the first stage of transformation in Poland deserves to be stressed. This watershed in the history of Poland is not however free of its own legitimation dilemmas which will be examined in the next section.

3.2.3. LEGITIMATION PROBLEMS IN THE TRANSFORMATION PHASE

As I pointed out one can analyze the legitimacy of a political order on three levels. The first, that of ideological-axiological legitimation concerns the normative bases of the system. The second is the legitimation of the institutions of the system while the third is the behavioral response to the everyday organizational reality of the system expressed in behavior which is based rather on pragmatic adaptation than on legitimacy. I presented and illustrated the thesis that during the communist period the maximum legitimacy deficit was to be found on the second institutional-political level.

How did the situation appear, after the 1989 breakthrough, from this point of view? Where were the bases of systemic legitimation located and where did gaps appear? At the end of 1989 and subsequently one could discover interesting observations in Polish discussions on the subject of the sources of systemic stability after the formal fall of communism. The unusually high level of confidence in the government, despite its introduction of a socially costly and hurtful economic program, was widely pointed out. Until then the communists had had political problems even with individual price rises. The first Solidarity government, however, was still supported by society despite such a drastic economic program. One can explain this phenomenon solely in terms of the social legitimization basis of the new political order.

At the same time that legitimacy exhibited certain characteristics which analysts began to note. Society had a "lover's attitude" towards the government (Dorn 1990). This depended upon an enormous degree of confidence unaccompanied by a similar amount of understanding. One can find a similar conclusion in A. Sułek's report (Sułek 1989). One notes likewise that the government is well served by the social

attitude of passivity and passive permissiveness which, as described by Jadwiga Staniszkis, does not offer people the chance to participate (Staniszkis 1990; Kolarska-Bobińska and Rychard 1989). I would like to take these remarks as the starting-points for further examination.

One can judge that the strongest stabilizers at the beginning of 1990 were an ideological-emotional legitimation as well as the behavioral adaptation which would appear to be expected by the government. In sum therefore, the system's stability was based mainly on the first and third legitimation levels while the second institutional-political level was the most weakly structured. From this point of view one can discern certain paradoxical, if superficial, similarities to the sources of stability and the structure of the legitimation pattern in communist times (pragmatic adaptation and some belief in socialist values) but also fundamental differences.

Above all the legitimation problems associated with the second political level was completely different in nature. The legitimacy deficit on this level stemmed in communist times from the lack of acceptance of the then political order which was rejected by the majority of the population. On the other hand the problem of the first post-communist stage stemmed from the partial absence of the new political order in the institutional sense, although its authors and general bases had mass support. Summing it up less precisely but more graphically *the communist political order existed but was rejected while the post-communist political order still has not been shaped but has been accepted*. Both situations create problems of legitimacy but they differ in type. The problems of communist political legitimacy stemmed from the rejection of the existing and structured reality of the second level, in other words, of basic institutional rules. On the other hand, in the first phase of the post-communist period it was not clear what should or should not be accorded legitimacy. Confidence therefore existed, but the appropriate level of reality to which it should be accorded still has not been shaped.

One can likewise see similar fundamental differences on the first level of basic principles. As I wrote in the former chapter, its role was conditioned during the communist period by the acceptance by a substantial part of society of general socialist ideas such as social justice and equality. All the same, it was difficult to build support for the reality of actually existing socialism on the basis of the acceptance

of such general slogans. Apart from that there was always an attachment in Polish society's system of values to another competing set of Christian and democratic values. The Solidarity government harks back to these traditions. One can suppose that as a result of the erosion of general socialist values that this type of appeal is much more accepted.³⁵ All the same legitimation on this level meets with certain barriers, which I will discuss later.

Finally, in what sense can one talk of the stabilizing role of behavior (the third level) in the post-communist period, insofar as I argued the case in the preceding section, that the exhaustion of pragmatic adaptation was one of the main reasons for the breakdown of the communist order? I view it that we have to deal with the building of a new form of that adaptation in the post-communist period. In the past this stemmed for the most part from the feeling of the lack of alternatives to the existing, although not accepted, order. Post-communist adaptation, on the other hand, is also based on such a feeling of a lack of alternative, but it involved an accepted order. We have, therefore, to deal with obedience on the level of behavior but as it has legitimizing belief behind it it is different from the previous type of pragmatic adaptation.

In other words, referring back to the distinction set out in the introduction, the communist system was based on some ideological belief, institutional rejection, and acquiescence on the behavioral level. Whereas in the post-communist situation strong belief exists on the ideological level (albeit with some problems), legitimizing belief also exists on the institutional level (even to a greater degree than the actual existence of the structures themselves) and on the basis of behavior; the latter can be exemplified by the sentiment that one has to be obedient, however difficult it may be, because it is "our" government. This last type of legitimating belief does not refer back either to the ideology of the new government or its institutional program; but it is also something more than unthinking acceptance, the form of obedience defined by W. Wesołowski (1988, p. 42). He writes that in this type of behavior the central feature is the unthinking "one

³⁵ According to CBOS data 9.8 percent of society considered in January 1987 that the socialist system had brought Poland more harm than good; the figure increased to 13.9 Percent in May 1987 and 37 percent in July 1989; "Opinia społeczna... 1990".

has to" (which refers to the demand for obedience). During the first phase of post-communism the central feature in the formulation "one must be obedient, even though it is difficult, *because it is our government*" was the italicised phrase. The stress put on the word "our" empowers me to describe this type of behavior as reinforced, legitimizing belief.

The common feature of both communist and post-communist stabilizing mechanisms on the behavioral level is however the feeling of rather weak participation in political life.

One can use the following arguments in order to justify this thesis. Modern legitimacy is based on active political support. Public opinion polls continued to show that support declared for the authorities was high (for example 76 percent had confidence in the government in December 1989) ("Nastroje społeczne..." 1989). But at the same time the population could not participate actively in this support and this did not change substantially in the years 1990-93. One can hypothesize that the difference between potential support and the weak possibilities for its mobilization would occasion tension. The danger was that one of the ways of reducing this tension will be the withdrawal of support. It is true that it did not happen during the first phase of post-communism.

The first precursor of the problem of maintaining support during that time was the clear increase in feelings of uncertainty and in the the percentage of people foreseeing social tension. This rise was noted by CBOS between November 1989 and January 1990. Apart from that, according to the same institute's findings between February and March 1990, the percentage of those considering that it would be possible to liquidate the crisis in Poland with five years fell from 63 to 52 percent; one also noted a certain falling-off in support for the government's economic program (which I described in the subchapter 2.2) (*Gazeta Wyborcza* 1990). It naturally does not follow that the basic reason for this wavering in political support was the tension caused by the impossibility of expressing this support in an active way. It is possible that a much greater role was played here by the hardships caused by the government's economic programme. Apart from that, some falling off in support could result from the insufficiencies of the institutionalized opposition to the Solidarity movement. In this critical situation discontent which could not find an institutionalized outlet could express itself well in a general falling-off in the level of support for the Solidarity program.

The hypothesis of the existence of tension between potential support and the impossibility of mobilizing it is therefore only one of a number of possibilities. Various indicators suggest that this state of passivity suited society. A CBOS report concludes, on the basis of its relevant surveys, that "one can in addition surmise that the 'pro-Solidarity' view expressed by the majority of society indicates a sympathetic and friendly favored sports team type of support rather than a readiness to join in actively in the movement or to tie oneself organizationally to it" ("Panorama polityczna..." 1990, p. 7). Similarly other authors pointed to the emergence of a strategy of passively waiting for the changes taking place to work themselves out, especially in the economic sphere (Staniszki 1990a; Rykowski 1990).

The fact that one can arrive at a certain consensus between the government and society on the basis of mutual agreement on passivity did not, however, rule out potential tensions but it could, at most, postpone the time of their appearance. It is inevitable that they will be born since the ongoing implementation of the program of fundamental transformation can only succeed under conditions of societal mobilization on the political, economic, and civic dimensions. In my opinion one can therefore see here the emerging outlines of conflict between a type of mobilized support (passive-emotional) and the program whose support depends upon support of a different, rational-active type linked with political, economic, and social participation. The results of social surveys carried out in Poland enable us to support such a thesis. They indicated that the authors and promoters of the change enjoyed more support than the program of change itself.³⁶ The emotional dimension therefore counted for more than the rational one. Here again one can call on the following survey findings in support; 56.3 percent supported the privatization program but only 10 percent knew what it entailed (*Gazeta Wyborcza* 1990).

It would appear that one can formulate the conflict discussed in the above thesis in the following terms: the institutional system in the first post-communist phase in Poland was stabilized rather more by values (the first legitimation level) than by interests which could express

³⁶ This is in effect a reversal of the situation during the communist period when the communist reform program enjoyed more support than its authors. Cf. OBOP 1989 communique and CBOS communique "Społeczna ocena i przewidywane następstwa programu Balcerowicza" (Warsaw 1990).

themselves in the institutions of the political and economic structures (the second level). At the same time the Solidarity government was implementing a program which could only succeed if interests are mobilized to work within these structures. This was the source of the most important contradiction of the transitional period which give birth to legitimation problems. Support based on emotional belief rather than on rational understanding is somewhat brittle and open to manipulation. Political and economic interests provide a more reliable basis but these are far from being organized and institutionalized in post-communist Poland. In this way I return to one of my earlier arguments, that in spite of the considerable "potential" for legitimation, basic problems may emerge in this field. In other words it is difficult to set a rational legitimacy into motion which is based on the negotiation of interests and the acceptance of divisions and conflicts. This is going to change during the second phase of post-communism which will be described in the last chapter of the book.

Passive support during the first phase of post-communism had in common with the communist times low participation in political life. This passivity was, however, supportive of reform, as I described in the chapter 2.2. The difference between communism and the first phase of post-communism is, in my opinion, that "active adaptation" mechanisms modifying the official rules were not very widely used after collapse of communism. They survived (and I will deal with them later on) but the dominant orientation was passive support. The reason for this was that the rise of normative legitimacy after the collapse of communism and resulting from it submitting of the individuals' and groups' needs to the general support for the first "our" government. We can pose a thesis that from the point of view of the dominant strategies *there was an evolution from the "active adaptation" strategies during the decline of communism to the "passive support" strategies during the first phase of post-communism.*

I will now move on to my second main thesis for this chapter, which is that the transformations proposed by Solidarity did not find institutional and social support for their implementation but in practice could only be based on Solidarity symbols and ideology. This thesis applies mainly to the first phase of post-communist. However, many peculiarities of the post-communism institutional structure last for a longer period of time. The Second Solidarity cannot be easily based

on the ethos of the First. Three types of legitimacy gaps or deficits consequently arise: the institutional, the social, and the symbolic, which correspond to my three legitimation levels, and whose coexistence cause basic problems for the identity of the order as a whole. I now move on to discuss these three types of problems.

I will begin with the problems connected with the *institutional structure*. It would appear that the basic transformations taking place in the first phase of post-communism were not supported by a sufficient rebuilding of the political and economic institutions. Consequently, it was difficult to examine the legitimacy of the system on this level as it was the least structured. The idea of economic planning has been challenged but fundamental institutional changes still have not taken place. Analysts point out that the first post-communist government maintained the whole industrial structure inherited from communism and that nothing constituting the kernel of the Polish economic firm had been changed (Kisiel 1990; Wesołowski 1990). A fundamental change will be introduced here by the privatization program but this is a long term task and is the basic measure for changing the economic system. Without going into detail, one can point out that according to expert opinion privatization will not of itself resolve the problem of large scale Polish enterprises; what is necessary, in addition, is a program for a whole range of other, not solely privatizational, property transformations.

The basic insufficiencies of the institutional structure in the transitional phase were also apparent in the political sphere. They stemmed primarily from the character of the transition which I defined earlier as one of peculiar dichotomy. The dissolution of the PZPR meant the disappearance of the basic institution against which Solidarity had defined itself.³⁷ Such a situation meant that the problem for Solidarity was no longer whether it should institutionalize its participation in politics, but merely how this should be done. Should it allow the appearance of specific political parties under the Solidarity banner working outside the trade union structure? One can suppose that this solution would maintain the situation in which politics in

³⁷ Such views were expressed at the sitting of the Economic Council attached to the Council of Ministers in February 1990.

³⁸ Jadwiga Staniszkis, as mentioned earlier, discusses the "legitimacy gap" caused by the disappearance of Solidarity's opponent in *Tygodnik Solidarność*, no. 1 (1990).

Solidarity took on both a trade union and a "civic" aspect; as it did not have its own specific place, confusions and problems of identity would arise. The political splits inside Solidarity and the creation of the multi-party structure in the years 1990-93 has solved some of these problems (as I pointed out in the chapter 2.2 and also in the last chapter). But generally, the institutional weakness of the transformation is a rather stable phenomenon.

It is a certain paradox that Solidarity's relative weakness as an organized political force was revealed at the moment when it took over power. Delays in forming the bases for a new "political class" hampered the transformation towards democracy. The absence of an organized political base increased the chance of social support for various types of political visionaries who might, for example, attempt to beguile society with the vision of a strong central power ensuring order. The problems which appeared on this score had therefore a legitimizing character *sensu stricto*; this applies where in institutional terms Solidarity's symbols and inheritance are most localized.

Quite apart from the question of how the Polish political scene will be filled in and energized, one can question the degree to which Polish society was (is?) ready to fill this political vacuum. It is really not known whether strongly crystallized and socially supported political options exist. The authors of the above-mentioned CBOS report argued that basic political options in Poland were still in an embryonic stage and that one should view the Solidarity movement not only from its political aspect but rather as having "the leading-role" in the new political order from which in the future clearer political orientations will emerge (Staniszki 1990a, p. 25). It would appear that many of the problems involved in filling the political scene still stem from Solidarity's emergence primarily as a moral protest against the deformations of socialism. It never had a crystallized political program because that was not its role. It was to a certain degree the child of the communist system and although it buried it, it found it difficult to discover its identity in this new phase when the system which created it no longer existed. I hold that Solidarity in moving from the "romantic" to the "political" phase did not have a conception of what aspects of its identity it should preserve and which it should change during these fundamental transformations. It was also unclear how society received these transformations and it could only succeed with its active

participation. Many people would doubtless like to see a clean moral force in Solidarity just as much as an effective actor on the political scene. Although these are not wholly contradictory expectations, the working out of political conceptions which are strongly grounded both on moral principles and interests is a difficult task.

The period of functioning of the framework of "imbalanced dichotomy" caused legitimation problems. This framework signified the absence of political opposition which would also be legitimate. In such a situation criticism did not have an institutional expression, and as I wrote earlier, it had to inevitably be directed in a generalized way against the Solidarity Government. In this way "imbalanced (or-imperfect) dichotomy" provoked legitimacy problems for Solidarity itself. When I write of "legitimate opposition" I want to emphasise that anti-Solidarity criticism directed from a communist position, although legal, was - and is - not perceived as legitimate by large groups in society. Another road still is not however fully shaped to a sufficient degree at the moment. A non-communist and non-Solidarity opposition is still rather weak in terms of program.

Independently of the lack of clarity of Polish political structures and of the place occupied within them by Solidarity one has to say that this structure was very effective in coping with possible conflicts caused by the implementation of hard economic measures during the first phase of post-communism. The absence of divisions between Solidarity's trade union and political sections resulted in all conflicts becoming internal ones. Apart from the already mentioned negative aspects, this also had some good consequences. Since in this way the possibility of a new conflict of the "them and us" type was diminished because, after all, divisions were within the family (between us). The existence of common origins and symbolism meant that the Solidarity government not only expected support from the Solidarity trade union but also received it, passively at least. This mechanism worked during the whole first phase of post-communism, and also during 1991 and - to some extent - even in 1992. In sum, therefore, the amorphous and unclear structure has shown itself very effective in absorbing conflicts and in mobilising the mass electorate. Such results do not seem to have occurred in other post-communist countries. They are, admittedly, rebuilding the pluralism of political parties but these organizations have often failed to gain much support.

The next factor causing legitimation difficulties is that the program introduced by the Solidarity government did not have a clear social addressee, or more precisely, social forces which would become its main promoter and protector. In this way one should add to the previously discussed legitimacy problems on the institutional level those on the everyday organizational level although this remained one of the basic stabilizers. This stabilization was, however, based above all on obedient behavior, which as defined earlier, was endowed with legitimating belief. The stabilization was based to a lesser degree on active support stemming from the possibility of realizing one's own interests due to the introduction of the program. As W. Wesołowski observed "there are no bearers of the process of economic reforms definitely interested in its success. Neither a group of 'laborious Puritans' is emerging nor a set of devoted 'captains of industry.' Almost all strata of the working class are very confused about the future, and they are very silent" (Wesołowski 1990, p. 12).

Solidarity grew out of the working class revolt and assumed its primary form as a trade union. It would therefore appear obvious that the main force promoting its program would be the *workers*. From the beginning, however, this program, at least in its government version, can present a threat to workers' interests because of the pressing need for the restructuring and privatization of the economy which raises the possibility of unemployment. According to a March 1990 survey, 39 percent of employees in state enterprises took the possibility of losing their jobs into account (it is unclear however what proportion of these were manual workers) (*Gazeta Wyborcza* 1990). Apart from that, workers, because of their involvement in the existing economic and management structures where wages depended primarily upon the effectiveness of the political pressure exerted by the "large industry" class, could and still can effectively block change by using their trade union representatives directly for this purpose (Celiński 1989). For many activists of the last phase of strikes in summer 1988, as pointed out by P. Szwajcer, the new Round Table identity of Solidarity associated with compromise was unattractive (Szwajcer 1990).

The possibility of a conflict between the revindication and pro-reform currents in Solidarity has been noted for some time. In 1989-90, however, these conflicts found their outlets in some sort of institutional division between the two currents. However, the result of

the tension was inevitably transferred to the whole Solidarity movement hindering the legitimation processes of the ongoing transformation as it was not very clear what symbolism one could appeal to. Solidarity could not however break free from its basic clientele, the workers, and at the same time proposed a program which aroused the feeling of threat within it. I consider this to be one of the basic contradictions of the first transitional period (1989 - middle 1990). The weakness of the trade union current within Solidarity was one of the consequences of this contradiction; as a result it was difficult to view the workers as the primary promoters of the ongoing transformations, at least in the short term perspective. One should not forget however that a large section of the workers might still retain the memory of the summer 1988 strikes; after all it was thanks to them that Solidarity's re-legalization, and much more, was gained. Feelings of frustration could, on the other hand, be all the greater among the workers. I would say therefore that the mere fact that this group refused to go on strike is a significant indicator of programmatic support and that it was and still is difficult to expect any more.

It was also difficult to see strong support for the program by the peasants. On the contrary, various peasant groups often demonstrated their dislike of government measures and pointed out the threat to their interests.

The question of support for the changes taking place by representatives of the so-called intelligentsia stratum can be interpreted in various ways. A large section certainly supported the political transformation directed at building a civic state and society. But large groups of white collar workers, specialists and large numbers of intellectuals would appear to be feeling the threat to their material interests posed by basic aspects of the economic changes. Among these processes one did not see the slightest sign of the liquidation of the material deprivation of these groups (which was exceptional in Poland even when compared with other communist countries). No radical change in the material situation of the intelligentsia and specialist groups has been proposed till now. The Marxist dogma of the lesser value of so-called "non-material" production still seems to weigh over economic life in practice. On the other hand, the quite contrary myth of the marketization and economization of life (which has the same consequences) was and is present; again this type of activity is treated rather as a cost than as an essential investment for transforming Poland into a modern country. Opportunities were therefore being wasted for

turning representatives of this group into one of the main motors of the ongoing transformation. To sum up, this group has found itself in a rather schizophrenic situation from the very beginning of post-communism (one to which, one may add in passing, it is quite accustomed); on the one hand systemic values move it to support the political changes while the threat to its economic interests inclines it towards caution in real support for the economic changes (despite their declaration in favor of it). This schizophrenia is also not a specific characteristic of the intelligentsia. Similar tensions also affect other groups such as the workers. The differentiated attitude of the first Solidarity government towards the intelligentsia certainly flowed from the fact that the so-called ex-nomenklatura group was situated within its ranks; the authorities did not work out their attitude towards it. That is why one heard such diverse postulates from various quarters ranging all the way from the total turnover of the administrative apparatus to its complete maintenance. In reality no differentiating mechanism in relation to these groups has been worked out with the aim of winning over its most valuable section, notably the industrial enterprise directors. Such initiatives as Senator Machalski's were somewhat exotic on the Polish political scene (Machalski 1990).

Finally, let us examine quickly the argument that private entrepreneurs could become the group promoting the new transformations in the first phase. One should note at the outset that, even if this were possible, this was too small a group to have a decisive impact on the outcome of the changes. But even this group, faced by the fiscal policy, lacked motivation to support the transformation. Apart from that not all of them had a developed pro-Solidarity ethos which would allow them to support the transformation on the basis of values.

In sum, therefore, the program, whose authors enjoyed such enormous social support, did not have forces behind it who could become its main promoters.³⁹ It is possible that this really was

³⁹ According to OBOP findings in December 1989 (communiqué, "Nastroje społeczne w grudniu 1989 r.") confidence in the Senate, Sejm, government and Solidarity ranged from 72.1 to 76 percent. However it is clear from CBOS surveys in January 1990 that, in comparison with November 1989, general disquiet was growing as was the number of those foreseeing increased tension. This may have indicated certain difficulties in maintaining this level of support, CBOS communiqué, "Nastroje społeczne w styczniu 1990 r."

a general-societal program, as it did not emphasise the interests of some selected group. Let us note that this program aroused certain groups, alas mainly in a defensive direction. It has mobilized and structured the interests antagonistic to it but its activities did not lead to the appearance of interest groups benefiting from this program during its first phase. The characteristic feature of this transitional period is that support for the program resulted more from the sharing of common values than the satisfaction of group interests. On the other hand the program's opponents integrated themselves rather on the basis of threatened interests than of values. *The situation, in which supporters were united by values, and opponents rather by a community of interest, hindered the effective introduction of the changes.*⁴⁰ This made the dangers all the greater as the basis of the transformation program was the mobilization of political and economic interests. The above observations are yet another argument for the case that during the transition period systemic legitimation on the first level of the acceptance of general norms and of an emotional attitude towards the government was more important than legitimation on the second institutional level designed to produce rational methods of satisfying and resolving interests.

Let us not forget that the difficulty of identifying the promoters of the transformation within traditional conceptions of the social structure (which I carried out in my examination of the attraction of change for workers, intellectuals, peasants, the nomenklatura, and private entrepreneurs) is not proof that forces supporting the program did not exist. During the last decade it turned out, more than once, that the traditional stratification concept of the social structure was inadequate to describe Polish reality. Nor can one rule out the possibility that a process of de-structuring the old order was taking place which could give birth to new social forces which would not fit into what have hitherto been the structural conceptions. In short, it was - and is - possible that these groups already exist, or have been beginning to form, but that we simply are incapable of naming them. If

This phenomenon may assume two forms. Firstly, the supporting groups may integrate around values while the opponents would do so around interests which would give birth to social tension. Secondly, these same individuals are often inclined to support change because of their values even though this threatens their interests; such a situation would naturally give rise to tension on the individual level.

it appears that the support of the program because of values and the opposition to it because of interests has hindered the structuring of the forces promoting change then it does not follow that this will be so in future. Divisions and integration according to values may appear structural but it may emerge in the near future as the spine of new basic divisions in social structure around which interests will also concentrate. A Polish press commentator on economics observed that the first Solidarity government had to begin to offend specific sections of society, and not everyone as in the past - which was much safer (Jankowiak 1990). While agreeing with this diagnosis, I consider that the replacement of a program by which all gained and lost equally with an ideology by which some will gain and others lose will of itself signify the beginning of the end of the first transitional period. We are witnessing the first signs of this process which I will describe in the last chapter of my book.

3.2.4. PROBLEMS OF THE IDENTITY OF THE NEW ORDER

I have argued so far that the system in the first transitional post-communist period was legitimated mainly on the levels of basic normative principles and behavior. All the same, as I have just demonstrated, legitimacy problems emerged on the behavioral level. They stemmed from the difficulty of basing the program on the crystalized interest of some social group. However, legitimacy problems also appeared on the level of basic principles, although they were one of the major stabilising factors.

It would appear to me that the legitimacy problems discussed up till now on the behavioral and institutional levels were connected with the fundamental legitimation gap concerning the basic principles and symbolism of the new order. The emerging social order, which in the transitional period did not find sufficient institutional supports and group interests promoting it, could only with difficulty be justified and symbolized by what has been Solidarity's symbolism and ideology. I will devote the last section of this chapter to this problem of the identity of the new order in the transitional period.

The Solidarity government, by creating a social order based on political pluralism and a market economy with an emphasis on privatization, faced legitimation problems. The unity symbolism and

ethos was not particularly useful for validating such a program for a movement basing itself organizationally upon its trade union and strongly exhibiting "social justice - trade union" values. The tensions connected with this appeared within the Solidarity movement in the form of long running discussions on the subject of whether to divide into trade union and reformist sections or to organize around existing political options. The term "social market economy" used by Premier Mazowiecki in his January 1990 speech to the Sejm, although not defined exactly, may be understood as an attempt to reconcile these incoherent elements of identity in order to gain a clearer basis of legitimacy.

The difficulties associated with legitimacy are therefore always the direct consequence of identity problems. The Solidarity movement, in my opinion, arrived at a crisis phase in what have hitherto been its forms of identity; the future of the systemic transformation in Poland depends upon the effectiveness of how it will cope with this stage. This identity crisis has several basic levels which I mentioned earlier but will now recapitulate. *Firstly*, there was the problem of validating political pluralism on the basis of the movement's unity symbolism and ethos. *Secondly*, there were the tensions stemming from the introduction of a market framework by structures growing out of the movement's trade union. *Thirdly*, there was the difficulty of moving on from the romantic to the political phase and of practicing politics in a movement based mainly on moral principles.

In this way, therefore, the thesis on the identity problems of the new order constitutes a generalization of the arguments concerning the legitimacy problems on the institutional and social levels. These are, after all, features which are strongly bound together and one should examine their mutual relations. On the one hand, the absence of legitimating symbolism which can bear such a load hindered the undertaking of bold institutional "openings." On the other hand, the impossibility of finding new social clienteles and the difficulty of breaking free from old ones, or more precisely the difficulty of winning over part of the old clientele for the new program, created problems of social support for the program of change. This hampered the development of legitimacy. There are certainly more of these types of bilateral relationships.

I consider that the analytical perspective of legitimation, or of identity associated with it, provides the most appropriate interpretative

framework. This is, after all, in its most general form of classical crisis of legitimacy and identity in the Habermasian sense. This depends upon the legitimizing principle being questioned by political practice. Just as state intervention destroyed the legitimizing principles of the private economy under capitalism, so in the post-communist period the program directed by the Solidarity movement could not find sufficient legitimizing support in its ideological inheritance. This resulted from the fact that Solidarity as a movement for change had a greater legitimacy potential when it grew out of the protest against the communist order. When this diminished, at least in its external forms, legitimacy problems appeared as discussed by Jadwiga Staniszkis. As mentioned earlier, she has identified a legitimacy gap after the disappearance of the communist party in Poland. This arised because Solidarity emerged more as a protest against socialist reality than as the desire for the building of a new order. It grew rather more out of the protest against the deformations of socialism than out of opposition to its very existence. Whereas after the collapse of communism *it was not so much the deformations which were being put right as the very essence which was rejected*. This also caused difficulties in building a positive legitimizing program for the political and institutional structures; in other words - in filling the previously mentioned legitimacy gap.

The consequence of all this was a situation in which the transformation program did not have its own ethos and had institutional shortcomings while on the other hand Solidarity's traditions and ethos were no longer sufficient for the building of new institutions. *A program without an ethos and an ethos without a program — that was one of the dilemmas of the first phase of transformation*. Changes could not be based on the symbolism of the 21 Gdańsk Shipyard strike demands of 1980 while the symbolism of the Round Table was insufficient. All the same, as I wrote in the introduction to this Chapter, efforts were made to demonstrate the "continuity of legitimacy" by stressing that the Solidarity of the 1990's was implementing the program which grew out of the first Solidarity upsurge and inheritance of 1980. The program documents of the Second Solidarity congress pointed out that it had only after 1989 become possible to fulfil the ideas of the Self-Managing Republic and the Address to the Working People of Eastern Europe which had been presented during the First Solidarity congress in 1981 (Sanford 1990).

All the same, the situation was characterized by a certain lack of that integrating element which Mira Marody (1987c) called the "collective sense," or more generally the sentiment of the sense and roots of the change in some coherent vision of the transformation. For many people there was no clear definition of what had happened in Poland. Was this the rejection of communism carried out in a spontaneous manner or was it a change in its form controlled from outside? Was this a change of the system or only a change in elites? It was unclear to what degree a return to capitalism was taking place and to what extent a new order was being built. K.T. Toeplitz expressed it most precisely and accurately in one of his weekly *Polityka* articles when he asked whether we were facing a revolution or a restoration. One can note that the term "capitalism" did not appear in program speeches in 1989-90. The talk was rather of moving towards the modern societies of the West, of parliamentary democracy and market economy, or as mentioned above, of the social market economy. But the general slogans of the market and democracy lost their integrating power and motivation in a situation when they were no longer the only way of expressing opposition to communism and have assumed an independent life of their own. The process by which these slogans are taking on a specific meaning will also be the process of the building of the identity of the new order.

The old order produced powerful forces in the social structure and consciousness as well as in the real economic structure which one cannot change in a day. Their process of adaptation to the new order will certainly be more long drawn out than the speed of the transformation itself. The spectre and inheritance of communism may therefore still hover over Europe for a certain time.

What is more important here is the inheritance than the ghost. Poles are resistant to the ghost, that is, against communist slogans and ideology. When I speak of the inheritance I mean that although we Poles have rejected "external communism," nevertheless "internal communism" has survived. Its legacy remains in several dimensions. Firstly, in the social consciousness, or rather subconscious, in the form of an attachment to certain arrangements which are often not even identified with communism. Secondly, it is an inheritance at the moment in the rules of organized activity which show themselves in such faults as the lack of public involvement, failure to accept the

settlement of disputes, and low regard for the law. Thirdly, this inheritance is present in the social structure in the divisions which still remain within it and the system of group belonging, the distance between them and convictions about the greater or lesser weight of individual groups (for example the devaluation of the role of the intelligentsia) which produces inadequate bargaining power by particular groups in facing up to the challenge of modernity.

The forms of the communist inheritance described above do not only result from the ideological and official form of this system. What is often more important and more difficult to get rid of are the various informal mechanisms inherited from communism which were in effect moves away from it, facilitating the everyday functioning of society; one can cite the role of the whole informal sector and the high degree of permissiveness for various pathologies such as the black market. The communist inheritance is thus also the legacy of the social strategy of "coping with communism" which under conditions of building the new order may become dysfunctional and a hindrance to the transformation (see chapter 2.2 and 4).

The permanence of these phenomena cannot be explained solely by analyzing their political causes. Nevertheless, one of the oft-remarked features of communism was that in an order where politics decided everything there was hardly any real politics and political life. Communism was perhaps not as much a political as a cultural, organizational and social phenomenon. In any case without freeing oneself from its inheritance in these three spheres it is difficult to talk of a modern political legitimacy. Many roads may lead away from the transitional post-communist phase. One of those is the road towards political democracy and the market economy. The effective resolution of the emerging problems of legitimacy increases the chances of entering on that road.

In concluding this discussion I cannot resist the observation that the dynamics of the transformation in Poland have been a continuous series of antagonisms. The system of Real Socialism created social forces which were to support it, but which turned against it and formed the Solidarity movement. This movement in turn created such a program of transformation that it could no longer find sufficient legitimation and social support in its own inheritance and traditions while it could not cut itself away from them, as this would also cause basic problems of legitimacy. These paradoxes will be analyzed in the last chapter.

CHAPTER 4

DYNAMICS OF POST-COMMUNISM: FROM PASSIVE POLITIZATION TO ACTIVE DEPOLITIZATION?

4.1. INTRODUCTION: THE SELF-DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNISM

In the last chapter of this book I will analyze the dynamics of transformation. This chapter will summarize some of the theses on the nature of post-communism. The logic of its first phase, which was analyzed in chapters 2.2. and 3.2 was exhausted and the second phase has started. The crucial features of this logic presented in the earlier chapters are summarized and synthetized here. In terms of the evolution of the social strategies it was a move from active adaptation (the last phase of communism) through passive support (the first phase of post-communism) to the active depolitization (the second phase of post-communism). The last two elements of this evolution will be analyzed in this chapter.

The study of this evolution will concentrate on three levels: the evolution of social strategies, the dynamics of social structure, and the dynamics of institutional structure. In this last section of the chapter I will try to propose a theoretical model of evolution of the institutional structure from the last period of communism to the second phase of post-communism. I will refer there to the concept of the fourfold system as a starting point.

* * *

After the initial, transitory optimism of 1989-90, when the societies of Central Europe were regarded as the source of radical change, the time for analyzing the limits to change has come. There is a growing number of studies of the limits of political and economic transformation in Europe. Among these studies, analyses of the "legacy of communism" as a constraint on transformation are very popular.

The starting point of this chapter is the thesis that the legacy of communism is only one element of the legacy of the past. We really do not know whether it is (was?) communism which is the central element of this history, that is, the element contributing most to our understanding of the constraints to transition. The opinion that communism is the strongest constraint on transition is at this point only a hypothesis, and I am not sure whether it is the best possible one. It may be that other elements of the past are more important (for example the lack of advanced capitalism in the pre-war period and other characteristics important in modernization theory).

But even if we limit the scope of analysis to the legacy of communism (which is the topic of this chapter), we have to discuss next its over-simplified popular understanding, which is the idea that communism means stability, rigidity, and the rejection of change. My idea is quite different: the foundations of communism became turning points and eventually contributed to the collapse of the regime. More precisely my first thesis is that the main sources of change were built into the communist system. They enabled communism to develop, and finally to collapse in the first phase of transition. Communism created its own grave-diggers: the working class.

However, the crucial element is the dynamics of the process of transition. Therefore, my second thesis is in line with the general idea of the book that the factors which were based on communist assets and contributed to the collapse of communism in the first phase, in the second one began to block further change.

Additionally, during the communist era there were many informal mechanisms of modifications to and departures from the official shape of communism (the second economy, informal organizations, corruption, etc). They enabled normal life to exist under communism, and "domesticated" communism. These phenomena simultaneously contributed to the erosion of the system, and made it more deeply rooted in society and in real social interests. Also because of them, the collapse of communism was accelerated, but the second phase of transition would be endangered. This illustrates one of the general theses of my book that some sources of changes which contributed to the collapse of the former system are simultaneously limiting the transformation on the second phase of post-communism.

As a result we can say that one of the paradoxes of communism's collapse lies in the fact that both the core elements of communist regimes and deviations from it contributed to this collapse. Finally, due to the dynamics of the processes of transition, both of these kinds of phenomena (the intended shape of communism and deviations from it) can slow the second phase of change. The "communist assets" which were necessary for the breakdown of the old system may endanger the transformation to a new one.

There are at least two consequences of these assumptions. The first is that the legacy of communism can be interpreted also as a factor contributing to systemic collapse, i.e., the main factor of change (at least in the first phase of transformation). On the other hand, the legacy of deviations from communism (informal mechanisms of coping with the system) can be interpreted as stabilizing factors, slowing the second phase of transformation.

The second consequence is that the transformation process is a dynamic one and that the logic underlying its phases shifts. The main aim of this chapter is to identify the logic of different phases of post-communism and to show what were the main resources activated and mobilized in each of them.

In this chapter, I reject two visions of transformation: the normative and the teleological. According to the first framework, there is a transition from a rigid, centralized, and stable communism to a market democracy based on flexibility, decentralization, and uncertainty. However, in reality, it is not normative communism which collapsed, but real communism, embracing many informalities, and spontaneous decentralization. As a consequence, this is not a transition from normative communism to normative capitalism, but the collapse of "real communism" leading to - who knows where?

The teleological vision of transition is based on the assumption that the transition has a goal - to build capitalism - and that we have to study how reality differs from this model of the future.¹ David Stark

¹ This understanding of the idea of transition is opposite to the classical one in which transition is understood as "transition from" (O'Donnel and Schmitter 1986). (I owe this remark to Schmitter). It is interesting to ask why this classical meaning was replaced by one in which the most popular form is the vision of "transition to democracy" (the so-called "TD" paradigm).

(1992) has shown that this picture is oversimplified and that the concept of transition should be replaced by that of transformation, which is less teleological. Similarly, Machonin (1992) proposes the concept of transformation as opening up more possibilities for sociological analysis. I also reject the teleological vision of transition as a single explanation, but do not reject it entirely.

The period "in between," i.e., the real transitional period, has its own systemic logic and dynamics (Rychard 1991) and analyzing this logic is more sociologically interesting than analyzing deviations from a normative model of capitalism (see Giza and Marody 1992). This is why the concept of transition is not wholly satisfactory. The internal logic of this period is also the reason why I oppose, following Stark (1992), the idea of a "nonsystem" as a description of the transitional period (see Bunce and Csandi 1991). There is a "systemic" logic of this period and an analysis of its evolution during transformation is described in this chapter.

However, my idea is that both concepts - transition, stressing the role of designed change, and transformation, stressing the role of spontaneous, non-goal-directed changes - are necessary and useful. *They describe and explain different stages of change: different in terms of their logic, individuals' strategies, and structures.* The dynamics of social change during the post-communist era can be interpreted as shifting between transition and transformation.

4.2. VANISHING LEGACY OF COMMUNISM AND SOLIDARITY: FROM PASSIVE POLITIZATION TO ACTIVE DEPOLITIZATION OF SOCIETY

The danger of analyzing communism as the source of collapse lies in the fact that, oversimplified, it can be taken to mean that communism collapsed because it was bad and oppressive, because it had to collapse, and would have collapsed without any external opposition. Instead, I am interested in how the internal dynamics of communism created and reshaped the forces which were both the source of change and of collapse. These resources were tapped by Solidarity and were behind the first "transitional movement."

However, in the second phase of transition, these resources were exhausted, and are now being replaced by new ones. This dynamic is described in the present paragraph.

First, we must define in what sense these assets were of a specifically communist nature. There are three main features: (1) they were shaped during the communist era; (2) they were intended to be the main supports of a communist system; and, finally, (3) they were used as tools facilitating the collapse of the regime. These three features in my opinion enable us to call them the resources which represent the legacy of the communist system.

The most important resource which was used by the anti-communist opposition was the special *social alliance* between workers and representativeness of the intelligentsia, which has been analyzed by many sociologists. The frustration of the aspirations of these two groups, which were to some extent shaped by communism, created the social base for the Solidarity movement. The next resource which was mobilized was the *moral integration* of Polish society based on rejection of the communist regime. The legacy of the past was also to some extent represented by the *form of the economic program* adopted by the first non-communist government in Poland. The decision to establish a market economy was made "from above" and the main goals of the first phase of the economic transformation were defined in a "negative" sense (Rychard 1991): hyperinflation was to be avoided, demand was to be constrained. The legacy of the past was reflected in this in the sense that it resembled to some extent the implementation of communist-sponsored reforms. The history of the communist regime in Poland is the history of failed attempts at economic reform. Despite the crucial difference between these attempts and the radical changes which began in 1989, there are some similarities which I presented in the chapter 2.2: the economic program of transformation in Poland was designed and implemented from above. The next resource which was consistent with the form of the economic program was the *type of social support and participation* in the program's implementation. It is clear that Polish society never actively participated in the political and economic life of the communist regime. It tolerated, informally modified, or rebelled against it. Paradoxically, no active participation was expected from the society by the first non-communist government. Due to the restrictive nature of the program, passive tolerance was expected by the authorities, and not active participation as I pointed out in the previous chapters. There is an important difference between this passive tolerance and the passivity of communist times: the first

was based on moral support for change; the passivity of communism was based on lack of alternatives. The support for change was not, during the first phase of transition in Poland, based on activated economic and political interests; there were rather values which integrated Polish society, represented by the Solidarity movement, against the collapsing communist regime. Corresponding with these elements was also *the type of political structure*. Solidarity was acting as a single more or less united political force. There were no new party structures, nor a large socio-political movement.

My thesis is that all these elements created a coherent socio-institutional system and that the consistency among these elements was the core feature of the logic of the first phase of transition. This consistency led to the achievement of the first transitional goals, especially in the economic sphere.

The sociological sense of the collapse of communism and of the first phase of transformation lies in the fact that it enables us to verify some theses related to the nature of systemic change under communism. Staniszkis (1986) posed a thesis of "nontransformative rebellion." Her idea is that massive rejection of the communist regime paradoxically endangers the possibility of its transformation. This is, among other points, the result of the fact that protests against communism share some features with communism, that they are, in a sense, rooted in the old regime. The idea of the "communist assets" used as tools for systemic change, presented here, shows that the socio-institutional forces inherited from communism enabled systemic collapse, and that they were of a dynamic and transformative character. Staniszkis' thesis does not apply to the first phase of transition, because the rebellion was clearly of a transformative character. However, this thesis can apply to the second phase of transition during which the forces and mechanisms which promoted the collapse of the old system endanger the creation of a new one.

The first phase of the post-communist transition lasted from the middle of 1989 (the elections of June 1989) to the middle of 1990 (the beginning of the presidential campaign). In the second half of 1990, the above-described assets were exhausted, paving the way to the second phase of transition. The moral-based passive support was decreasing, some differences of interests between workers and intelligentsia became

apparent, the need for restructuring and not simply stabilizing the economy emerged, and, finally, Solidarity was "diffused" and a multi-party political system started to function. The "old" social forces can potentially block reform: on the one hand, restructuring the economy through privatization is threatening workers in the large state enterprises, and, on the other, the process of forming new economic interests and institutions is very slow. This is a popular vision of the threats to transformation in the region as a whole and is shared by many students of the Polish situation too. However, I am of the opinion that this is an oversimplified picture of the current phase of transition.

The political frustration of the society disappointed by the political fragmentation of the Polish parliament, by the unclear links between elites and masses, and, last but not least, by the lack of job security resulted in a withdrawal from political life. This is reflected in many indicators, among them low electoral turnout. In January 1992, 75 percent of Poles declared medium or low interests in political life (CBOS). The great and growing majority of society is interested more in being effectively governed than in active participation in government (*Poczucie wpływu na sprawy publiczne*, 1992). Such data provoked some analysts to see Polish society as passive.

I would like to take the opposite stance. In my opinion, *Polish society was more passive during the communist period and during the first phase of transition than it is in the second phase*. Low participation in formal "macro" politics does not mean passivity. On the contrary, there are many signs of new forms of social activity. I present some examples in this chapter.

In the area of economic life, the growing number of private ventures should be mentioned. In the period between December 1990 and December 1991, the number of state-owned enterprises decreased by 2.7 percent, while the number of private ventures increased by 25.1 percent (*Biuletyn Statystyczny* 1992). These data show that besides the slow process of massive privatization of the state sector, the so called "small privatization" is going much faster. New private ventures are growing much faster than the "old" state sector is restructuring itself. One reason for this are the problems with the program of mass privatization of the state sector which till March.1993 was not approved by Parliament.

There are also new social phenomena, mainly the growing differentiation of the labor force resulting in an increase in the number of households with more than one source of income (Beskid et al. 1992). On the other hand, the professionally active part of society is decreasing (*Ibid.*). These two facts combined together create quite an interesting situation: there is a growing number of households whose members are working in the private sector and households combining different forms of employment with unemployment benefits. This shows the emergence of new types of divisions within the social structure. It also results in a very interesting phenomenon: that the social position of any given household is determined by a multitude of factors (Sikorska 1992). As a consequence, *we can posit the simultaneous existence of parallel social structures*: any given individual can be unemployed, while simultaneously retired and working part-time in the "second economy." This phenomenon more deeply differentiates the social structure. It is even difficult to say that right now there is one social structure in Poland. The process of "structural diffusion" or the existence of the parallel social structures was also present during the decline of communism. However, the difference is that during that time one "structure" was dominating, and now they are more diffused. Apart from differentiation in economic activity, the growing number of non-governmental organizations, among them many self-help groups, should be mentioned here. There are now about 4500 such organizations in Poland (Sufin 1992).

New processes are also emerging on the level of institutional structures. Despite frequent changes in the political sphere (changing governments), all these governments continued to follow the main line of the economic program which was begun in 1990. "The Balcerowicz program without Balcerowicz" became a popular description of the situation. Additionally, these frequent political changes, some of them dramatic and conflictual, did not affect the economic situation. The political situation was getting worse but not the economic performance. These institutional phenomena were reflected in social consciousness. According to data from the "Demoskop" Public Opinion Institute there is a growing discrepancy between the evaluation of the general situation of the country (which is worsening) and the index of consumer optimism (which is more stable) (*Przegląd* 1992).

Data from CBOS also show that respondents' family situations and workplace situations are assessed as better than the political and

economic situation of the country and that this tendency is stable over time ("Nastroje społeczne we wrześniu '92" 1992). These results reflect the discrepancy between the perception of the macro-political situation and that of the micro-economic situation.

"Economy better than politics, and micro better than macro:" this is the general impression that can be drawn from the results. This shows that there must be some mechanisms for making the situation on the micro-economic level better than the situation on the macro-political level. The "logie of macro" is not merely the reflection of the "logie of micro;" it has its own dynamic. During the communist era too macro-systemic challenges and obstacles were buffered and modified on the micro-level of social life. But there are some new elements in the situation. The fact that despite the worsening political situation, the economic one (and its perception on the micro level) is not getting worse shows that *there is a beginning of an independent, internal dynamics in the economic system. If this hypothesis is true, it would mean that we are witnessing the first result of the transformation, as the weakening of political domination over the economy can be regarded as one of its main goals.*

We can hypothesize that during the first phase of post-communism the "passive-macro-oriented strategy" was dominant, and that during the second phase a new "active-micro-oriented" strategy is emerging (Rychard 1992). The dominant social orientation during the first phase was toward the state: it addressed both expectations and passive support. During the second phase of post-communism, the dominant social orientations are more active. They are also directed towards other social groups and individuals². This is also reflected in the behavior of enterprises: there is a growing horizontal orientation corresponding to a decreasing vertical dependency on the state administration. This phenomena is mainly present among small enterprises, while the bigger ones are still oriented mainly toward the state administration (Federowicz 1992).

The evolution of the logie of different phases of post-communism means shifting from vertical to more horizontally oriented strategies. This is different comparing to the adaptation strategies under com-

² I owe this remark to M. Kofta who formulated it during my presentation of the first version of this chapter in the Institute for Social Studies, March, 1992.

munism, which I described earlier: they were oriented vertically toward the official system. This evolution reflects also the change *from passive politization to active depolitization*. I am of the opinion that the current depolitization can create new politics in the future. This could emerge from below, paving the way for the real emergence of a civil society in Poland. The popular view is that the history of Polish civil society is linked with the history of the Polish anti-communist opposition, and civil society was born together with the Solidarity movement. These are important elements which played their role in preparing the collapse of communism. However, the result was rather passive support for the first phase of transition, as I am trying to show. From this point of view, the present active depolitization is not necessarily an obstacle to the emergence of civil society; it can be a factor promoting it.

The two phases of change described above illustrate the general thesis of this chapter on the relationship between transitions and transformations, and of the usefulness of both concepts. The first phase was of a "transitory" character: change was introduced mainly from above and "tolerant passivity" was a dominant social strategy during it. This covers the period between 1989 and the middle of 1990. Starting from that time more and more spontaneous processes from below began to emerge. This is associated with a withdrawal from official macro-politics, but, as I would argue, this does not mean passivity. This is a real transformative process in which planned and spontaneous phenomena are mixing with each other. The evolution "from transition to transformation" is also an evolution in terms of social strategies: from "state-oriented" to "micro-oriented". In the next part of this chapter I will try to pose some hypotheses about the structural results of the strategies described above.

4.3. THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURES

I would like to start with some hypotheses on the emergence of social interests. The problem of the existence or nonexistence of interests during transformation has been widely discussed. The importance of interests lies in the fact that their existence is crucial for the creation of new social structures. In the disputes among Polish scholars, there are

a variety of positions. In order to clarify them, we can discern four hypotheses concerning interests in the transformative period:

(1) There are no interests in Polish society because of the lack of structures which create such interests. This is a legacy of the communist period in which there were neither real politics nor real economics.

(2) There are interests, but they are "hidden." This means that there are "objective" interests but social groups have not yet discovered what their interests are. People do not see the connection between their strategies and the functioning of the institutional system.³

(3) There are interests, and they are known but these are the interests of the supporters of the old structures and order. The supporters of the new order are integrated on the basis of values and the supporters of the old one on the basis of interests. According to this hypothesis, the supporters of the old, non-market order are not only communists but also "average citizens" who were involved in the old system and accepted it, not ideologically but practically. Many Polish sociologists have noted that one of the crucial features of Polish communism was the fact that the majority of society simultaneously rejected and was implicated in it. Sometimes even the ways in which people tried to reject or modify communism (corruption, informal mechanisms) paradoxically strengthened it. This created the real network of interests which represents one of communism's legacies. According to this hypothesis it is very difficult for supporters of the new order, who are integrated only on the basis of values to destroy this interests-based network. Weak pro-reform values versus strong anti-reform interests is the most important dilemma according to this approach.

(4) According to the last approach there are interests, which are known, and which are the interests of those who support a free-market economy; but these interests have not been socially legitimized. The reason for this is that the interest-oriented supporters of the free-market economy are not regarded as supporters of political democracy. Additionally, the sources of their market assets are perceived as socially unjust. The most important example of such groups are the former "nomenklatura" members who became businesspeople. The exact scope of this phenomenon is not known, but it raises much emotion and many disputes. There is still a tendency to

³ I owe this remark to David Stark.

perceive this way of building capitalism as "non-legitimate" but this tendency is decreasing. The origin of capital counts less and less as the beginnings of a new system are emerging.

The four approaches described above can be used for explaining the first phase of post-communism. The difference between this phase and the second one is that now a fifth approach can be used. According to this, there are emerging interests oriented toward the micro-scale. This is connected with the general hypothesis on the evolution of orientations from a macro- to a micro-scale. These new interests are oriented toward localities, where there are new economic interests as well. Unfortunately, we still do not know how big is the group of people who built their businesses using former communist ties and successfully transferred themselves from "apparatchiks into enterpreneurchiks," to use J. Tarkowski's phrase.

The results of these processes are new divisions in the social structure. These divisions cut across existing structures. It is reflected in the process of creation of the "parallel social structures" which I have mentioned earlier. As a consequence, *we can hypothesize two simultaneous processes occurring in the social structure*. On the one hand, there are some signs of a *dichotomous division* between winners and losers in the transition process. On the other hand, there is the opposite process of the *fragmentation of society* resulting from micro-scale divisions and from the fact that the distinction between losers and winners cuts across existing structures since many individuals simultaneously participate in various social structures.

The consequence of these two processes is the fact that the probability of massive rejection of the transformation is relatively low. We can say that the first phase of post-communism was the last period of massive support (based on a massive rejection of the former communist order). But this means something more as well: *the end of the era of massive support could also be the end of the era of massive rebellion*. This does not mean that there will be no more protest. Fragmented forms, for example local strikes, can coexist with others, such as withdrawal from the official system and, increase in the number of informal arrangements, etc. These forms are not clearly defined, partly because of the fact that now the distinctions between the official and unofficial system are less clear than in the communist era. But this does not mean that these forms of protest cannot be dangerous to the stability of the whole socio-institutional system. *Fragmented and*

unclear forms of protest can be even more difficult to control and can incapacitate the system.

The crucial feature of the newly emerging divisions in the social structure is the fact that the distinction between winners and losers is based on socially unclear rules. Many people see in their closest environment, among their friends and neighbors, that some people are suddenly climbing the social ladder while others are going down. The problem is that the rules underlying the processes of social promotion and degradation are not known. However, this is beginning to change. Some groups and individuals are learning what elements of their accessible assets can be transformed into various forms of social, political, and economic capital. On the other hand, there are groups which are slower in this learning process. I am of the opinion that one of the most important division within the Polish social structure right now is the "cognitive" one *between these who know these rules and know how to implement them and those who do not*. This is also one of the divisions which cuts across traditional social structures. Discovering and describing the social correlates of these divisions seems to be one of the most important tasks for sociologists.

The problem of rules underlying the formation of new social structures brings us closer to the question of institutional structures. The description of the evolution of social strategies (from passive macro-oriented to active micro-oriented) enables me to propose hypotheses concerning the structural consequences of these strategies. The last part of this chapter will be devoted to the institutional consequences of this evolution.

4.4. FROM A SYSTEM WITHOUT A STATE TO A STATE WITHOUT A SYSTEM?

Among the many interpretations of communism was one according to which communism was not a "normal" institutional system but more a deviation, or deformation of some norm. Consequently, it can be assumed that communism had no internal sources for its dynamic because it was artificial and imposed on state and society. As a result of such reasoning, there is an opinion that the destruction of communism will result almost instantly in the recovering of the natural and normal

shape of society which still existed but was hidden under the oppressive armor of communism.

However, the prolongation of the post-communist period has proved this approach to be untrue. Communism had its own sources of dynamic and its own logic of evolution. This logic finally resulted in its destruction, as I argued earlier. To put it briefly and not very precisely, though during communism there was no sovereign Polish state there was a system; there were institutional rules, imposed and oppressive but to some extent socially rooted, at least on the behavioral level. These rules were inefficient and unjust, but they existed. This was a system without sovereignty. Unfortunately, while under communism *there was a system without a state, now we can pose a question whether we have a state without a system?*

A positive answer to this question would be an oversimplification. There are three hypotheses about the nature of the institutional evolution from communism to post-communism.

The first one is that there is a change from rigid and centralized communism to flexible and pluralistic market democracy. We can call this approach normative because it takes the ideological vision of the system as real. It can result in a "teleological" vision of the transition.

The second hypothesis is that there was no any coherent system during communism, just as now, during post-communism there is also no such system. This approach could be called "from one non-system to another non-system."

The third hypothesis is that both communism and post-communism were systems, but in a deeper sense. Communism had its own identity, which was different from its normative vision of itself. However, the deviations from the normative shape, and the many informalities and games embodied in communist institutions, do not mean that communism was not a system. It had its own deeper logic, its own dynamic, and its own mechanisms of reproduction (Mokrzycki 1991, p. 51). Analogously, during the post-communist period there is also a logic and a dynamic, despite the chaos evident at first glance (Rychard 1991). I identified part of this logic and dynamic earlier while describing the rules underlying the two phases of post-communism and the evolution from passive politization to active depolitization.

The first approach is mainly found in non-scientific disputes and in fact reflects the "official" ideology of transition. At the intersection of the first and second hypotheses there is an approach represented by

Bunce and Csanadi (1992) according to which we are witnessing the change from the clear identity of communism to the unclear, chaotic period of a post-communist "nonsystem." David Stark (1992), in arguing with this approach, stresses the fact that during communism as well there was no clear identity but rather a multitude of contradictory meanings, and that now the problem is not one of an "institutional vacuum" but rather of organizational diversity.

In my opinion the fact that real communism differed from its normative vision does not mean that it lacked institutional identity. The lack of a normative identity (or its erosion) does not mean the lack of an identity in a deeper sense. I think that this is the case with post-communism as well: it has its own identity and logic of evolution. This is why I advocate a third hypothesis. In the last part of this chapter I will present some hypotheses about the nature of the evolution of institutional identity between communism and post-communism.

I would like to go back to the concept of a "fourfold system" as an analytical tool for the description of the "real" institutional identity of communism (chapter 3.1). According to this concept, real communism was a dispersed system. It had four main institutional elements: (1) *the official system*, which represented the normative shape of politics and economics and their main institutional rules (the domination of one political party, the prevalence of state-owned industry, etc); (2) *the unofficial system*, which represented the variety of informal arrangements under communism; (3) *the non-system*, consisting of all institutional arrangements which were alien to the normative bases of communism, such as the role of the Catholic Church, private ownership of land in agriculture, and small, private businesses; and (4) *the anti-system*, which represented the anti-communist opposition.

My thesis is that individuals and social groups could not fulfill all their needs in exchanges within any one of these systems (or subsystems). As a result, individuals compensated for their unbalanced exchanges with one system by means of exchanges with another one. For example, material needs unsatisfied by the exchanges with the official state sector were compensated either by exchanges with the unofficial one (the moonlight economy) or by exchanges with the nonsystem (the private sector). The need for information was compensated for by exchanges with the anti-system (the underground press). As a consequence, a system which was unbalanced on the level of its

elements achieved balance on the level of the whole fourfold entity. Thus, the network of exchanges between individuals and among the four systems integrated the system as a whole. *This network of exchange relations was the main source of the systems integrity and the main source of its identity enabling the whole fourfold system to survive, function, and reproduce itself*

In the last part of this chapter, I will try to adapt this model to describe the dynamic of transformation. What were the main elements of the institutional structure of Polish society during the first ("transitional," according to the terminology adopted in this article) phase of post-communism (between 1989 and the middle of 1990)?

The most important division was that between the *new* political structures (and, subordinated to them, the existing state-owned industrial sector), represented by Mazowiecki's government and the *old* ones represented by the communists. Paradoxically, there co-existed with this division some cooperation and interlocking mechanisms between these two structures. This was due to the "Round Table Agreement" according to which both the communists and Solidarity were to share power. The most important division was between old and new, and no substantial division existed between politics and economics: these were the features of the institutional structure of the first phase of post-communism.

In the second phase of post-communism (transformation), which started in the middle of 1990, the situation has been more complicated. The divisions between the elements of the institutional systems are unclear mainly because of the fact that those systems are not very developed. My hypothesis is that one of the most important distinctions during this time is the one between *macro politics* and the *micro-level of everyday life*. There is also a distinction between *politics* and the *economy*, which is a very important one, and new with respect both to communism and to the first phase of post-communism. I described this line of division earlier. To sum up, two lines of division seem to be most important when defining the institutional structure of the second phase of post-communism: the micro-macro line and the division between politics and the economic system, the latter becoming more autonomous.

The evolution of the institutional structure from communism to the second phase of post-communism described above is illustrated in the following diagram.




Diagram 1. The evolution of the institutional system in Poland 1980-93

To summarize the general features of the evolution described in the diagram: in both the communist period and the first phase of the post-communist period, the most important difference is between the communist and non-communist elements of the institutional structure. In both these cases, there is no institutionalized difference between politics and economics. In the first phase of post-communism, economics is still subordinated to the state, albeit to a new state. The difference between these two periods is that during post-communism "the systemic dispersion" is smaller, and instead of four elements we have only a dichotomous division. The evolution *is from dispersion to dichotomization* (but, paradoxically, with some degree of cooperation).

In the second phase of post-communism, the division between the political and economic elements of the institutional system emerged. This division was present neither in communism nor in the first phase

of post-communism. There is also a second division, between the macro and micro spheres of life. This distinction was also present during communism (the well-known inconsistencies between public and private, official and non-official, for example) but during that time, there was a strong conflict between these spheres, while during the second phase of post-communism, there is merely a distinction. This is related to the problem of the evolution of rational strategies, which I will address later.

The most important difference between this phase and the former two is the emergence of a functional division between the political and economic systems. The presence of functional divisions signals an evolution toward modernization, differentiation based on specialization emerges. This is something new: both in communism and in the first phase of post-communism the dominant divisions were of an ideological or political character (old and new, "us" and "them"). *The evolution from ideological divisions to functional ones is the first important step toward pluralism.* There is also an evolution in the direction of these divisions. The ideological divisions were vertical, between "us" and "them," while the functional ones are horizontal. As I pointed out earlier (chapter 3.1), the dominant orientation and frame of reference in the adaptive processes during communism were toward the state: the opposition to it helped in the self-identification of the individual and groups strategies. The orientations during the first phase of post-communism were paradoxically similar. The only difference was that not the opposition but support for the first non-communist government helped social identification. This has changed in the second phase of post-communism. Social orientations are getting more and more horizontally directed, toward other groups and individuals. To some extent, politics matters less and less. For all these reasons we can call the difference between the first and second phases of post-communism the evolution from *dichotomization to pluralization.*

To sum up the nature of the processes described above, we can say that the evolution of the institutional system in Poland during the last two decades can be represented as a shift from ideological dispersion through political dichotomization to the beginnings of functional pluralism.

These are only general hypotheses. The picture described here is certainly simplified. To make it more complex, we must stress several points. First, during communism in the period of a fourfold dispersed system, the borders between systems were more clear than they are

now. Second, during that time, there was one system which dominated the whole socio-institutional order: the official system. This is not the case in the present situation, in which there is no such dominating or prevailing system. Third, relations between the systems now are not as clear. As a result, the network of exchanges is also poorly defined and institutionalized. During communism the "terms of trade" were known, now they are not always known and this is the institutional aspect of the unclear social rules to which I referred earlier.

Further elaboration of this model could provide a theoretical background for the verification of some theses on the dynamic of transformation. For example, Stark has proposed a thesis on the *"...plurality of transitions in a dual sense: across the countries we are seeing a multiplicity of distinctive paths that differ in kind and not simply in degree; within any given country, we find not one transition, but many occurring in different domains -political, economic, and social - and the temporality of these processes are often asynchronous and their articulation seldom harmoniom"* (1992, p. 7). We can adopt this thesis to analyze the temporality of the transitions of the different elements of the fourfold system. It is clear that some of these elements were transformed faster than others.

The next analytical possibility is to study the mechanisms by which particular elements are transformed. Which elements of the fourfold system contributed the most to the emergence of the "new system" in the first phase of post-communism? Which elements of these systems affected macro-politics and which the micro-economy, and how? Some theses on transforming the political capital of the nomenklatura into the economic capital of the new market system can be also analyzed within the framework of this approach (Selenyi 1990). In the diagram I have drawn, arrows show the direction of these transformations, but these are only "hypothetical" directions and should be verified by further analysis.

Institutional evolution during transformation also reflects changes in the relations between macro and micro rules of rationality. During communism, there was a conflict between these rules. Individual or group success was possible only by breaking or avoiding the macro-systemic rules (Rychard 1991a). Under communism, however, these macro-systemic rules of rationality suppressed the micro ones.

In the first phase of post-communism the contradiction between these two types of rules of rationality did not disappear but was only

"frozen." People decided to submerge their own individual interests to the systemic rules. As in the communist era the macro-systemic rules were dominant. The difference was that during the first phase of post-communism, these macro rules were socially accepted, although more as values as than as interests.

In the second phase of post-communism, the difference is that the dominant role is played by micro-rationality rules, while the macro ones are to some extent neglected or do not constitute as important a frame of reference for individuals as they did in the past. There is a chance that new macro rules may emerge from below, as a result of the interplay between different micro rules.⁴

4.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this chapter, I have tried to present some hypotheses on the evolution of post-communism. This evolution can be interpreted as a shift from passive macro-oriented politics to an active micro-oriented society. It is also a shift from transition to transformation, as I argued earlier. Both these concepts are needed to describe the different phases of change.

Each of the phases of change has its own logic and dynamics. I described their three levels: social strategies of individuals, the social structure, and the institutional structure. My starting point was that the legacy of communism is one of both stability and of change. The theoretical framework which I proposed in the last part of this chapter lead to some hypotheses on the institutional effects of the evolution of social strategies and structures. The replacement of ideological

⁴ The present domination of the micro sphere does not mean that the contradiction has disappeared entirely; it reappears in certain concrete situations. One could be the campaign of decommunization. Then the question can emerge: if all communism is rejected, what will people do with their individual pasts? (I owe this remark to G. Kolankiewicz.) The consequence of this is that the more people are pushed to reject communism, the more they are delegitimizing their own past. No one wants to regard his or her previous life as senseless. The psychological tension produced by this process can be reduced in at least two ways. First, the tendency to "reject the rejection" can emerge and result in a weak support for slogans of decommunization. Second, individuals can make an even stronger distinction between their daily life and the macro-system. This strategy can strengthen the discrepancy between the rules of rationality operating at the macro- and micro-levels.

divisions with functional ones seems to be one of the most important features of this evolution.

I would like to end by saying that I hope the evolution from macro-politics to a "micro-society" will result, finally, in the creation of a new kind of politics rooted rather than imposed. This would create new institutional structures, based on new social forces. The process of social change seen from this perspective leads to a final thesis: that the most important transition or transformation lies ahead.

When we adopt this more general perspective, we can see that the ongoing transformation and its two phases are only the beginning of the end of communism. The emergence of a new institutional order which will be the result of the network of micro strategies will be a long process. The crucial question here is whether the institutional system will be capable of encompassing these "new politics" as they emerge from below. If not, the result could be either social unrest, or the withdrawal from the sphere of politics by these new social forces.

The other and opposite danger is that the current shape of post-communism will become "fixed," and the transition frozen, which, since post-communism has its own mechanisms and logic of reproduction, is still a possibility.⁵ This danger is strengthened by the fact that implementation of the restructuring phase of transformation (privatization, new constitution) is taking place much slower than the first, that of stabilization. The first phase of post-communism was rather short. After its logic was exhausted, the logic of the second phase is emerging slowly. Additionally, some new post-communist interests groups have emerged and at least some of them may want to slow down further transformation. These are the reasons why I think that it is quite possible that the current phase of post-communism can be "frozen" and can reproduce itself.

These are two contradictory hypotheses according to which everything is ahead of us - or everything has already happened. Between these two extremes lies the future of Poland's social and institutional systems.⁶

⁵ "When will it be better? It already was." This is the second hypothesis in the form of a joke.

⁶ I am indebted to David Stark, Valerie Bunce, and other colleagues for their comments to my presentations at Cornell University, which form the basis for this chapter. I would also like to thank doctoral students of the seminar on Political Sociology at the Graduate School for Social Research of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology for their remarks and comments.

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